This section is from the book "The Law Of Contracts", by William Herbert Page. Also available from Amazon: Commercial Contracts: A Practical Guide to Deals, Contracts, Agreements and Promises.
Whether demand is necessary to start the statute to running is a question presenting considerable difficulty. If the demand is an essential part of the cause of action limitations does not run until such demand is made.1 A note payable in work or property cannot be the basis of an action until demand has been made; and accordingly limitations does not run until that time.2 So limitations does not run against a bond to furnish support until demand and refusal.3 The statute does not run against liability on subscriptions to corporate stock, payable on call, until a call is made.4 If the corporation has become insolvent and its affairs are being wound up by a court of equity, limitations is sad to run from the order of the court that a call should be made5 or in some courts as far as the claims of the creditors are concerned, from the time that the corporation becomes avowedly insolvent.6 It has been held that the right of action against an officer of a corporation which has gone out of business begins when such corporation is dissolved, and is not postponed by omission to make demand even though such demand is a condition precedent to an action.7 So though demand is a condition precedent to an action for a dividend,8 or, by statute, on swamp land warrants9 limitations begins to run when the right to make demand accrues, and is not postponed by omission to make demand.
19 Hemmingway v. Tong (Ky.), 66 S. W. 278.
1 Thomas v. Beach Co.. 115 Cal. 136; 46 Pac. 899; Owen v. Higgins, 113 la. 735; 84 N. W. 713; Bank of Louisville v. Gray, 84 Ky. 565; 2 S. W. 168: Horton v. Seymour, 82 Minn. 535; 85 N. W. 551; Stevens v. Rogers, 16 Utah 105; 51 Pae. 261.
2 Lincoln v. Purcell, 2 Head. (Tenn.) 143; 73 Am. Dec. 196.
3 Portner v. Wilfahrt, 85 Minn. 7.5; 88 N. W. 418.
4 Glenn v. Liggett, 135 U. S. 533; fiawkins v. Glenn. 131 U. S. 319;
StoviH v. Thayer. 105 U. S. 143;
Vermont Marble Co. v. Granite Co., 135 Cal. 579; 87 Am. St. Rep. 143; 56 L. R. A. 728; 67 Pac. 1057.
5 Glenn v. Marbury, 145 U. S. 499; Glenn v. Williams, 60 Md. 93.
6 West v. Bank, 66 Kan. 524: 63 L. R. A. 137; 72 Pac. 252: Washington Savings Bank v. Bank. 107 Mo. 133; 28 Am. St. Rep. 405: 17 S. W. 644. (In this case time was extended by issuing to the creditor's of the corporation scrip representing the indebtedness payable in three years.) The question was left undecided in Thompson v. Bank, 19 Nev. 171; 3 Am. St. Rep. 881, as the time had not expired on either theory.