The effect of the outbreak of a war between the country of the principal and the country of the agency, upon the prior authority of the agent, depends in part upon the interest of the country in which it is sought to enforce transactions growing out of such agency, and in part on the interest of the respective parties to the agency. As far as the interests of the state are concerned, the question whether the outbreak of war terminates an agency in cases in which the principal is domiciled in one of the belligerent countries, and the agent is domiciled in another, depends upon the nature of the agency, and the purpose which it is sought to accomplish thereby. If the authority of the agent can be exercised without communicating with his principal across the lines of war, without transferring property or money to the principal, and without engaging in trading with the enemy on behalf of the principal, the agency is not discharged by the outbreak of the war.1 As long as the agency can be performed without communicating with the enemy, the outbreak of war between the countries in which the principal and the agent are domiciled respectively, is said not to terminate the agency as long as such agency is not contrary to the policy of the country in whose courts it is sought to enforce transactions growing out of such agency, and as long as it is to the interest of the adversary belligerent.2 An agent appointed to care for his principal's property, having money on hand to pay taxes, can not buy the property at a tax sale and thus acquire an interest adverse to his principal.3

7 See Sec. 2751.

8 Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines [1902], A. C. 484 [affirming, Driefontein Consolidated Mines v. Jan-son (1901), 2 K. B. 419].

1 United States. Ward v. Smith, 74 U. S. (7 Wall.) 447, 19 L. ed. 207; Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 42 L. ed. 658.

Kansas. Fisher v. Krutz, 9 Kan. 501.

New York. Robinson v. Society, 42 N. Y. 54, 1 Am. Rep. 490; Hubbard v.

Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43, 13 Am. Rep. 562.

Tennessee. Darling v. Lewis, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 125; Maloney v. Stephens, 58 Tenn. (11 Heisk.) 738.

Texas. McCormick v. Arnspiger, 38 Tex. 569.

Virginia. Manhattan, etc., Co. v. Warwick, 61 Va. (20 Gratt.) 614, 3 Am. Rep. 218.

Contra, Howell v. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302.

If the agency is of such a nature that the exercise thereof requires communication with the principal who has become an alien enemy, or that such performance amounts in legal effect to trading with the enemy, war between the country in which the principal is domiciled and the country in which the agent is domiciled operates as a revocation of such authority.4 War ordinarily operates as a revocation of authority to buy or to sell property on behalf of an alien enemy principal who is domiciled in the territory of the adversary belligerent power.5 In cases of this sort it is the domicile of the party and not the nationality that renders the contract objectionable as trading with the enemy.6 If a loyal citizen of the United States, who remained domiciled during the war within the territory of a state which adhered to the Confederacy, and who had acted before the war and during the war as the agent of a principal who is also domiciled in Confederate lines, such agent could not represent his principal in making a sale of personal property after the Union lines had been extended so as to include the territory in which the agent was domiciled,7 even if he undertakes to make such contract on behalf of his principal with a subject of a neutral power, whose domicile has also been included in the Union lines.8 War operates as a termination of the authority of a sales agent in the country of the adversary belligerent,9 and not merely as a suspension of such authority.10

2 Fisher v. Krutz, 9 Kan. 501; nub-bard v. Matthews, 54 N. Y. 43, 13 Am. Rep. 562.

Contra, Howell v. Gordon, 40 Ga. 302.

3 Fisher v. Krutz, 9 Kan. 501. 4 Distington Hematite Iron Co. v.

Possehl [1916], 1 K. B. 811; Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft fur Cartonnagen Industrie [1916], 1 K. B. 763; Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97; Conley v. Bur-son, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 145.

5 Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

It is said that the agent may, how-ever sell the property as his own, and that he must then account to his principal after the war. McCormick v. Arnspiger, 38 Tex. 569.

6 Montgomery v. United States 82 V. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

7 Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

8 Montgomery v. United States, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 395, 21 L. ed. 97.

9 Distington Hematite Iron Co. v. Possehl [1916], 1 K B. 811; Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft fur Cartonnagen Industrie [1916], 1 K. B. 763.

10 Distington Hematite Iron Co. v. Possehl [1916], 1 K. B. 811; Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft fur Cartonnagen Industrie [1916], 1 K. B. 763.

A sale of realty situated in the country of a belligerent power seems to be regarded as a transaction which does not amount to a trading with the enemy;11 and, accordingly, a power of attorney to effect a sale of realty or the transfer of an interest therein, is not revoked by the outbreak of war between the country in which the donor of the power is domiciled and the country in which the attorney in fact is domiciled.12 If A, while domiciled in one of the United States, which subsequently adhered to the Union in the Civil War, left such state when the war broke out, and entered the Confederate lines and resided there until the end of the war, such removal did not revoke a power of attorney which was executed before the Civil War, in such state which subsequently adhered to the Union and which authorized the conveyance of property in the District of Columbia.13 A power of attorney to sell land which by its terms was irrevocable for a year, has been held not to be avoided by the fact that war broke out within the year between the country in which such land was situated, and such attorney in fact was domiciled, and the country of which the donor of the power was a natural-born subject, and to which he returned at the outbreak of the war.14 Since a power of attorney to sell land is not ordinarily affected by the fact that the donor of the power has become an alien enemy domiciled in the territory of the adversary belligerent, it is not affected by the fact that the donor of the power has become a prisoner of war.15

11 Tingley v. Muller [1917], 2 Ch. 144 [following, Porter v. Freudenberg (1915), 1 K. B. 857; and applying, Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916),. 2 A. C. 307]; Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S, 55, 42 L. ed. 658.

Contra, Conley v. Burson, 48 Tenn, (1 Heisk.) 145.

12 Tingley v. Muller [1917], 2 Ch. 144 [following, Porter v. Freudenberg (1915), 1 K. B. 857; and applying, Daimler Co. v. Continental Tyre and Rubber Co. (1916), 2 A. C. 307]; Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 42 L. ed. 658.

Contra, Conley v. Burson, 48 Tenn. (1 Heisk.) 145.

13 Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 42 L. ed. 658.

"It is entirely plain, as we think, that the mere fact of the breaking out of a war does not necessarily and as a matter of law revoke every agency. Whether it is revoked or not depends upon the circumstances surrounding the case and the nature and character of the agency. This case shows that in 1859, at the time when the power of attorney was executed, Lieutenant Ransom and his wife were desirous of realizing their share of the value of the land in controversy. It was vacant, unimproved land in the city of Washington, and the charge for taxes was quite burdensome The parties desired to realize the money. No sale of the property was effected from that time until the latter part of 1864, or early part of 1865. There is no evidence of any such change of circumstances as would naturally suggest a revocation of the authority to sell, but on the contrary the testimony is otherwise. It appears to have been to the interest of all parties to sell and thus to free themselves from a constant source of expense." Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55, 42 L. ed. 658.

During a civil war, at least, the extension of the military lines of the original government operates as a revocation of the authority of an agent who remains domiciled in such territory, while his principal remains domiciled in territory which continues to adhere to the insurgent cause.16

If an agent has in fact received property during the war on behalf of an alien enemy principal, and such property has not been confiscated by the government of the country in which such agent is domiciled, such agent must, at the end of the war, account to his principal for the value of the property thus received.17 The agency may be such that its exercise would hinder the country in whose courts it is sought to enforce such transaction, in prosecuting the war, or it may be of such a nature as to aid the adversary belligerent in the prosecution of the war. In cases of this sort, the courts of the country, whose interests are injuriously affected, would undoubtedly hold that war operates as a revocation of such agency.