In discussion of the question of what may constitute the terms of a written contract of this class we find even greater difficulty than usual in separating one topic from its context of allied topics. Any such division is in its nature more or less arbitrary, yet for practical purposes it is an inevitable necessity. In this case the question of what constitutes the terms of a written contract is intimately connected with the so-called parol evidence rule,1 and the parol evidence rule is in turn a branch of construction. The truth is that construction is essentially a part of the contract,2 and yet for purposes of convenience it must be discussed apart from the question of what makes up the contract.

Rep. 225; Easton v. Driscoll, 18 R. I. 318; 27 Atl. 445.

4Sullivan County v. Ruth, 106 Tenn. 85; 59 S. W. 138.

5Shelby v. Tardy, 84 Ala. 327; 4 So. 276.

6 Ordinary v. Thatcher, 41 N. J. L. 403; 32 Am. Rep. 225.

7Curry v. Colburn, 99 Wis. 319;

67 Am. St. Rep. 860; 74 N. W. 778.

8 Hayes v. Boylan, 141 Ill. 400; 33 Am. St. Rep. 326; 30 N. E. 1041.

9 Wilson v. Wilson. 158 Ill. 567; 49 Am. St. Rep. 176; 41 N. E. 1007.

10 Southern, etc., Co. v. Cole, 4 Fla. 359: Black v. Shreve, 13 N. J. Eq. 455.