If it is true, as contended in the preceding section, that there is a separate election against each of two or more joint tort-feasors, it would seem to follow that in case of successive converters of the same property an election as to one converter is not conclusive as to another. For example, if A's goods are seized by X and subsequently sold by X to Y, who refuses to deliver them up to A, the commencement of an action against X, even though held to be an election as to X, should not be regarded as an election as to Y.1

1 See Elliot v. Porter, 1837, 5 Dana (35 Ky.) 299; 30 Am. Dee. 689; In re Pierson's Estate, 1897, 19 App. Div. 478; 46 N. Y. Supp. 557, 562; Huffman v. Hughlett, 1883, 11 Lea (79 Tenn.) 549.

2 Terry v. Munger, 1890, 121 N. Y. 161; 24 N. E. 272; 8 L. R. A. 216; 18 Am. St. Rep. 803. See also Du Bose v. Marx, 1875, 52 Ala. 506, 510; Floyd v. Browne, 1829, 1 Rawle (Pa.) 121; 18 Am. Dec. 602.

If, in the case just stated, X purports to sell the goods as A's agent, the bringing of an action by A against X to recover the proceeds of the sale as money had and received to A's use may be evidence of a ratification of the sale;2 and, of course, if the sale is ratified Y cannot be held for conversion. Moreover, even if X does not profess to act for A, the bringing of an action of assumpsit by A against X and the attachment of the goods converted as the property of X, may, it seems, estop A to sue Y, in case Y buys the goods from X without knowledge of the conversion, and in reliance upon the evidence of ownership afforded by A's conduct in suing X in assumpsit and attaching the goods as X's.3

1 Rice v. Reed, [1900] 1 Q. B. 54; Huffman v. Hughlett, 1883, 11 Lea (79 Tenn.) 549. In the latter case the court, speaking of waiver of tort, said (p. 554): "It is simply an election between remedies for an act done, leaving the rights of the injured party against the wrongdoers unimpaired until he has obtained legal satisfaction. If it were otherwise, the suing of any one of a series of tort-feasors, even the last, on an implied promise, where there was clearly no contract, would give him a good title and release all the others."

2 See Marsh v. Pier, 1833, 4 Rawle (Pa.) 273; 26 Am. Dec. 131.

3 Nield v. Burton, 1882, 49 Mich. 53; 12 N. W. 906. In this case it was said that the fact that the action against the first converter was brought in a court which was without jurisdiction did not affect the estoppel. See also Rowe v. Sam Weichselbaum Co., 1908, 3 Ga. App. 504; 60 S. E. 275.