(s) 12 Cl. & Fin. 45.

(0 11 East, 142.

So too, where property is sold by auction subject to conditions of sale, an entry made at the time of the sale in the auctioneer's book which contains either no reference at all to the conditions, or no reference such as to identify the conditions upon their production as being the conditions contained in the entry, is insufficient to satisfy the statute, though the entry contain the names of the vendor and purchaser, the subject-matter of the contract and the price to be paid (u).

Still, where the contract is sought to be made out from more than one document, although parol evidence is inadmissible to connect the documents, and so partly by parol evidence, partly by writing to make out a contract, yet parol evidence is admissible to identify one document referred to in another as the document actually intended by that *reference. This, indeed, is merely a particular application of the doctrine as to latent ambiguity (x) already referred to (y). To use the illustration given by Bramwell, L. J., in the case just cited (z), "Suppose that A. writes to B., saying that he will give 1000 for B.'s estate, and at the same time states the terms in detail, and suppose that B. simply writes back in return 'I accept your offer.' In that case there may be an identification of the documents by parol evidence, and it may be shown that the offer alluded to by B. is that made by A., without infringing the Statute of Frauds, sect. 4, which requires a note or memorandum in writing." This illustration has been applied in Cave v. Hastings (a). There the plaintiff had signed, on the 1st of December, 1879, a memorandum agreeing to provide a Victoria, horse, harness, and a coachman, to the defendant's satisfaction, for one year, from the 1st of January, 1880, for 18 10s. per month, and occasionally, in wet weather, the use of a Brougham; but this document was not signed by the defendant. The latter, in a subsequent letter, signed by him, to the plaintiff, referred to "our arrangement for the hire of your carriage." It was held that parol evidence was admissible to shew *that there could be no other arrangement than that contained in the memorandum to which the defendant could have intended to refer, and the first document being thus identified with the reference in the defendant's letter, it was held that there was a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds.

(u) Rishton v. Whatmore, 8 Ch. Div. 467; Peirce v. Corf, L. E. 9 Q. B. 210; 43 L. J. Q. B. 52.

(x) See per Thesiger, L. J. in Long v. Millar, 4 C. P. D. 450, 456; 48 L. J (Q. B. etc.) 596, 600.

{y) Ante, p. *49.

(z) 4 C. P. D. 454; 43 L. J. (Q. B. etc.) 599.

(a) 7 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. (Q. B) 575.

There is a third point common to all the five contracts mentioned in the 4th section; it is with regard to the signature. The words are, you will recollect, "signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully authorized." The signature, it is obvious, is most regularly and properly placed at the foot or end of the instrument signed : but it is decided in many cases, that although the signature be in the beginning- or middle of the instrument, it is as bind-ing as if at the foot; although, if not signed regularly at the foot, there is always a question whether the party meant to be bound by it as it stood, or whether it was left so unsigned because he refused to complete it. But when it is ascertained that he meant to be bound by it as a complete contract, the statute is satisfied, there being a note in writing showing the terms of the contract, and signed by him. Therefore, where in the case of the sale of a quantity of cotton yarn, a bill of parcels was sent by the seller to the purchaser, headed :-"Loudon, 24th Oct., 1812.-Messrs. John Schneider & Co., bought of Thomas Norris *& Co., agents, cotton yarn and piece goods. No. 3, Freeman's Court, Cornhill." Following this was a list of the articles sold, the particulars, quantities, and prices. It was held, in an action for not delivering the yarn, to contain a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the requirement of the statute as to the signature of the party to be charged (b). In this case, the whole of the heading of the bill of parcels was printed, except the words " Messrs. John Schneider & Co." But as it was then given out to the other contracting party by the party to be charged, recognizing the printed name as much as if he had subscribed his mark to it, he had recognized and avowed it as his signature (c). For the same reason, where the plaintiff's traveller called on the defendant with samples of hops, and agreed with him for sale of them, and the defendant thereupon wrote in a book of his own, of which he retained possession, as follows:-" Leeds, 19th Oct., 1836.-Sold John Dodgson, 27 pockets Play-stead, 1836, Sussex, at 103s., the bulk to answer the sample; 4 pockets Selmes Berkleys at 95s., samples and invoice to be sent per Rockingham coach,-payment in banker's in two months," which was signed, at the defendant's request, by the plaintiff's traveller thus:-"Signed, for Johnson & *Co., D. Morse," this was deemed a sufficient signature of the contract to bind the defendant; for the defendant's name was contained in it in his own handwriting, and his having required plaintiff's agent to sign it showed that he meant it to be a memorandum of contract between the parties (d). But, of course, where it appears that, notwithstanding the insertion of the parties' names in the instrument, it was intended that their signatures should be affixed in the proper place, such an instrument would not be a compliance with the statute, as it could not be considered as signed by them. Therefore, where articles of agreement contained the terms of a contract which was not to be performed within a year, purporting to be made between certain persons whose names were stated at the commencement of the articles, and who were described as the contracting parties, and concluded with the words, "As witness our hands," without being followed by any name or signature, they were held not to be sufficiently signed within the Statute of Frauds (e). And as a signature in print is good (f), so is a signature in pencil. This, indeed, was held in a case of a pencil endorsement *of a promissory note, but it seems equally applicable to the signature required by the Statute of Frauds (g). There is also little or no doubt that a party may sign, within this statute, by stamping his signature instead of writing it (h). It seems, too, that a telegram containing, as usual, the names of the sender and receiver, would be a sufficient writing signed, within the statute, to bind the sender (i)1 The signature is to be that of the party to be charged; and, therefore, though, as I have pointed out to you, both sides of the agreement must appear in the writing, the consideration as well as the promise, it is not necessary that it should be signed by both the parties; it is sufficient if the party suing on it is able to produce a writing signed by the party whom he is seeking to charge (k)} And such a writing signed is sufficient to satisfy the 4th section, though it be only a proposal accepted by parol by the party to whom it is made (I). The person, however, who seeks to enforce the agreement has not the other altogether at his mercy, but must either do, or be ready to *do, his own part of the agreement, before he can seek per-formance on the part of the person who has signed (m). But although the written memorandum may be made and signed subsequently to the making of the contract (n), yet it must exist before an action is brought upon it (o).