(b) Schneider v. Norris, 2 M. & S. 286.

(c) See Saunderson v. Jackson, 2 Bos. & P. 238.

(d) Johnson v. Dodgson, 2 M. & W. 653. See Lobb v. Stanley, 5 Q. B. (48 E. C. L. R.) 574; Lewis v. Lord Kensington, 2 C. B. (52 E. C. L. R.) 463.

(e) Hubert v. Treherne, 3 M. & G. (42 E. C. L. R.) 743. See also Caton v. Caton, L. E. 2 H. L. 127; 36 L. J. (Ch.) 886.

(f) Schneider v. Norris, supra.

{g) Geary v. Physic, 5 B. & C. (11 E. C. L. R.) 234.

(h) Bennett v. Brumfitt, L. R. 3 C. P. 28; 37 L. J. (C. P.) 25.

(i) Godwin v. Francis, 39 L. J. (C. P.) 121; L. E. 5 C. P. 295. See also Williams v. Prisco, 22 Ch. Div. 441.

1 Among the American cases are Kinghorne v. Montreal Tel. Co., 18 U. C. Q. B. 66; Durkeef. Vermont Central E. Co., 29 Vt. 140; Dunning v. Roberts, 35 Barb. 468; Beach v. E. E., 37 N. Y. 457. See 4 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 207. In Indiana (Rev. Stat. 1881, § 4180) there is a statutory provision that contracts by telegraph shall be considered contracts in writing.

(k) Laythoarp v. Bryant, 2 Bing. N. C. (29 E. C. L. R.) 735.

(l) Reuss v. Picksley, L. R. 1 Ex. 342; 35 L. J. (Ex.) 218, Ex. Ch., confirming Warner v. Willington, 3 Drew. 523, 25 L. J. Ch. 662; Smith v. Neale, 2 C. B. (N. S.) (89 E. C. L. E.) 67; 26 L. J. (C. P.) 143.

(m) Eeuss v. Picksley, L. E. 1 Ex. 342, 353; 35 L. J. (Ex.) 218, Ex. Ch.

(n) Leroux v. Brown, 22 L. J. (C. P.) 1; 12 C. B. (74 E. C. L. E.) 801; Jones v. Victoria Graving Dock Co., 2 Q. B. D. 313, 46 L. J. (Q. B., etc.) 212. In the latter case, where the minute book of a company contained a resolution admitting a contract, the signature of the chairman, affixed at the next meeting to attest the accuracy of the minute, was held a sufficient, signature of the company's agent to satisfy the 4th sect.

(o) Bill v. Bament, 9 M. & W. 36, quaeresee Fricker v. Tomlinson, 1 M. & G. (39 E. C. L. E.) 772.

1 As it was in Penniman v. Hartshorn, 13 Mass. 87; Hawkins v. Chace, 19 Pick. 502; Ballard v. Walker, 3 Johns. Cas. 60; Clason v. Bailey, 14 Johns. 487; Douglass v. Spears, 2 N. & McC. 207; Anderson v. Harold, 10 Ohio, 399; Smith v. Smith, 8 Blackf. 208. By the New York Revised Statutes the memorandum must be subscribed; and it is held, therefore, that a signature elsewhere than at the bottom or end of the writing is insufficient to satisfy the statute as thus varied: Davis v. Shields, 26 Wend. 341. [See Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ross, 10 Abb. Pr. 260; Hubbell v. Livingtone, 1 Code Rep. (N. Y.) 63.]-R.

Signature by initials is valid and parol evidence is admissible to apply them: Sanborn v. Flagler, 9 Allen, 474. A telegram accepting an offer and completing a contract is sufficient to take a case out of the statute: Trevor v Wood, 36 N. Y. 307. [See Reed, Statute of Frauds, Chap, xvi.]-s.

The last point I shall mention common to all the contracts falling within this section regards the consequence of non-compliance with its provisions. This consequence is, not that the unwritten contract shall be void, but that no action shall be brought to charge the contracting party by reason of it (p). And cases may occur in which the contract may be made available without bringing an action on it; and in which, consequently, it may, *though unwritten, be of some avail. Thus, for instance, if money have been paid in pursuance of it, that payment is a good one for all purposes : thus, where 100 was paid by the incoming tenant to the outgoing one, partly for himself, and partly for the landlady, in pursuance of a verbal agreement, and the outgoing tenant refused to pay the landlady her share, saying that there was no writing, and that words were but wind; on the landlady bringing her action, Lord Ellenbovough nonsuited her, on the ground that the agreement, being for an interest in land, ought to have been in writing; but the Court of King's Bench set aside the nonsuit, with Lord Ellen-borough's own concurrence (q)} And where, to an action for goods sold, the defendant pleaded an agreement that, in consideration of the defendant giving up possession of certain premises and stock-in-trade, the plaintiff should pay him 100, and also discharge him from all debts and causes of action, which premises had been given up and the 100 paid; it was decided that this accord and satisfaction might be proved by parol; although, if it had been required to enfore the delivery up of possession of the premises, a writing might have been necessary (r).

(p) Per Bosanquet, J., in Laythoarp v. Bryant, supra. See Britain v. Bos-Biter, 48 L. J. (Q. B.) 362; 11 Q. B. D. 123; Maddison v. Alderson, per Lord Blackburn, 8 App. Cas. 488; 52 L. J. (Q. B.) 749; In re Hilliard, 2D.&L, 919; Sweet v. Lee, 3 M. & G. (42 E. C. L. R.) 452; Crosby v. Wadsworth, 6 East, 611; Carrington v. Boots, 2 M. & W. 248.

(q) Griffith v. Young, 12 East, 213. See Cocking v. Ward, 1 C. B. (50 E. C. L. E.) 858; Pulbrook v. Lawes, 1 Q. B. D. 284; 45 L. J. (Q. B.) 178.

1 To the same effect is Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383.-R. 106

Although these lectures only profess to deal with *contracts under their Common Law aspect, and to treat of such subjects as have been, previously to the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 1875, enforceable by action in the Courts of Common Law, it should be briefly noticed here that the Courts of Equity would enforce the complete performance of an agreement which came within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, even where the absence of a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute would have been an insuperable obstacle to success at Law, provided that the party who sought to enforce the agreement had himself partly performed his share of it. In other words, in Equity part performance took the case out of the statute. This doctrine, indeed, had always been confined in Equity to questions relating to land (s), but when the provisions of the Judicature Act of 1873 (t) came into force, which enable the High Court and Court of Appeal to recognize all equitable duties and liabilities appearing in the course of any matter before them, and to grant all remedies in respect of any legal or equitable claim; and which provide, too, that where "there is any conflict between the rules of Equity and the rules of Common Law with reference to the same matter, the rules of Equity shall prevail;" it was thought possible that the equitable doctrine of part performance might *become applicable to contracts other than those to which Courts of Equity had been in the habit of applying it. Accordingly, in Britain v. Rossiter (u), it was sought to apply it to a contract of service. There the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an agreement in writing, but not signed, for the plaintiff to serve for a year as clerk and accountant to the defendant. The agreement was concluded on Saturday, the 21st of April, 1877; the plaintiff's service began on the Monday following. It was, therefore, a contract not to be performed within a year, and a writing, duly signed, became necessary in the event of an action being brought on the contract. The plaintiff served some months, and was then dismissed at a month's notice, and subsequently brought his action. The Court of Appeal, before whom it was contended that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, on the ground of part performance taking the case out of the statute, refused to extend the application of the doctrine to any cases in which Equity had not applied it, holding that to apply it to a contract of service which could not have come within the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery would be to construe the Judicature Acts as conferring new rights, whereas in truth they only change the procedure; and the Court held that the plaintiff could not maintain the action. By this decision, *therefore, the law seems now to be settled that the doctrine of part performance only applies to cases relating to land. It is not intended here to go further into the subject of part performance, or to consider what acts of part performance have been held sufficient to, take the case out of the statute. The student who desires further information on the subject is recommended to peruse carefully the judgment in the case of Maddison v. Alderson (x), recently decided in the

House of Lords; and is also referred to the case of Lester v. Foxcroft, and the notes thereto in White and Tudor's "Leading Cases in Equity (y)."

(r) Lavery v. Turley, 30 L. J. (Ex.) 49.

(s) Britain v. Rossiter, 48 L. J. (Q. B.) 364, 366; 11 Q. B. D. 129, 130.

(t) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 24, sub-ss. 4, 7, and 6. 25, sub-s. 11.

(u) 48 L. J. (Q. B.) 362; 11 Q. B. D. 123.

(x) 8 App. Cas. 467; 52 L. J. (Q. B.) 737 (H. L.), affirming Alderson v. 108

I have now pointed out to you the matters in which all simple contracts agree, and the practical differences which exist between the effect of written and that of verbal contracts, although in theory both sorts fall within the denomination Simple Contracts. I have described the consequences which follow from the rules of evidence upon the reduction of any contract whatever into writing, and I have begun to describe those consequences which follow from the provisions of the Statute of Frauds, in the cases to which it is applicable. But as it is impossible to finish the consideration of that statute this evening, I shall proceed with it in the next Lecture.

Maddison, 7 Q. B. D. 174 (C. A.), 50 L. J. (Q. B.) 466; and reversing S. C. 5 Ex. Div. 293; 49 L. J. (Q. B.) 801. (y) White & Tu. vol. i. p. 828, 5th ed.