(j) Hood v. Lord Barrington, L. R. 6 Eq. 218; Sale v. Lambert, L. R. 18 Eq. 1, 43 L. J. (Ch.) 470; Potter v. Duffield, L. R. 18 Eq. 4, 43 L. J. (Ch.) 472. See also Williams v. Byrnes, 1 Moo. P. C. N. S. 154; 9 Jur. N. 6. 363.

(k) Sale v. Lambert, ubi supra.

The purchaser of flour wrote to the vendor as follows - "I hereby give you notice that the corn you delivered to me in part performance of my contract with you for one hundred sacks of good English seconds flour at 45s. a sack, is of so bad a quality that I cannot sell it or make it into saleable bread. The sacks of flour are at my shop, and you will send for them, otherwise I shall commence an action." To this the vendors answered by their attorney: "Messrs. L. consider that they have performed their contract with you as far as it has gone, and are ready to complete the remainder; and *unless the flour is paid for at the expiration of one month, proceedings will be taken for the amount." The two writings were considered to constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract. This case was indeed decided upon the 17th section of the Statute of Frauds, but the reason of the decision applies equally to the 4th section (o). In another instance, on a sale by auction, the particulars of sale described the premises, and the conditions of sale were on the same sheet. The plaintiff purchased the property, and on paying the deposit, signed an agreement endorsed on the before-mentioned particulars and conditions, in the words following:- "I do hereby acknowledge myself the purchaser of the property described in the within particulars at and for the price or sum of 94 10s., and I do hereby undertake and agree to perform my part of the conditions therein specified, in furtherance of which I have this day paid the sum of 18 18s., being the amount of the deposit, as also the sum of 2 7s., being my moiety of the government duty. As witness my hand this 11th day of June, 1857, Isaac Dobell" (the plaintiff). Neither the defendant nor any one for him signed the agreement, nor was his name mentioned in it or in the particulars or conditions, except that in the particulars of sale he was referred to for particulars of the premises. On discovering *afterwards that a small yard mentioned in the particulars was not comprised in the lease purchased, which defect was not known at the time of sale to either party, the plaintiff's attorney wrote to the defendant as follows :-" We are instructed to inform you that Mr. Dobell, in consequence of your not having shown a good title to the premises offered for sale on the 11th instant as described in the particulars, declines taking the property, and we have to request that you will direct the auctioneer to return the deposit and duty received by him of Mr. Dobell, and that you will remit to us the expenses incurred in this matter, and make some arrangement for payment thereof." On this the defendant sent a letter signed by him to the plaintiff's attorney, in which he mentioned having "stated the case to counsel relating to our sale to Mr. Dobell," and added, "having obtained his opinion thereon, I beg to acquaint you that the reasonable compensation to which he is entitled (alluding to a provision in the condition for compensation) on our securing to him a lease of the yard adjoining the Aberdeen Arms, is 11 16s. If he is willing to accede to this, the business may be completed without delay; if not, we beg to be understood as now calling on Mr. Dobell to settle the compensation in the way provided for. If he declines this, we presume you will accept Chancery process for him at our suit." In another letter to the plaintiff's attorney, the defendant expressly *mentioned the abatement in the price as being according to the condition of sale. It will be observed in this case that the letters of the defendant refer expressly and distinctly to the conditions of sale, and he had in his hands, or those of his auctioneer, at the very time, the conditions of sale signed by the plaintiff to which reference is made, so that no parol evidence of any kind was requisite to show a contract binding both parties, except evidence of the handwriting of each, which must be adduced in all cases. For these reasons the Court of King's Bench was of opinion that there was a sufficient contract within the Statute of Frauds (p). Neither is it material that the letters out of which the contract may be proved, are written to third parties (q), even to the writer's own agent, provided the contract be fully recognized therein (r). A

(I) Potter v. Duffield, ubi supra. See also Williams v. Jordan, 6 Ch. Div. 517; 46 L. J. (Ch.) 681.

(m) 5 Ch. Div. 648, 46 L. J. Ch. 228, 737; 3 App. Cas. 1124; 48 L. J. (Ch.) 10 (H. L.). The H. of L. affirmed as to this point, both the M. R. and C. A., but reversed the latter as to the question of there being a concluded agreement.

(n) 5 Ch. Div. 660; 46 L. J. (Ch.) 384. 96

(o) Jackson v. Lowe, 1 Bing. (8 E. C. L. R.) 9. See Barker v. Allan, 29 L. J. (Ex.) 100.

(p) Dobell v. Hutchinson, 3 A. & E. (30 E. C. L. R.) 355; Ridgway v. Wharton, 27 L. J. (Ch.) 46; 6 H. of L. C. 238; Baumann v. James, L. R. 3 Ch. 508; Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450; 48 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 596; Cave v. Hastings, 7 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. (Q. B.) 575.

(g) Welford v. Beazley, 3 Atk. 503; Owen v. Thomas, 3 Myl. & K. 353.

(r) Gibson v. Holland, L. R. 1 C. P. 1; 35 L. J. (C. P.) 5. 98 remarkable instance of the application of this rule is afforded by the case of Hammersley v. Baron de Biel (s). It will be recollected that one of the cases in which a written contract or memorandum is required by the Statute of Frauds, is where any promise is made in consideration of marriage. In *the present instance, proposals of marriage had been written by the lady's brothers by her father's authority, which were described therein to be the bases of the arrangement, subject, of course, to revision; and as sufficient for the proposed husband to act upon. These proposals were not signed. A letter, afterwards written and signed by the father after the marriage, admitting the terms of the written proposals, was considered as a recognition of them as his agreement, and sufficient within the Statute of Frauds. But though, where there are several papers, the agreement may be collected from them all, provided they are sufficiently connected in sense among themselves, so that a person looking at them all together can make out the connection and the meaning of the whole without the aid of any verbal evidence; yet it is otherwise when such connection does not appear on the face of the writings themselves; for, to let in parol evidence in order to connect them with one another, would be to let in the very mischief which it was the object of the framers of the Act to avoid, namely, the uncertainty and temptation to falsehood occasioned by allowing the proof of the contract to depend on the recollection of witnesses : and, therefore, where a written agreement is re- -quired by the 4th section of the statute, it is clear that several writings, not bearing an obvious connection inter se in sense, cannot be joined together by verbal evidence to make up the *agreement. This was one of the points decided in the great case of Boydell v. Drummond (t), where the plaintiff proposed to publish an edition of Shakespeare with splendid engravings, and issued a prospectus stating the terms. A copy of the prospectus lay in his shop, and beside it lay a book headed "Shakespeare Subscribers, their Signatures:" but there was nothing in the book about the prospectus, or in the prospectus about the book. The defendant had signed the book, and, having afterwards refused to continue taking in the Shakespeare, the plaintiff brought an action against him. Now, the Shakespeare was not to be finished for some years, and therefore the case was one of those provided for by the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, falling within the words "any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof." It was, therefore, necessary that it should be in writing, and that that writing should be "signed by the party to be charged, or his agent." Now, the terms of the agreement were in the prospectus, and so far the statute had been complied with; but the signature unluckily was in the book: and the Court held, that, as the prospectus did not refer to the book, or the book to it, the statute had not been complied with, and the contract could not be enforced. "If," said Le Blanc, J., "there had been anything in that book * which had referred to the particular prospectus, that would have been sufficient; if the title to the book had been the same with that of the prospectus, it might perhaps have done: but, as the signature now stands, without reference of any sort to the prospectus, there was nothing to prevent the plaintiff from substituting any prospectus, and saying that it was the prospectus exhibited in his shop at the time to which the signature related: the case therefore falls directly within this branch of the Statute of Frauds."