(s) Chesman v. Nainby, 2 Ld. Raym. 1456; 2 Stra. 739.

(t) Tindal, C. J., Horner v. Graves, 7 Bing. (20 E. C. L. R.) 744. But see Tallis v. Tallis, 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 185.

(u) Catt v. Tourle, L. E. 4 Ch. 654, 33 L. J. (Ch.) 565; Elves v. Crofts, 10 C. B. (70 E. C. L. B.) 241, cited post, p. *223.

(x) 8 East, 80.

1 Warner v. Jones, 51 Me. 146; Clark v. Crosby, 37 Vt. 188; Hard v. Seeley, 47 Barb. 428; McClurg's Appeal, 58 Pa. St. 51; Jenkins v. Temples, 39 Ga. 655; Treat v. Snoniger Melodeon Co., 35 Conn. 543; Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst 342; Crawford v. Wick, 18 Ohio St. 190; Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561; Warfield v. Booth, 33 lb. 63; Dean v. Emerson, 102 Mass. 480; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251; Perkins v. Clay, 54 N H. 518; Nougland v. Segur, 38 N. J. 230; Dwight v. Hamilton, 113 Mass. 175; Brown v. Rounsavell, 78 111. 589; Roller v. Ott, 14 Kan. 609; Peltz v. Eichelle, 62 Mo. 171.-s.

In Horner v. Graves (b), 100 miles from the place where a dentist carried on business was considered an unreasonable space from which to exclude an assistant and pupil from practising the same profession after his service was determined and his instruction completed. "We do not see," said Tindal, C. J., in delivering the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, " how a better test can be applied to the question, whether reasonable or not, than by considering whether the restraint is such only as to afford a fair protection to the *interest of the party in favour of whom it is given, and not so large as to interfere with the interest of the public. Whatever restraint is larger than the necessary protection of the party can be of no benefit to either, it can only be oppressive; and, if oppressive, it is in the eye of the law, unreasonable. Whatever is injurious to the interests of the public, is void, on the grounds of public policy. In the case above referred to (Mitchell v. Reynolds) (c) Lord Chief Justice Parker says,'A restraint to carry on a trade throughout the kingdom must be void; a restraint to carry it on in a particular place is good;' which are rather instances or examples than limits of the application of the rule, which can only be at last what is a reasonable restraint with reference to the particular case. In that case the plaintiff had assigned to the defendant the lease of a house in the parish of A. for five years, and the defendant entered into a bond conditioned that he would not exercise the trade of a baker within that parish during that term; and the restraint was held good, because not unreasonable either as to the time or distance, and not larger than might be necessary for the protection of the plaintiff in his established trade. No certain precise boundary can be laid down within which the restraint would be reasonable, and beyond which, excessive. In Davis v *Mason (d), where a surgeon had restrained himself not to practise within ten miles of the plaintiff's residence, the restraint was held reasonable. In one of the cases referred to by the plaintiff, 150 miles was considered as not an unreasonable restraint, where an attorney had bought the business of another who had retired from the profession. But it is obvious that the profession of an attorney requires a limit of a much larger range, as so much may be carried on by correspondence, or by agents. And unless the case was such that the restraint was plainly and obviously unnecessary, the Court would not feel itself justified in interfering. It is to be remembered, however, that contracts in restraint of trade are in themselves, if nothing more appears to show them reasonable, bad in the eye of the law; and upon the bare inspection of this deed, it must strike the mind of every man that a circle round York traced with the distance of one hundred miles incloses a much larger space than can be necessary for the plaintiff's protection." A fortiori, where the plaintiff, a coal merchant in London, had taken the defendant into his service as town traveller and collecting clerk, and the defendant agreed that he would not within two years after leaving the plaintiff's service, solicit or sell to any customer of the plaintiff, and would not follow or *be employed in the business of a coal merchant for nine months after he should have left the employment of the plaintiff, the contract was decided to be void, as a restraint of trade unlimited in point of space (e). "I cannot express," said Parke, B., in this case, "the rule on this subject better than has been done by Tindal, C. J., in giving the judgment of the Court of Exchequer Chamber in Hitchcock v. Coker (f), where he says, 'We agree in the general principle adopted by the Court of Queen's Bench, that, where the restraint of a party from carrying on a trade is larger and wider than the protection of the party with whom the contract is made can possibly require, such restraint must be considered as unreasonable in law, and the contract that would enforce it must be therefore void.' Now a restraint prohibiting a party from carrying on trade within certain limits of space would be good, and a contract entered into for the purpose of enforcing such an agreement as that would be valid; and the limit of the space is that which, according to the trade he carries on, is necessary for the protection of the party with whom the contract is made." The cases upon this branch of the subject are reviewed by the Court of Exchequer in the great case of Mallan v. May, before mentioned; and it may be *convenient to the student to subjoin the brief observations made upon them by that Court in giving judgment (g):(y) 2 Str. 739; 3 Bro. P. C. 349.

(z) 4 East, 190; Whittaker v. Howe, 3 Beav. 383; Dendy v. Henderson, 24 L. J. (Ex.) 324; Nicholls v. Stretton, 10 Q. B. (59 E. C. L. R.) 346.

(a) 2 M. & Gr. (40 E. C. L. R.) 20; Benwell v. Inns, 24 L. J. (Ch.) 663. (b) 7 Bing. (20 E. C. L. R.) 735. 234

(c) 1 P. Wms. 1S1, 1 Smith, L. C. 417, 8th ed. This case, with the note thereon, should be carefully studied.