1 Ibid. Per Chancellor Kent, in Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129; Doe d. Duroure v. Jones, 4 T. R. 300; Doe d. George v. Jesson, 6 East, 80; Stowel v. Zouch, Plowd. 353; Jackson v. Wheat, 18 Johns. 40; Mercer v. Selden, 1 How. 37; Bradstreet v. Clarke, 12 Wend. 602; Dease v. Jones, 23 Miss. 133. The same rule is adopted in equity. Demarest v. Wynkoop, supra; Smith v. Clay, 3 Bro. Ch. 639, note; Hovenden v. Annesley, 2 Sch. & L. 630, 640; Medlicott v. O'Donnel, 1 Ball & B. 156; Butler v. Howe, 13 Me. 397.
2 Eager v. The Commonwealth, etc, 4 Mass. 182; Layton v. State, 4 Harring. 8; Robertson v. Wurdeman, 2 Hill (S. C), 324.
3 Helps v. Winterbottom, 2 B. & Ad. 431; Rhodes v. Smethurst, 4 M. & W. 42; Freake v. Cranefeldt, 3 M. & C 499; Shutford v. Borough, Godb. 437; Miller v. Miller, 7 Pick. 133; Codman v. Rogers, 10 Pick. 112.
4 Picquet v. Curtis, 1 Sum. 478; Wenman v. Mohawk Ins. Co., 13 Wend. 267; Rowe v. Young, 2 B. & B. 165; s. c. 2 Bligh, 391.
5 Whitehead v. Walker, 9 M. & W. 506.
§ 1425. Again, the statute begins to run from the time when the action can be brought therefor, and not from the time that the knowledge thereof comes to the party having authority to bring it, or, in other words, it dates from the present right of action, not from the knowledge of the party.8
1 Short v. M'Carthy, 3B.& Ald. 626; Battley v. Faulkner, 3 B. & Ald. 288; Brown v. Howard, 2 B. & B. 73; 4 Moore, 508; Howell v. Young, 8D.& R. 14; 5B. & C. 259.
2 Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519 (1872), overruling Payne v. Gardiner, 29 N. Y. 146 (1864).
3 Norton v. Ellam, 2 M. & W. 461; Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488; Ruff v. Bull, 7 H. & J. 14; Wenham v. The Mohawk Ins. Co., 13 Wend. 267; Hill v. Henry, 17 Ohio, 9; Wheeler v. Warner, 47 N. Y. 519 (1872), distinguishing Merritt v. Todd, 23 N. Y. 28, and Herrick v. Woolverton, 41 N. Y. 581. See Hirst v. Brooks, 50 Barb. 335 (1867); Howland v. Edmonds, 24 N. Y. 307 (1862).
4 Wittersheim v. Lady Carlisle, 1 H. Black. 631; Wheatley v. Williams, 1 M. & W. 533; Irving v. Veitch, 3 Ib. 90; Fryer v. Roe, 12 C. B. 437; 22 Eng Law & Eq. 440.
5 Wolfe v. Whiteman, 4 Harring. 246; Holmes v. Kerrison, 2 Taunt. 323. 6 Shutford v. Borough, Godb. 437; Fenton v. Emblers, 1 Wm. Black.
353; Argall v. Bryant, 1 Sandf. 98; The Governor v. Gordon, 15 Ala. 72.
7 Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757.
8 Waters v. Earl of Thanet, 2 Q. B. 757; Battley v. Faulkner, 3 B. & Ald. 288; Short v. McCarthy, 3 Ib. 626; Granger v. George, 5 B. & C.
Therefore, on an agreement to pay upon a certain condition, the statute attaches at the moment the condition occurs, whether such fact be known or not.1 And in cases of breach of contract whereby injury results, the statute attaches at the moment of the breach of contract, and not when the injury actually results therefrom.2 Ordinarily, where continuous labor and services are given, and no time for their completion is fixed, the statute would commence when the labor and services are completed;3 but if a bill be rendered at any time and payment demanded, the statute would commence at the time of the presentment of the bill,4 unless the contract were entire and the completion of it essential to a demand for any part of the price. But where the cause of action arises from the improper or imperfect execution of work and labor to be completed at a fixed time, the statute commences with the fixed time. Where a sum of money is to be paid by instalments, the statute attaches to each instalment as it becomes due; but if the agreement be that upon any one default the whole sum after deducting the payments already made should become due, the statute would begin to run from the time of the default.1 But coupons are not barred by the Statute of Limitations, though cut from the bond, by a less time than would bar a suit on the bond to which they belonged.2
149; Howell v. Young, 5 lb. 259; Brown v. Howard, 2 B. & B. 73; Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. 33; Wilcox v. Plummer, 4 Pet. 172; Kerns v. Schoon-maker, 4 Ohio, 331; Garden v. Bruce, Law R. 3 C. P. 300 (1868).
1 Ib.; Shutford v. Borough, Godb. 437. If a bond is given to re-convey real estate, the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against such bond until the obligor has been requested to reconvey, or has put it out of his power to do so. Ward's Appeal, 35 Conn. 161 (1868).
2 Sinclair v. Bank of S. C, 2 Strob. 314; Little v. Blunt, 9 Pick. 488. See supra, § 1424; Argall v. Bryant, 1 Sandf. 98; Smith v. Fox, 6 Hare, 386. Where the cause of action is a single act, or one which amounts to a trespass, the statute begins to run from the doing of the original act (except in cases of continuing trespass); but when the cause of action is not the doing of the thing itself, but merely and solely the resulting consequence, the limitation commences only from the latter event. Whitehouse v. Fellowes, 10 C. B. (n. s.) 765 (1861). Therefore when a person makes an excavation on his own land which causes the adjoining land to subsequently cave in. the cause of action arises, and the limitation commences, not from the excavation, but only from the actual sinking. Bonomi v. Backhouse, El., B. & E. 622, affirmed in the House of Lords, 9 H. L. C. 503; 7 Jur. (N. S.) 809.
3 Thus the statute does not commence running against an attorney's bill until the suit on which it accrues is terminated. Harris v. Quine, Law R. 4 Q. B. 653 (1869); Mygatt v. Wilcox, 45 N. Y. 306 (1871); Whitehead v. Lord, 7 Exch. 691: Hall v. Wood, 9 Gray, 60; Eliot v. Lawton, 7 Allen, 274. See Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 36 N. Y. 255 (1867). The liability of an ordinary collecting agent commences on the receipt of the money, and the Statute of Limitations begins at once to run against such liability. Hart's Appeal, 32 Conn. 520 (1865)
4Vansandau v. Browne, 9 Bing. 402; Harris v. Osbourn, 2 C. & M. 629; Nicholls v. Wilson, 11 M. & W. 106; Whitehead v. Lord, 7 Exch. 691; 11 Eng. Law & Eq. 587; Phillips v. Broadley, 9 Q. B. 744; Foster v. Jack, 4 Watts, 334; Rothery v. Munnings, 1 B. & Ad. 15.