The questions that generally arose in determining the liability of a married woman's separate estate, may be grouped under two general classes: first, to what extent a married woman had the power to bind her separate estate by contract; and second, what contracts within the scope of her power had the effect of binding her separate estate. The weight of authority on the first question is that a married woman is empowered to bind her separate estate by contract except in so far as she is restrained by the instrument creating the estate, or by the statute which made the estate a separate statutory estate.1 In other jurisdictions, however, a married woman has only such power to charge her separate estate as is specifically conferred on her by the instrument creating it.2

4 Deering v. Boyle, 8 Kan. 525; 12 Am. Rep. 480.

5 Pike v. Fitzgibbon, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 454; Sykes's Trusts, 2 Johns. & H. 415; Ankeney v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 118; Mendenhall v. Leivy, 45 Mo. App. 20; Kocher v. Cornell, 59 Neb. 315; 80 N. W. 911; Sticken v. Schmidt, 64 O. S. 354; 60 N. E. 561; Manahan v. Hart, 24 Ohio C. C. 527; Flanagan v. Grocery Co., 98 Tenn. 599; 40 S. W. 1079; Filler v. Tyler, 91 Va. 458; 22 S. E. 235.

6 Fallis v. Keys, 35 O. S. 265.

7 D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Graham,

46 Mo. App. 28; Flanagan v. Gro cery Co., 98 Tenn. 599; 40 S. W. 1079.

8 Western, etc., Bank v. Bank, 91 Md. 613; 46 Atl. 960.

9 Hood Barrs v. Cathcart (C. A.) (1894), 2 Q. B. 559.

10 Ex parte Jones, L. R. 12 Ch. Div. 484, 490. To the same effect are Shattock v. Shattock, L. R. 2 Eq. 182; London, etc., Bank v. Lem-priere, L. R. 4 P. C. 572; Warren v. Freeman, 85 Tenn. 513; 3 S. W. 513.