44; Nichols v. Rensselaer Mutual Ins. Co., 22 Wend. 125; Skeels v. Chick-ering, 7 Met. 316; Pearson v. Archbold, 11 M. & W. 477; Lutz v. Lin-thicum, 8 Pet. 165; Bigelow v. Maynard, 4 Cush. 317; French v. Richardson, 5 Cush. 450.
1 Houston v. Pollard, 9 Met. 169; Rider v. Fisher, 3 Bing. N. C. 874. Schuyler v. Van Der Veer, 2 Caines, 235; Lincoln v. Whittenton Mills, 12 Met. 31.
2 Com. Dig. Arbitrament, E. 11; Macon v. Crump, 1 Call, 575; Buck-land v. Conway, 16 Mass. 396; Wright v. Smith, 19 Vt. 110.
3 Grier v. Grier, 1 Dall. 173; Jackson v. Ambler, 14 Johns. 96.
4 Sears v. Vincent, 8 Allen, 507 (1864).
5 Ante, § 1363; Gray v. Gwennap, 1 B. & Ald. 107.
6 Commonwealth v. Pejepscut Proprietors, 7 Mass. 399; Wharton v. King, 2 B. & Ad. 528; Thornton v. Carson, 7 Cranch, 596; Lee v. Elkins, 12 Mod. 585; Hanson v. Webber, 40 Me. 194.
7 Jackson v. De Long, 9 Johns. 43; Barnet v. Gilson, 3 Serg. & Rawle, 340; Tipping v. Smith, 2 Strange, 1024; Thinne v. Rigby, Cro. Jac. 314. But see Peck v. Wakely, 2 McCord, 279, where the term "sufficient indemnity " was held to be good.
8 Cockson v. Ogle, 1 Lutw. 550.
9 Watson v. Watson, Style, 28.
10 See Goode v. Waters, 20 L. J. Ch. 72; 1 Eng. Law & Eq. 181; Nichols v. Rensselaer Mutual Ins. Co., 22 Wend. 125.
1 Comyn, Dig. Arbitrament, E. 15.
2 Lindsay V.Lindsay, 11 Irish Com. Law 311 (1860), approving and following Tomlin v. Mayor of Fordwich, 5 Ad. & El. 147, and commenting on and explaining Ward v. Dean, 3 B. & Ad. 231; Miller v. De Burgh, 4 Exch. 809; Manser v. Heaver, 3 B. & Ad. 295; Moore v. Butlin, 7 Ad. & El. 595.
3 Carnochan v. Christie, 11 Wheat. 446.
4 Per Mr. Justice Trimble, in Karthaus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 230.
5 Houston v. Pollard, per Mr. Chief Justice Shaw, 9 Met. 169; Harden v. Harden, 11 Gray, 435; Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560; Jewell v. Christie, Law R. 2 C. P. 296 (1867); Whitworth v. Hulse, Law R. 1 Exch. 251 (1866).
§ 1366. The power of arbitrators is exhausted when they have once finally determined matters before them. Any second award is void.7
§ 1367. It is also a rule that an award should be mutual, and cannot give an advantage to one party without an equivalent to the other.8 But it is also settled that this mutuality need not be expressly stated in the award, if it actually exist, and if the award be for the payment of a sum or the performance of an act, the discharge of the other party would be necessarily implied.1
1 Sohier v. Easterbrook, 5 Allen, 311 (1862).
2 Collet v. Podwell, 2 Keble, 670; Furser v. Prowd, Cro. Jac. 423; Roll. Abr. tit. Arbit. (H.) pl. 8.
3 Williams v. Williams, 11 Smedes & Marsh. 393.
4 Emery v. Wase, 5 Ves. 816; Hopcraft v. Hickman, 2 Sim. & Stu. 130; Anderson v. Wallace, 3 CI & Fin. 26; Scale v. Fothergill, 8 Beav. 361; Winter v. Garlick, 1 Salk. 75.
5 Ibid. See, also, Archer v. Williamson, 2 Harr. & Gill, 62; Tomlin v. The Mayor, etc., of Fordwich, 5 Ad. & El. 147; Manser v. Heaver, 3 B. & Ad. 295; Tandy v. Tandy, 9 Dowl. P. C. 1044; Levezey v. Gorgas, 4 Dallas, 71; Lingood v. Eade, 2 Atk. 501; Glover v. Barrie, 1 Salk. 71.
6 Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560.
7 Bayne v. Morris, 1 Wall. 97 (1863).
8 See Yeamans v. Yeamans, 99 Mass. 585.
§ 1368. In the next place, an award must be possible, legal, and reasonable. An award, therefore, to pay at a day past, or to release a right in consideration of a trespass, or to cause a stranger to do a thing which he has no legal or equitable right to do, is void.2 But if the award be possible at the time, it will be good, although it afterward be rendered impossible by the act of the party himself or of a stranger.3 An award to pay a less sum in satisfaction of a greater is good;4 and generally an award will not be set aside for unreasonableness unless a strong case be made out, nor will it be considered unreasonable merely because it imposes a burden on one party only.1
1 Purdy v. Delavan, 1 Caines, 304, 319. In this case Kent, J., said: "It may not be unnecessary to notice another rule applicable to awards, which is that they must be mutual, or not give an advantage to one party, without an equivalent to the other. [Kyd, 148.] But this mutuality is nothing more than that the thing awarded to be done should be a final discharge of all future claim by the party in whose favor the award is made against the other for the causes submitted, or, in other words, that it shall be final. Thus in Baspole's Case [8 Co. 97, 6], the submission was general of all matters and demands; and the award was that one party should pay to the other a certain sum in consideration of a debt long due, and for his costs, and said no more. The award was held good; for the one party received the money, and the other was discharged from the debt, which was a sufficient reciprocity. [Com. Rep. 328.] So, where a certain alleged trespass was submitted to arbitrators, to arbitrate concerning the said trespass, and divers suits concerning the same, pending between the parties, and the award was that the defendants should pay a certain sum and certain costs in and about the suit arising, it was objected that the award was on one side only, for it directed nothing as to the other party, there being no releases awarded, nor words of satisfaction used: but the award was, upon demurrer, held good, and, therefore, it may now be safely laid down, in the words of Mr. Kyd [p. 153], that an award need not contain any equivalent terms; for a discharge to the other party must necessarily be presumed from the payment of the sum or the performance of the act." See, also, Weed v. Ellis, 3 Caines, 253; Byers v. Van Deusen, 5 Wend. 268; Jones v. Boston Mill Corporation, 6 Pick. 148; Onion v. Robinson, 15 Vt. 510.
2 Comyn, Dig. Arbitrament, E. 12, E. 13; Alder v. Savill, 5 Taunt. 454; Maybin v. Coulon, 4 Dall. 298; Turner v. Swainson, 1M. & W. 572.