A statute of limitations which restricts the time for bringing an action on pre-existing contract rights does not impair the obligation of such contracts if it gives a reasonable time after it is promulgated for bringing actions on such pre-existing contract rights.1 Thus a statute hastening the time of sale for delinquent taxes,2 or for enforcing a mechanic's lien,3 or one providing that the right to foreclose a mortgage is barred when the debt is barred,4 or one providing that unless assignments of real estate mortgages are recorded within six months from the time that they are made, they cannot be used in evidence against the mortgagor,0 or one denying the right of attacking a judgment on the ground of mistake after three years if a bona fide purchaser has, in reliance on such judgment, acquired an interest in the realty,6 or changing the time for suing on a judgment,7 or the time for filing an abstract thereof so as to make it a lien on realty,8 are not invalid as impairing the obligation of contracts. If, on the other hand, a change in the statute of limitations bars causes of action at the time that the statute is promulgated,9 or does not give a reasonable time after its promulgation for enforcing a preexisting contract right,10 it is invalid aa impairing the obligation of contracts.

28 Webster v. Bowers, 104 Fed. 627; Evans v. Nellis, 101 Fed. 920.

29 Western National Bank v. Reckless, 96 Fed. 70.

1 Davis v. Mills, 194 U. S. 451; Turner v. New York, 168 U. S. 90 (affirming People v. Turner, 145 N. Y. 451; 40 N. E. 400; s. c, 117 N. Y. 227; 22 N. E. 1022); Bear Lake, etc., Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1; Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245; Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633; Gilfillan v. Canal Co., 109 U. S. 401; Vance v. Vance, 108 U. S. 514; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 596; Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 45; Hill v. Gregory, 64 Ark. 317; 42 S. W. 408; Tucker v. Harris, 13 Ga. 1; 58 Am. Dec. 488; Boston v. Cummins, 16 Ga. 102; 60 Am. Dec. 717; Ryhiner v. Frank, 105 111. 326; Connecticut, etc., Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373; 3 Am. St. Rep. 655; 14 N. E. 586; Elliott v.

Lochnane, 1 Kan. 126; Louisville, etc., R. R. v. Williams, 103 Ky. 375; 45 S. W. 229; Howard v. Ins. Co., 13 B. Mon. (Ky.) 282; King-ley v. Cousins, 47 Me. 91; Muir-head v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487; 69 N. W. 826; Watson v. Doherty, 56 Miss. 628; Cranor v. School District, 81 Mo. App. 152; Guiterman v. Wishon, 21 Mont. 458; 54 Pac. 566; Bartol v. Eckert, 50 O. S. 31; 33 N. E. 294; Kenyon v. Stewart, 44 Pa. St. 179; Landa v. Obert, 78 Tex. 33; 14 S. W. 297; Lawton v. Waite, 103 Wis. 244; 45 L. R. A. 616; 79 N. W. 321. This rule applies to adverse possession. Power v. Kitching, 10 N. D. 254; 88 Am. St. Rep. 691; 86 N. W. 737.

2Muirhead v. Sands, 111 Mich. 487; 69 N. W. 826.

3 Bear Lake, etc., Co. v. Garland, 164 U. S. 1.

4 Hill v. Gregory, 64 Ark. 317; 42 S. W. 408.

What is a reasonable time in the application of this rule depends on the circumstances of each particular case. Nine years,11 three years,12 one year,13 ten months,14 and nine and one half months,15 have each been held reasonable. If a reasonable time is in fact given, it is not necessary that its duration should be fixed when the statute of limitations is shortened.16 Thus in jurisdictions where time is counted rro±n the passage of the act, a statute to go into effect when the revision of the statutes then pending, was completed, was held valid, such revision having been completed ten months after the statute was passed.17 A change in statute extending the period of limitations is valid as to a claim not yet barred.18 If a cause of action has once been barred by limitations a subsequent statute cannot extend the period for bringing action so as to revive such right.10 Thus a statute providing that a judgment and sale for taxes should not be set aside unless action was brought in nine months from the date of the sale cannot by being repealed after that period has elapsed, deprive purchasers of its protection.20 Some of the cases used to support this proposition are illustrations of non-claim of debts due from a decedent's estate.21 This rule seems to apply to torts as well as to contracts.22 A right of appeal, or of prosecuting error, which has once expired cannot be revived by subsequent statute.23

5 Myers v. Wheelock, 60 Kan. 747; 57 Pac. 956; and see on the same point, Citizens' State Bank v. Julian. 153 Ind. 655; 55 N. E. 1007.

6 Drew v. St. Paul, 44 Minn. 501; 47 N. W. 158.

7 Ross v. Duval, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 45; Bartal v. Eckert, 50 O. S. 31; 33 N. E. 294.

8 Spencer v. Rippe, 7 Okla. 608; 56 Pac. 1070.

9 Rock Island National Bank v. Thompson, 173 111. 593; 64 Am. St. Rep. 137; 50 N. E. 1089; Norris v. Tripp, 111 la. 115; 82 N. W. 610; Casady v. Grimmelman, 108 la. 695; 77 N. W. 1067; Gilbert v. Acker-man, 159 N. Y. 118; 45 L. R. A. 118; 53 N. E. 753.

10 Wheeler v. Jackson. 137 U. S. 245; Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. (U. S.) 596; Rock Island National Bank v. Thompson, 173 111. 593; 64 Am. St. Rep. 137; 50 N. E. 1089; Dobbins v. Bank, 112 111. 553; Pearce v. Patton, 7 B. Mon. (Ky.) 162; 45 Am. Dec. 61; Cranor v. School District, 151 Mo. 119; 52 S. W. 232; Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1; 81 Am. St. Rep. 516; 46 L. R. A. 715; 81 N. W. 72; Relyea v. Pulp Co., 102 Wis. 301; 72 Am. St. Rep. 878; 78 N. W. 412.

11 Bartol v. Eckert. 50 O. S. 31; 33 N. E. 294.

12 Korn v. Browne, 64 Pa. St. 55.

13 Lockhart v. Yeiser, 2 Bush. (Ky.) 231.

14 Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1; 81 Am. St. Rep. 516; 46 L. R. A. 715; 81 N. W. 72.

15 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628.

16 Merchants' National Bank v. Braithwaite, 7 N. D. 358; 66 Am. St. Rep. 653; 75 N. W. 244.

17 Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N. D. 1; 81 Am. St. Rep. 516; 46 L. R. A. 715; 81 N. W. 72. Contra, that as to prior causes, a definite time in which to sue must be given. Lud-wig v. Stewart, 32 Mich. 27.

18 Bowman v. Colfax, 17 Wash. 344; 49 Pac. 551.

19 Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393; 7 Am. Rep. 239; Fish v. Farwell, 160 111. 236; 43 N. E. 367; Normal School v. Blodgett, 155 111. 441; 46 Am. St. Rep. 348; 31 L. R. ,A. 70; 40 N. E. 1025; Right v. Martin, 11 Ind. 123; Woart v. Winnick. 3 N. H. 473; 14 Am. Dec. 384; Ireland v. Mackintosh, 22 Utah 296; 61 Pac. 901; Wires v. Farr, 25 Vt. 41; Brown v. Parker, 28 Wis. 21. "A right of defense against a money demand, arising from the complete running of the statute of limitations, is property within the protection of the constitutional guaranty of due process of law." Fish v. Farwell, 160 111. 236, 252; 43 N. E. 367.

20 Whitney v. Wegler, 54 Minn. 235; 55 N. W. 927. For other cases of tax-liens see McCracken County v. Trust Co., 84 Ky. 344; 1 S. W. 585; Kipp v. El well, 65 Minn. 525; 33 L. R. A. 435; 68 N. W. 105; Bowman v. Colfax, 17 Wash. 344; 49 Pac. 551.

21 Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393; 7 Am. Rep. 239; Ryder v. Wilson 41 N. J. L. 9.

22 Lawrence v. Louisville, 96 Ky 595; 49 Am. St. Rep. 309; 27 L. R. A. 560; 29 S. W. 450; Mynatt v. Hubbs. 6 Heisk. (Tenn.) 320; Ein-gartner v. Steel Co., 103 Wis. 373; 74 Am. St. Rep. 871; 79 N. W. 433.

23 Atkinson v. Dunlap. 50 Me. Ill; Germania Savings Bank v. Suspension Bridge, 159 N. Y. 362;

A. contrary rule, namely, that if the statute of limitations merely gives a defense and does not vest property rights, it may be extended so as to revive claims already barred, has been followed by the Supreme Court of the United States,24 and by some of the state courts,25 while in others it has been left an open question.26