(d) 5 T. R. 118.

(e) Ward v. Byrne, 5 M. & W. 548, 561; and see Allsopp v. Wheatcroft, L E. 15 Eq. 59; 42 L. J. (Ch.) 12.

"Applying this rule and referring to the analogous authorities, it appears to us, that, for such a profession as that of a dentist, the limit of London is not too large. In Davis v. Mason (A), Thetford and ten miles round, in Hayward v. Young (i), twenty miles round a place, were held reasonable limits in the case of a surgeon; in that of an attorney, London and one hundred and fifty miles round, in Bunn v. Guy (k); and in

(f) 6 A. & E. (33 E. C. L. R.) 453. {g) 11 M. & W. 667. (h) 5 T. R. 118.

(i) 2 Chit. 407; Atkyns v. Kinnier, 4 Ex. 776; Sainter v. Ferguson, 7 C. B. (62 E. C. L. R.) 716. (k) 4 East, 190.

Proctor v. Sargent (I), five miles from Northampton Square, in the county of Middlesex, was held reasonable in the case of a milkman. And it makes no difference, in our opinion, that it appears on the face of this record that London contains a million of inhabitants. We doubt, indeed, whether the comparative populousness of particular districts ought to enter into consideration at all; if it did, it would be difficult to exclude others, such as the number of men of the same profession, the habits of the people in that neighbourhood, and other matters of a fluctuating and uncertain character, which would produce great difficulty and embarrassment in determining such question." Yet the *Court will take into consideration the circumstances at the time of the execution of the bond and the nature of the business, the goodwill of which was sold (m).

Upon this principle a covenant not at any time to carry on the business of a butcher within five miles of the place where the covenantor carried it on, before his sale of the business to the covenantee, has been supported as not unreasonable either in respect of time or distance (n). And in Tallis v. Tallis (o), the Court of Queen's Bench declared that any covenant is valid unless it plainly appear that a restriction is imposed by it beyond what the interest of the covenantee requires.

The proposition that a covenant or promise not to carry on a trade within the limits of England is totally

(l) 2 M. & Gr. (40 E. C. L. E.) 20; Pemberton v. Vaughan, 10 Q. B. (59 E. C. L. R.) 87.

(m) Avery v. Langford, 23 L. J. (Ch.) 837; Harms v. Parsons, 32 Beav. 328; 32 L. J. (Ch.) 247.

(n) Elves v. Crofts, 10 C. B. (70 E. C. L. R.) 241.

(o) 1 E. & B. (72 E. C. L. R.) 391; S. C, 22 L. J. (Q. B.) 185. See Mumford v. Gething, 7 C. B. N. S. (97 E. C. L. R.) 305; 29 L. J. (C. P.) 105. 238 void (p), seems somewhat qualified in the recent case of Leather Cloth Company v. Lorsont (q). There a company was formed for the purchase and working of certain patents and processes for the manufacture of American leather cloth; and the agreement for the purchase contained a provision, that the vendors " will not *directly or indirectly carry on, nor will they, to the best of their power, allow to be carried on by others, in any part of Europe, any company or manufactory having for its object the manufacture or sale of productions now manufactured in the business or manufactory" (of the vendors), "and will not communicate to any person or persons the means or processes of such manufacture, so as in any way to interfere with the exclusive enjoyment by the purchasing company of the benefits hereby agreed to be purchased." James, V. C, held, that the restriction contained in this clause was not greater, having regard to the subject-matter of the contract, than was necessary for the protection of the purchasers. His Honour, however, seems to have to some extent proceeded on the ground that the case much more resembled "the sale of a secret, which has been held to be perfectly good, with a stipulation unlimited as to time and place as to communicating the secret, or dealing with it so as to interfere with the purchaser. It is settled by authority that a man may bind himself not to communicate that process to anybody else anywhere, under any circumstances, in any part of the world" (r). But still more recently it has been *held that a contract, unlimited in point of space whereby the defendant agreed with the plaintiffs not to establish himself in the champagne trade, was not under the circumstances of that trade unreasonable and might be enforced (s).

(p) Ante, p. *214.

(q) L. R. 9 Eq. 345; 39 L. J. (Ch.) 86.

(r) Leather Cloth Co. v. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq. 345, 354; 39 L. J. (Ch.) 86, 90. " Although the policy of the law will not permit a general restraint of trade, yet a trader may sell a secret of business, and restrain himself generally from using that secret." Per Sir J. Leach, V. C, in Bryson v. Whitehead, l Sim. & S. 74, 77.

It may be mentioned here that where one covenants with another not to carry on business within a given distance of that other's house, this distance is to be calculated, popularly speaking, "as the crow flies," more accurately, by drawing a circle on a map, the radius of which is the given distance measured on the map. And where the question is whether the covenant is broken by the too great proximity of one house to another, then, in measuring the distance, it should be taken from the nearest point of the one house to the nearest point of the other, without regard to where the doors are situated (t).

Further, contracts in restraint of trade must, in order to be good, be founded on a consideration, even although they be made by deed. "Where one agrees," said Lord Lyndhurst in a remarkable case, which is well worthy of attention (u), " with *another to employ him, and the latter agrees not to work for any third person, such agreement is a partial restraint of trade, and must be supported by adequate consideration." Thus, in the case of Hutton v. Parker (x), it was held most clearly by the Court of Queen's Bench, that in an action on a bond given by the defendant not to enter into the service of any other than the plain(s) Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. Div. 351; 49 L. J. (Ch.) 338.