An instrument may, by its terms, be payable at a fixed time, but a provision may be made for accelerating the payment of such instrument either at the option of the holder, or at the option of the maker, or in case of default in paying an installment of the principal or interest. Whether such provisions for acceleration for the time of payment prevent such a contract from being negotiable is a question upon which there has been a conflict of authority. A provision to the effect that the holder of an instrument may accelerate its maturity at his option, has been held to render such instrument non-negotiable.1 A provision to the effect that the holder may accelerate the maturity of an instrument if he deems himself insecure,2 or in case the maker refuses to furnish additional security on demand,3 has been held to render the instrument non-negotiable. Such an instrument can not be upheld as a demand note.4 Under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a provision to the effect that the holder may accelerate maturity in case he deems himself insecure, does not render the contract non-negotiable.5 Under this statute, a provision to the effect that maturity may be accelerated if the collateral depreciates in value and additional collateral is not furnished, does not render the instrument non-negotiable; 6 nor does a provision giving to the holder the right to call for additional security and making the instrument payable at once on failure to furnish such security.7 Even under the Negotiable Instruments Law, a provision for declaring a debt mature when the holder deems himself insecure, has been held to render the contract non-negotiable, on the theory that since the contract was non-negotiable the Negotiable Instruments Law did not apply thereto.1

1 Joseph v. Catron, 13 N. M. 202, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1120, 81 Pac. 439.

2 Joseph v. Catron, 13 N. M. 202, 1 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1120, 81 Pac. 439.

3 Burgess v. Fairbanks, 83 Cal. 215, 17 Am. St. Rep. 230, 23 Pac. 292; Shel-ton v. Bruce, 15 Tenn. (9 Yerg.) 24.

4 Husband v. Epling, 81 111. 172, 25 Am. Rep. 273; McQuesten v. Spalding, 231 Mass. 301, 120 N. E. 850. •

5 Weidler v. Kauffman, 14 Ohio 455.

6 McQuesten v. Spalding, 231 Mass. 301, 120 N. E. 850.

7 McQuesten v. Spalding, 231 Mass. 301, 120 N. E. 850.

1 California. Wetzel v. Cale, 175 Cal. 208, 165 Pac. 692.

Kansas. Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 390, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1, 116 Pac. 239.

Oregon. Reynolds v. Vint, 73 Or. 528, 144 Pac. 526.

Washington. Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870.

Wisconsin. Continental National Bank v. McGeoch, 73 Wis. 332, 41 N. W. 409.

See, Acceleration Provisions in Time Paper, by Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 32 Harvard Law Review, 747.

2 Kimpton v. Studebaker Bros. Co., 14 Ida. 552, 125 Am. St. Rep. 185, 14 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 1126, 94 Pac. 1039; Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870.

3Holliday State Bank v. Hoffman, 85 Kan. 71, 35 L. R. A. (N.S.) 390, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1, 116 Pac. 239 (attempting to apply Missouri law).

4 Puget Sound State Bank v. Washington Paving Co., 94 Wash. 504, 162 Pac. 870.