If tender of property, other than money, is necessary, the production of the articles at the proper time and place is necessary,1 and an offer to produce them in the future is insufficient.2 If the property tendered is not homogeneous, the exact property to be tendered must be selected by the debtor, and if he tenders a greater amount, leaving the creditor to make the selection required by the terms of the contract, the tender is insufficient.3

If the property is homogeneous,4 such as nuts,5 or grain,6 tender of a larger amount than that provided for by contract, leaving the creditor to select the quantity specified, is sufficient. But cattle have been held not to be homogeneous within the meaning of this rule.7 villc Trartion Co. v. Wilkerson. 117 Trnn. 482, 9 L R. A (NS) 579, 99 S. W. 992

16 Jones v. Louisville & Nashville Ry.. 109 Miss. 655, 68 So. 924.

17 Tollefson v Tollofson, - Wis. - , 176 N. W. 879.

1 Boncwcll v Jacobson, 130 la 170, 5 L R. A. (N S) 436, 106 N \V. 614; Leffcrts v. Dolton, 217 Pa St 299, 118 Am St Rep 913. 66 Atl 527.

2 "The word 'offer' is frequently used by courts and text writers as synonymous with 'tender,' and it may be properly so used with reference to articles capable of manual delivery and actually produced But, with respect to heavy articles of merchandise situated at a distance from the place to which they must be transported if restored to the vendor, the phrase •offer to return* is more commonly and aptly applied to express a willingness, or to make a proposal to rescind the contract and return the goods. It is not sufficient, however, for a buyer who has taken delivery of the goods at the vendor's place of business, merely to express a willingness or make a.pro-pro-posal to return the goods, or simply to give notice to the seller that he holds the goods subject to his order, or to request him to come and take them back. If he would rescind the contract, he must return or tender back the goods to the seller at the place of delivery, unless upon making the offer so to do he is relieved of the obligation, as stated, by a refusal to receive them if tendered." Milliken v. Skill-inga, 89 Me 180, 36 Atl. 77 [quoted in Mundt v. Simpkins, 81 Neb. 1, 115 N W. 325].

3 Clark v. Baker, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 186, 45 Am Dec. 199; Croninger v. Crocker, 62 N. Y. 151.

4 Nash v. Brewster, 39 Minn. 530, 2 L. R A. 409, 41 N. W. 105; Brownfield v. Johnson, 128 Pa. St. 254, 6 L. R. A. 48, 18 Atl. 543.

5 Brownfield v. Johnson, 128 Pa. St. 254, 6 L. R. A. 48, 18 Atl 543.

6 Armstrong v. Tait, 8 Ala. 635, 42 Am. Dec. 656; Nash v. Brewster, 39 Minn. 530, 2 L. R. A. 409, 41 N. W. 105; Hughes v. Prewitt, 5 Tex. 264.

In many cases, even of homogeneous property,8 such as scrap iron,9 or brick,10 it has been held to be the duty of the debtor to separate the property to be tendered from the general mass.