Outside of questions of abuse of legal process in seizing person or property, a lawful act does not amount to duress, although by such act a person is induced to make a payment which he is not willing to make. Thus to constitute duress of goods the detention must be unlawful. The party making paymortgage had been discharged by a tender of the full amount of the mortgage debt. Wessel v. Mortgage Co., 3 N. D. 160; 44 Am. St. Rep. 529; 54 N. W. 922.

7 Hipp v. Crenshaw. 64 Ia. 404; 20 N. W. 492. (Hence the pro-ceedings in error were dismissed.)

8 First National Bank v. Sargeant, 65 Neb. 594; 91 N. W. 595.

9 Stover v. Bowman, 45 111. 213; Davies v. Galveston. 16 Tex. Civ. App. 13; 41 S. W. 145.

10 Davies v. Galveston, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 13; 41 S. W. 145.

11 Stover v. Mitchell. 45 111. 213.

ment must do everything necessary to entitle him to the property detained if he wishes to recover excess payments. This principle has been carried so far that a payment of excessive freight charges to obtain possession of goods cannot be recovered where the consignee did not tender the amount actually due, which amount he knew, and demand the property.1 In this case payment was made to an agent on his statement that the company would refund any excessive charges. Such agent did not, however, have authority to bind his principal by a contract to refund. Thus where A moved his office to B's stockyards, as tenant at will, B agreeing to charge no rent, and B then charged rent, which A paid because all the offices at such yards belonged to B, no duress exists.2