"Considering, then, the credit in this case as a payment of the notes, the question arises, whether, after payment, the defendants would be permitted to recover the money back; if they would not, then they have no right to retain the money, and the plaintiffs are entitled to a recovery in the present suit.

"In Price v. Neal, 3 Burr. 1355, there were two bills of exchange, which had been paid by the drawee, the drawer's handwriting being a forgery; one of these bills had been paid, when it became due, without acceptance; the other was duly accepted and paid at maturity. Upon discovery of the fraud, the drawee brought an action against the holder to recover back the money so paid, both parties being admitted to be equally innocent. Lord Mansfield, after adverting to the nature of the action, which was for money had and received, in which no recovery could be had, unless it be against conscience for the defendant to retain it, and that it could not be affirmed that occasion loss to him, there is no reason why he should throw the burden of that loss upon the other.1 Of course, the payer it was unconscientious for the defendant to retain it, he having paid a fair and valuable consideration for the bills, said: ' Here was no fraud, no wrong. It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn upon him was the drawer's hand, before he accepted or paid it. But it was not incumbent upon the defendant to inquire into it. There was notice given by the defendant to the plaintiff, of a bill drawn upon him, and he sends his servant to pay it, and take it up. The other bill he actually accepts, after which the defendant innocently and bond fide discounts it. The plaintiff lies by for a considerable time after he has paid these bills, and then found out that they were forged. He made no objection to them at the time of paying them. Whatever neglect there was, was on his side. The defendant had actual encouragement from the plaintiff for negotiating the second bill, from the plaintiff's having, without any scruple or hesitation, paid the first; and he paid the whole value bona fide. It is a misfortune which has happened without the defendant's fault or neglect. If there was no neglect in the plaintiff, yet there is no reason to throw off the loss from one innocent man upon another innocent man. But, in this case, if there was any fault or negligence in any one, it certainly was in the plaintiff, and not in the defendant.' The whole reasoning of this case applies in full force to that now before the court. In regard to the first bill, there was no new credit given by any acceptance, and the holder was in possession of it before the time it was paid or acknowledged. So that there is no pretence to allege that there is any legal distinction between the case of a holder before or after the acceptance. Both were treated in this judgment as being in the same predicament, and entitled to the same equities. The case of Price v. Neal has never since been departed from; and, in all the subsequent decisions in which it has been cited, it has had the uniform support of the court, and has been deemed a satisfactory authority. The case of Smith v. Mercer, 6 Taunt. 76, was a stronger application of the principle. There the acceptance was a forgery, and it purported to be payable at the plaintiff's, who was a banker, and paid it, at maturity, to the agent of the defendant, who paid it in account with the defendant. A week afterwards the forgery was discovered, and due notice given to the defendant. But the court (Mr. Justice Chambre dissenting) decided, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Two of the judges proceeded upon the ground that the banker was bound to know the handwriting of his customers; and that there was a want of caution and negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The Chief Justice, without dissenting from this ground, put it upon the narrower ground, that during the whole week the bill 'must be considered as paid, and if the defendant were now compelled to pay the money back, he could not recover against the prior of a promissory note would have his remedy against the counterfeiter in such case. This exception only applies to cases indorsers; so that he would sustain the whole loss from the negligence of the plaintiff. The very case occurred in the Gloucester Bank v. The Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33, where forged notes of the latter [former] had been paid to the former, and, upon a subsequent discovery, the amount was sought to be recovered back. The authorities were there elaborately reviewed both by the counsel and the court, and the conclusion to which the latter arrived was, that the plaintiffs were not entitled to recover, upon the ground, that by receiving and paying the notes, the plaintiffs adopted them as their own, that they were bound to examine them when offered for payment, and if they neglected to do it within a reasonable time, they could not afterwards recover from the defendants a loss occasioned by their own negligence. In that case, no notice was given of the doubtful character of the notes until fifteen days after the receipt, and no actual averments of forgery until about fifty days. The notes were in a bundle when received, which had not been examined by the cashier until after a considerable time had elapsed. Much of the language of the court as to negligence is to be referred to this circumstance. The court said, 'The true rule is, that the party receiving such notes must examine them as soon as he has opportunity, and return them immediately. If he does not, he is negligent, and negligence will defeat his right of action. This principle will apply in all cases where forged notes have been received, but certainly with more strength when the party receiving them is the one purporting to be bound to pay. For he knows better than any other whether they are his notes or not; and if he pays them, or receives them in payment, and continues silent after he has had sufficient opportunity to examine them, he should be considered as having adopted them as his own.1