Although most frequently employed as a remedy for the conversion of goods, the action of assumpsit is available in a number of other cases. For the sake of clearness, the following torts to which the doctrine applies will be separately considered:

1. Conversion.

2. Deceit.

1 1892, 18 N. Y. Supp. 460. 445

3. Trespass on land.

4. Abduction of child or servant: inducing breach of contract.

5. False imprisonment: services under compulsion.

6. Usurpation of office.

7. Infringement of patent rights.

Sec. 277. (1) Conversion

The tort of conversion, for the purpose of this discussion, may be said to consist of either (a) the wrongful destruction of personal property, or (6) the wrongful taking, retention, use, or disposition of personal property. In cases of the first class, the wrongdoer derives no benefit from his act and the only remedy against him is an action for damages.1 In cases of the second class, the wrongdoer is commonly enriched, and to the extent of the benefit received by him may be obliged to make restitution. This obligation is everywhere recognized, in case the converter sells the property and receives the proceeds of the sale.2 And though, as has been pointed out {ante, Sec. 273), there is authority for confining the doctrine to cases in which the count for money had and received is available, the better rule is that restitution may be demanded, instead of damages, even where the wrongdoer retains or consumes the goods.3

In jurisdictions where it is insisted that the count for money had and received is the only form of assumpsit that may be employed against a tort-feasor, restitution cannot be enforced in case the goods have been disposed of by barter, instead of by sale.1 With the obvious purpose of avoiding the limitation, however, it has been held that where the property taken by the converter in exchange for the converted goods "is received as money or as money's worth [i.e. at an agreed money valuation] the plaintiff may elect so to treat it and recover accordingly." 2 And in one case the court went so far as to hold that the promise of a purchaser from the converter to pay for the goods may be deemed to have been accepted by the converter as the equivalent of money.3

1 See Reynolds p. Padgett, 1894, 94 Ga. 347; 21 S. E. 570.

2 Bettis v. McNider, 1903, 137 Ala. 588; 34 So. 813; 97 Am. St. Rep. 59; Jester v. Notts, 1904, 57 Atl. 1904, (Del.); Bates-Farley Sav. Bank v. Desmukes, 1899, 107 Ga. 212; 33 S. E. 175; Staat v. Evans, 1864, 35 I11. 455; Leighton p. Preston, 1850, 9 Gill (Md.) 201; Johnson-Brinkham Co. v. Central Bank, 1893, 116 Mo. 558; 22 S. W. 813; 38 Am. St. Rep. 615; Seavey p. Dana, 1881, 61 N. H. 339; Olive v. Olive, 1886, 95 N. C. 485; Pryor p. Morgan, 1895, 170 Pa. St. 568; 33 Atl. 98. See also cases ante, Sec. 273, and 4 Cyc. 332, n. 67.

. 3 Roberts p. Evans, 1872, 43 Cal. 380; City of Elgin p. Joslyn, 1891, 136 111. 525; 26 N. E. 1090; Cooper v. Helsabeek, 1838, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 14; Crane v. Murray, 1904, 106 Mo. App. 697; 80 S. W. 280; Harman v. Loscalzo, 1910, 125 N. Y. Supp. 517; Tidewater Quarry Co., p. Scott, 1906, 105 Va. 160; 52 S. E. 835; 115 Am. St. Rep. 864; Walker v. Norfolk, etc., R. Co., 1910, 67 W. Va. 273; 67 S. E. 722; Heber p. Estate of Heber, 1909, 139 Wis. 472 ; 121 N. W. 328. See also cases cited ante, Sec. 273, and 4 Cyc. 334, n. 69.

Where the conversion consists of the wrongful taking or detention of money, or of negotiable paper received as money, it is obvious that the count for money had and received is immediately available against the wrongdoer.4