3 Ibid.; Bridges v. Bedingfield, 2 Mod. 27; ante, Conditional Contracts, § 32.
4 Ibid.; Lumley v. Hutton, 1 Cro. Jac. 447; Godfrey v. Godfrey, 2 Mod. 303.
§ 1869. In the construction of awards, it is a well-settled rule that it is to be favorable, and no intendment shall be indulged to overturn it, but every reasonable intendment shall be allowed to uphold it.2 Thus, if a submission be of all actions, real and personal, and the award be only of actions personal, the award is good, for it shall be presumed no actions real were depending between the parties.3 So if, under a particular submission, accompanied with a general submission, an award be made concerning the particular things, and also for a money payment, the money payment will be held to cover all other demands, unless the contrary appears, for every reasonable intendment is to be made in favor of an award.4
§ 1370. In general, arbitrators have full power to decide upon all questions, both of law and of fact, which arise either directly or indirectly in the consideration and adjudication of the question submitted to them, as incident to the decision of the questions of fact; they have power to decide all questions as to the admission or rejection of evidence, as well as the credit due to evidence, and the inferences of fact to be drawn from it; and also, unless they be limited by the terms of the submission, they have authority to decide all questions of law necessarily involved in the matters submitted. And their decision upon matters of law and of fact within the scope of their authority is conclusive, and has the effect of a final judgment.5
1 Wood v. Griffith, 1 Swanst. 43; Brown v. Brown, 1 Vern. 157; Waller v. King, 9 Mod. 63; Hardy v. Innes, 6 J. B. Moore, 574; Earl v. Stocker, 2 Vern. 251.
2 Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560.
3 Karthaus v. Ferrer, 1 Pet. 228, per Justice Trimble; Baspole's Case, 8 Co. 98; Boston Water Power Co. v. Gray, 6 Met. 166.
4 Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560.
5 Boston Water Power Co. v Gray, 6 Met. 166, per Mr. Ch. Justice Shaw. See, also, Jones v. Boston Mill Corp., 6 Pick. 148; Faviell v. Eastern Counties Railway Co., 2 Exch. 344; Fuller v. Fenwick, 3 Com. B. 705; Greenough v. Rolfe, 4 N. H. 357; Cramp v. Symons, 1 Bing. 104;Hodgkinson v. Fernie, 3 C. B. (n. s.) 189; Mickles v. Thayer, 14 Allen, 114; White Mountains Railroad v. Beane, 39 N. H. 106.
§ 1371. The question whether a mistake as to the law will invalidate an award depends solely on the terms of the submission. If the submission require that the award should be decided according to the principles of law, a decision contrary to the law would avoid the award. But if the parties have, either expressly or impliedly, submitted all questions of law or fact to the decision of the arbitrators, their decision is final, whether it be well founded in law or not.1 If, however,
1 The rule is ably laid down by Mr. Ch. Justice Shaw in Boston Water Power Co. v. Gray, 6 Met. 131. He says: "If the submission be of a certain controversy, expressing that it is to be decided conformably to the principles of law, then both parties proceed upon the assumption that their case is to be decided by the true rules of law, which are presumed to be known to the arbitrators, who are then only to inquire into the facts, and apply the rules of law to them, and decide accordingly. Then if it appears by the award, to a court of competent jurisdiction, that the arbitrators have decided contrary to law, - of which the judgment of such a court, when the parties have not submitted to another tribunal, is the standard, - the necessary conclusion is that the arbitrators have mistaken the law, which they were presumed to understand; the decision is not within the scope of their authority, as determined by the submission, and is for that reason void. But when the parties have, expressly or by reasonable implication, submitted the questions of law, as well as the questions of fact, arising out of the matter of controversy, the decisions of the arbitrators on both subjects is final. It is upon the principle of res judicata, on the ground that the matter has been adjudged by a tri-hunal which the parties have agreed to make final, and a tribunal of last resort for that controversy; and therefore it would be as contrary to principle, for a court of law or equity to re judge the same question, as for an inferior court to rejudge the decision of a superior, or for one court to overrule the judgment of another, where the law has not given an appellate jurisdiction, or a revising power acting directly upon the judgment alleged to be erroneous.
"It has sometimes been made a question, whether the court will not set aside an award on the ground of mistake of the law, when the arbitrator is not a professional man, and decline inquiry into such mistake, when he was understood from his profession to be well acquainted with the law. Some of the earlier cases may have countenanced this distinction. But the probability is that this distinction was taken rather by way of instance to illustrate the position that when the parties intended to submit the questions of law as well as of fact, the award should be final, but otherwise not; which we take to be the true principle. But we think the more modern cases adopt the principle that inasmuch as a judicial decision upon a question of right, by whatever forum it is made, must almost no reservation be made in the submission, the parties are presumed to agree that every question of law and fact necessarily involve an application of certain rules of law to a particular statement of facts, and as the great purpose of a submission to arbitration usually is to obtain a speedy determination of the controversy, a submission to arbitration embraces the power to decide questions of law, unless that presumption is rebutted by some exception or limitation in the submission. We are not aware that there is any thing contrary to the policy of the law, in permitting parties thus to substitute a domestic forum for the courts of law, for any good reason satisfactory to themselves; and having done so, there is no hardship in holding them bound by the result. Volenti non jit injuria. On the contrary, there are obvious cases in which it is highly beneficial. There are many cases where the parties have an election of forum; sometimes it is allowed to the plaintiff, and sometimes to the defendant. It may depend upon the amount or the nature of the controversy, or the personal relations of one or other of the parties. As familiar instances in our own practice, one may elect to proceed in the courts of the United States, or in a State court; at law or in equity; in a higher or lower court. In either case, a judgment in one is, in general, conclusive against proceeding in another. A very common instance of making a judgment conclusive by consent, is where a party agrees, in consideration of delay, or some advantage to himself, to make the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas conclusive, where, but for such consent, he would have a right to the judgment of the higher court.