The general principle is clearer than the application of it in some instances. Some method of promoting in a lawful way desired legislation must be permissible; and an unskilled person must have the right to employ a lawyer or other agent to act for him in the matter. Contracts to draft a bill and have it introduced in a legislature can afford no ground for criticism. If the legislature then affords an opportunity for those interested in the proposed legislation to appear before a committee, a contract for the payment for services in presenting the matter to the committee is everywhere valid; but a contract requiring argument with individual legislators even though it was stated that ho improper means should be used to influence them would generally be held invalid. In attempting to urge National legislation, however, no opportunity is afforded those interested to appear before Congressional committees on a large majority of bills which are introduced. The enormous number of such bills precludes the possibility of giving such an opportunity in most cases. It is certainly the practice for individual congressmen to receive In their offices persons interested in promoting legislation, and to hear argument thereon. On these arguments the question whether a committee will even give a hearing on a bill may depend. It should also be observed that the evil guarded against in lobbying contracts is not so much the individual solicitation of legislators as the agreement to pay for it. In matters of public moment individual citizens are often re-quested to urge upon their individual representatives the propriety of voting for or against particular legislation, and reputable citizens do not hesitate to do so.
366; Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 61 Am. Dec. 346; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26, 61 N. W. 698, 30 L. R. A. 737, 51 Am. St. 493; Richardson v. Scott's Bluff County, 59 Neb. 400, 81 N. W. 309, 48 L. R. A. 294, 80 Am. St. Rep. 682; Lyon v. Mitchell, 36 N. Y. 235, 93 Am. Dec. 502; Mills v. Mills, 40 N. Y. 543,100 Am. Dec. 535; Veazey v. Alien, 173 N. Y. 359, 66 N. E. 103, 62 L. R. A. 362; Winpenny v. French, 18 Ohio St. 469; Obenchain v. Ran-some-Crummey Co., 69 Oreg. 547, 138 Pac. 1078; Sweeney v. McLeod, 15 Oreg. 330, 15 Pac. 275; Hyland v. Oregon Hassam Paving Co., 74 Or. 1, 144 Pac. 1160, L. R. A., 1915 C. 823, Ann. Cas., 1916 E. 941; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. A S. 315; Spalding v. Ewing, 149 Pa. 375, 24 Atl. 219, 15
L. R. A. 727, 34 Am. St. Rep. 608; Powers v. Skinner, 34 Vt. 274, 80 Am. Dec. 677; Bryan v. Reynolds, 5 Wis. 200, 68 Am. Dec. 55; Chippewa Valley R. Co. v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 75 Wis. 224, 44 N. W. 17, 6 L. R. A. 601; Houlton v. Nichol, 93 Wis. 393, 67 N. W. 715, 33 L. R. A. 166, 57 Am. St. Rep. 928. See also Washington Irrigation Co. v. Knits, 119 Fed. 279, 56 C. C. A. 1; Brown v. First Nat. Bank, 137 Ind. 655, 37 N. E. 158, 24 L. R. A. 206; Thompson v. Wharton, 7 Bush, 563, 3 Am. Rep. 306; Buck p. First Bank, 27 Mich. 293,15 Am. Rep. 189; McDonald v. Buckstaff, 56 Neb. 88, 76 N. W. 476. Cf. Knut v. Niltt, 83 Miss. 365, 35 So. 686, 102 Am. St. 452, 200 U. S. 12, 50 L. Ed. 348, 26 S Ct. 216.
The fact that the compensation bargained for is contingent on the procurement of legislation is frequently held a strong and sometimes a conclusive circumstance in determining the invalidity of an agreement to promote legislation, because even though no improper means of such promotion are bargained for, there is inevitable temptation to use such means.3 But generally where no improper means are contemplated or bar-gained for the contract is not invalidated merely because the compensation is to be contingent on the enactment of legislation.4