Since all are bound to know the powers of a public corporation and the formalities necessary to valid contracts1 there can ordinarily be no question of estoppel to deny the validity of an ultra vires contract.2 Payment of interest on invalid obligations does not estop the corporation from alleging their invalidity,3 even if the payments are continued for twenty years.4 So a town cannot consent to a compromise judgment by which it issues a smaller amount of bonds than it voted, the judgment • not involving the power of the town to issue such bonds.5 So as a warrant is non-negotiable, recitals of validity of its purpose are not conclusive even in the hands of a bona fide holder.6 So performance for several years of an ultra vires contract with a railroad company, whereby the city agrees to erect and maintain a bridge over the railroad track, which it was the duty of the railroad to erect and maintain, does not estop the city to avoid such contract.7 While acquiescence in issuing ultra vires bonds does not work an estoppel, it may lead the court to a more liberal construction of the statute in favor of the bondholders than would otherwise be made.8 Payment of interest for a long period is a fact to be considered, if in the meantime the bonds have been transferred to bona fide holders, in determining whether the bond was originally valid. Thus where bonds are issued irregularly, but within the powers of the corporation, payment of interest for nine years is a circumstance tending to show the original validity of such bond.9 If, however, the contract is one which on its face is within the powers of the corporation, a question of estoppel may arise if by reason of facts not known to the adversary party such contract is in fact entered into for an ultra vires purpose.10 If bonds show on their face that they are issued for a lawful purpose, they are not invalidated by the fact that they were in fact issued for other purposes,11 or that their proceeds were misapplied.12 So if a building is contracted for for a lawful purpose, the fact that it is used for other purposes does not defeat the right of the contractor to recover.13

25 State v. Pullman, 23 Wash. 583; 83 Am. St. Rep. 836; 63 Pac. 265; Davis v. Wayne Co., 38 W. Va. 104; 18 S. E. 373 (as binding future levies).

26 Lexington v. Bank, 165 Mo. 671; 65 S. W. 943.

27 Lexington v. Bank, 165 Mo. 671; 65 S. W. 943.

1 See Sec. 1009.

2 Lake County v. Graham, 130 U. S. 674; Stevens v. St. Mary's Training School, 144 111. 336; 36 Am. St. Rep. 438; 18 L. R. A. 832; 32 N. E. 962; Seeger v. Mueller, 133 111. 86; 24 N. E. 513; Pettis v. Johnson, 56 Ind. 139; Cedar Rapids Water Co. v. Cedar Rapids, 117 Ia. 250: 90 N. W. 746; Day v. Green, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 433; Black v. Detroit, 119 Mich. 571; 78 N. W. 660; State v. Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 108; 50 L. R. A. 656; 83 N. W. 32; State v. Murphy, 134 Mo. 548; 56 Am. St. Rep. 515; 34 L. R. A. 369; 31 S. W. 784; 34 S. W. 51; 35 S. W. 1132; Washington County v. David (Neb); 89 N. W. 737; Syracuse Water Co. v. Syracuse, 116 N. Y. 167; 5 L. R. A. 546; 22 N. E. 381; Cleveland v. Bank, 16 O. S. 236; 88 Am. Dec. 445; Dube v. Peck, 22 R. I. 443. 467; 48 Atl. 477; McAleer v. Angell, 19 R. I. 688; 36 Atl. 588.

3 Marsh v. Fulton Co.. 10 Wall. (U. S.) 676; Town of South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U. S. 282; Daviess Co. v. Dickinson, 117 U. S. 657; Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U. S. 366; Board, etc., of Oxford v. Bank, 96 Fed. 293; 37 C. C. A. 493; Debnam v. Chitty, 131 N. C. 657; 43 S. E. 3; Glenn v. Wray, 126 N. C. 730; 36 S. E. 167; Buncombe Co. v. Payne. 123 N. C. 432; 31 S. E. 711; Noel. etc., Co. v. Mitchell Co., 21 Tex. Civ. App. 638; 54 S. W. 284.

4 Clark v. Northampton, 105 Fed. 312.

5 Board, etc.. of Oxford v. Bank. 96 Fed. 293; 37 C. C. A. 493 (citing Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S. 425; Kelley v. Milan, 127 U. S. 139; Doon Township v. Cummins, 142 U. S. 366).

6 Watson v. Huron, 97 Fed. 449; 38 C. C. A. 264.

7 St. Paul v. Ry., 80 Minn. 108; 50 L. R. A. 656; 83 N. W. 32.

8 Washington County v. Williams, 111 Fed. 801; 49 C. C. A. 621.

9 Wetzell v. Paducah, 117 Fed. 647.

10 Ft. Scott v. Brokerage Co.. 117 Fed. 51; 54 C. C. A. 437.

11 Board of Education v. McLean, 106 Fed. 817; 45 C. C. A. 658; Thompson v. Mecosta, 127 Mich. 522; 86 N. W. 1044.

12 Jones v. City of Camden, 44 S.

C. 319; 51 Am. St. Rep. 819; 23 S. E. 141.

13 Hubbell v. Custer City, 15 S.

D. 55; 87 N. W. 520.