1 Tibbits v. George, 5 Ad. & El. 115; Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Mass. 316; Mowry v. Todd, 12 Mass. 281; Warren v. Wheeler, 21 Me. 484; Ford v. Adams, 2 Barb. 349; De Bernales v. Fuller, 14 East, 590, note; Mande-ville v. Welch, 5 Wheat. 277; Barrett v. Union M. F. Ins. Co., 7 Cush. 175; Hodges v. Eastman, 12 Vt. 358; Barger v. Collins, 7 Har. & J. 213.

2 Jessel v. Williamsburgh Ins. Co., 3 Hill, 88; Coolidge v. Ruggles, 15 Mass. 387; Stocks v. Dobson, 4 De G. M. & G. 11; 19 Eng. Law & Eq. 97.

3 Dawes v. Boylston, 9 Mass. 337; Cutts v. Perkins, 12 Mass. 206.

4 Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 638; Langton v. Horton, 1 Hare, 549; Robinson v. Macdonnell, 5 M. & S. 228; Lunn v. Thornton, 1 C. B. 379; Moody v. Wright, 13 Met. 17; Petch v. Tutin, 15 M. & W. 110; Congreve v. Evetts, 10 Exch. 298; Hope v. Hayley, 5 El. & B. 830; 34 Eng. Law & Eq. 189.

5 2 Story, Eq. Jur. § 1040; Arthur v. Bokenham, 11 Mod. 152; Doe v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181; Weale v. Lower, Pollex. 54; Fearne on Conting. Rem. ch. 6, § 5, p. 363; Bensley v. Burdon, 2 Sim. & St. 519.

6 Leslie v. Guthrie, 1 Bing. N. C. 697, 710.

§ 473. Courts of law, however, now follow the doctrine of equity, as far as possible, without infringing upon established principles of common law; and it has been said that the beneficial interest of the assignee is so far protected that the defendant may set off a debt due to the assignee in like manner as if the suit had been brought in his name.3

1 Hartley v. Tapley, 2 Gray, 565; Emery v. Lawrence, 8 Cush. 151. See Macomber v. Doane, 2 Allen, 541; Boylen v. Leonard, ib. 407.

2 Mulhall v. Quinn, 1 Gray, 105, Shaw, C. J., said: "The future earnings constituted a mere possibility, coupled with no interest. There was no subsisting engagement under which wages were to be earned; and it depended altogether upon a future engagement whether any thing would ever become due. Such was the decision of the judge who tried the cause; and we are satisfied that it was correct. None of the cases go so far as to hold that the mere possibility of being again employed by the city and of earning wages under that employment at a future time, is capable of being assigned. The debt may be conditional, uncertain as to amount, or contingent, but to be the subject of an assignment there must be an actual or possible debt due or to become due. The assignment of an unliquidated balance is good. Crocker v. Whitney, 10 Mass. 316. A power of attorney, although irrevocable in terms, does not amount to an assignment when no assignable interest exists at the time. Hall v. Jackson, 20 Pick. 194. The case of Carrique v. Sidebottom, 3 Met. 297, went on the ground, not only that there was no assignable interest, but apparently no interest to assign, and only a power of attorney to receive. In Gardner v. Hoeg, 18 Pick. 168, though it was an assignment of wages not earned, yet it was for a voyage on which the assignor had shipped for a certain lay or rate of wages to be earned. In the case of Weed v. Jewett, 2 Met. 608, in which the assignment was held good, the assignor was in the actual employment of the company summoned as trustees, and it does not appear whether for a certain time or indefinitely. So in Emery v. Lawrence, 8 Cush. 151, the assignor was in the actual employment of the trustees. The true principle is stated, and the proper distinction taken in Brackett v. Blake, 7 Met. 335. If a party is under an engagement for a term of time to which a salary is affixed payable quarterly, especially if he has entered upon the duties of his office, although at any time liable to be removed, he has an interest which may be assigned." See Twiss v. Cheever, 2 Allen, 40; Skipper v. Stokes, 42 Ala. 255.

3 Corser v. Craig, 1 Wash. C. C. 424, sed quaere.

§ 474. Where the assignment is perfected by the assent of the debtor, the assignee stands in place of the assignor. He is entitled to all his remedies, and is subject to all the equities between him and his debtor. And the debtor on his part may avail himself of all the equitable defences he would have had against the assignor, and to none other.1

§ 475. Where there is no fraud, and the subject-matter of the assignment is not created by the assignor, as in the case of a warehouse receipt, bond, or charter-party of a third person, it is the duty of the assignee to make inquiries in respect to it; and the original maker of the security is not bound to volunteer information.2 But if the assignee so give notice of the assignment as to induce a belief that he has been deceived, the creator of the security is bound to inform him of the real circumstances, and unless he do, he cannot be allowed to take advantage of the equities between the assignor and himself, where they operate as an injury to the assignee.3 If, however, the assignee have sufficient notice to put him on inquiry, it is the same as if full notice were given him of any fraud which he might on inquiry have discovered.4

§ 476. After notice of the assignment has been given, the equitable interest of assignees is protected in courts of law against all interference of the original parties.5 If, therefore, the assignment be in good faith and for a valuable consideration, neither the bankruptcy of the assignor nor his release will defeat the action of the assignee, although it be brought in the name of the assignor.6 And if a bond be assigned, the courts will set aside a release given by the obligee after notice to the obligor of the assignment, and prevent him from fraudulently interfering to defeat the action.1

1 Mitchell v. Winslow, 2 Story, 630; Priddy v. Rose, 3 Meriv. 86; Coles v. Jones, 2 Vern. 692; Murray v. Lylburn, 2 Johns. Ch. 441; Mangles v. Dixon, 3 H. L. C. 702; 18 Eng. Law & Eq. 82; Bartlett v. Pearson, 29 Me. 9; Commercial Bank v. Colt, 15 Barb. 506; Sanborn v. Little, 3 N. H. 539; Wood v. Partridge, 11 Mass. 488; Willis v. Twambly, 13 Mass. 204; Greene v. Darling, 5 Mason, 201.