15 Vt. 727; but in England the statute has been held to commence on the temporary return of the debtor, although not known to the creditor. Gregory v. Hurrill, 5 B. & C. 341; Holl v. Hadley, 2 Ad. & El. 758. See, also, in this country, State Bank v. Seawell, 18 Ala. 616.
1 Perry v. Jackson, 4 T. R. 516. See, also, Marsteller v. M'Clean, 7 Cranch, 156; Henry v. Means, 2 Hill (S. C), 328.
2 Fannin p. Anderson, 7 Q. B. 823.
3 Per Lord Denman, C. J., in Fannin v. Anderson, 7 Q. B. 823.
4 Lafond v. Ruddock, 13 C. B. 813; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 239; Strithorst v. Graeme, 3 Wils. 145; Chomqua v. Mason, 1 Gall. 342. In Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263, Kent, C. J., said: "Whether the defendant be a resident of this State, and only absent for a time, or whether he resides altogether out of the State, is immaterial. He is equally within the proviso. If the cause of action arose out of the State, it is sufficient to save the statute from running in favor of the party to be charged, until he comes within our jurisdiction. This has been the uniform construction of the English statutes, which also speak of the return from beyond seas of the party so absent. The word return has never been construed to confine the proviso to Englishmen who went abroad occasionally. The exception has been considered as general, and extending equally to foreigners who reside always abroad." See, also, Hall v. Little, 14 Mass. 203; Dunning v. Chamberlin, 6 Vt. 127. So if a debtor has never resided in the State where he is sued, he is held to have been "absent from the State," in like manner as if he had resided there and removed therefrom.
§ 1423. A debtor can, however, only avail himself of the disabilities existing when the right of action first accrued; if no disability then exists, the time for bringing the action cannot be extended by a disability subsequently supervening.4 So, if several disabilities exist together at the time when the right of action accrues, the statute does not begin to run until the party has survived them all.5 But cumulative clisathat breach.1 Upon a note payable on demand, with or without interest,2 it begins to run from the day of its date;3 where an exact term of credit is given, from the time when the credit expires;4 if payable at sight, from the day of presentment and demand.6 So, also, where the promise is conditional, the statute begins to run from the happening of such condition, whether notice be given of it or not.6 Thus, where, upon a bill of exchange which was barred by the statute, a promise was made by the drawer to pay as soon as his circumstances should enable him so to do, and he should be called upon for that purpose, it was held that a complete right of action accrued from the time of the drawer's actual ability to pay, although the other party had made no demand, and had not been informed by the defendant, or otherwise had knowledge of such ability; and that the bringing the action was a sufficient demand.7
Paine v. Drew, 44 N. H. 306 (1862); Brown v. Nourse, 55 Me. 230. See, also, Hacker v. Everett, 57 Me. 548 (1869); Putnam v. Dike, 13 Gray, 535 (1859); Milton v. Babson, 6 Allen, 322.
1 Strithorst v. Graeme, 3 Wils. 145; Chomqua v. Mason, 1 Gall. 342; Ruggles v. Keeler, 3 Johns. 263; Von Hemert v. Porter, 11 Met. 210; McMillan v. Wood, 29 Me. 217; Lafond v. Ruddock, 13 C. B. 813; 24 Eng. Law & Eq. 239; Graves v. Weeks, 19 Vt. 178. In other States absence of the plaintiff is no bar to the statute, if the defendant was an inhabitant of the State. Brian v. Tims, 5 Eng. 597; Smith v. Newby, 13 Mo. 159; Wynn v. Lee, 5 Ga. 217; Jones v. Hayes, 4 McLean, 521; Snoddy v. Cage, 5 Tex. 106.
2 Faw v. Roberdeau, 3 Cranch, 174; Bank of Alexandria v. Dyer, 14 Pet. 141; Brent v. Tasker, 1 Har. & McHenry, 89; Murray v. Baker, 3 Wheat. 541; Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361; Galusha v. Cobleigh, 13 N. H. 79; Richardson v. Richardson, 6 Ohio, 125; Pancoast v. Addison, 1 H. & J. 350; Forbes v. Foot, 2 McCord, 331; Field v. Dickinson, 3 Pike, 409.
3 This is so in North Carolina. Earle v. Dickson, 1 Dev. 16; Whitlocke v. Walton, 2 Murph. 23. And in Pennsylvania, Thurston v. Fisher, 9 Serg. & Rawle, 288. And Missouri, Fackler v. Fackler, 14 Mo. 431; Marvin v. Bates, 13 Mo. 217. See, also, Ward v. Hallam, 2 Dall. 217; Darling v. Meachum, 2 Greene, 602.
4 Peck v. Randall, 1 Johns. 165; Fitzhugh v. Anderson, 2 H. & M. 289; Dowell v. Webber, 2 Sm. & M. 452; Dillard v. Philson, 5 Strob. 213; Pendergrast v. Foley, 8 Ga. 1; Adamson v. Smith, 2 Mills, 269.
5 Per Chancellor Kent, Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129; Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 181; Bonny v. Ridgard, cited in 17 Ves. 97; Jenner bilities occurring one after the other, are not allowed, since, if disability could be added to disability, claims might be protracted to an indefinite extent of time.1 If, therefore, the right of action accrue when the debtor is an infant, and before the termination of her infancy the disability of coverture occur, the statute runs from the time her infancy ceases, and not from the termination of her coverture.2
§ 1424. This statute begins to run upon a debt from the moment that there are a complete and present cause of action, a plaintiff within the country, capable of bringing the action, and a defendant capable of being sued. Thus, upon an agreement for the sale of goods where payment is to be made at the end of six months, the statute begins to run on the expiration of the six months.3 So, also, the statute begins to run upon a bill of exchange or note upon the last day of grace, if it be accepted, or upon the day of demand, if it be dishonored.4 If it be not accepted, the statute begins at the non-acceptance, and not from the non-payment.5 So, also, it begins to run against a contract from the time of its actual breach, and not from the time when damage accrues from v. Tracy, 3 P. Wins. 287, note; Jackson v. Johnson, 5 Cow. 74; Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill, 138; Butler v. Howe, 13 Me. 397; Sturt v. Hellish, 2 Atk. 610.