7 Goodloe v. Godley, 13 Smedes &

M. 233; Woodin v. Foster, 16 Barb, 146.

8 Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Eason v. Isbell, 42 Ala, 456; Townsend v. Heer Dry Goods Co., 85 Mo. 503; Guignon v. Trust Co., 156 111. 135; Bank of Metropolis v. Brant, 2 Cranch, C. C. 530; Bank of U. S. v. O'Neale, 2 Cranch, C. C. 466.

9 Barker v. Fullerton, 11 La. Ann. 25; People's Bank v. Keech, 26 Md, 521; Jenks v. Doylestown Bank, 4 Watts & S. 505.

10Rahm v. Philadelphia Bank, 1 Rawle, 335; Britton v. Doylestown Bank, 5 Watts & S. 87; Hallowell v. Curry, 41 Pa. 322; Ogden v. Dobbin, 2 N. Y. Super. Ct. 112; State Bank v. Napier, 6 Humph. 270; Bank of U. S. v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543; Merchants' Bank v. Elderkill, 25 N. Y. 178; Remington v. Harrington, 8 Ohio, 507. It is certain the demand is sufficient if the note is at the bank for collection. But suppose the note is not there at maturity, and the maker does not come there to pay, and makes no deposit paper be there for collection, but the fact be unknown to the bank officers, there is no sufficient demand.11 Referring again to the hour of demand, we will not repeat what has been already said as to the hour of demand, where the place of payment is an office or bank.12 As we have seen, also, the acceptor may make his acceptance payable at a particular place, and demand at that place is all that is required.13 If the bill is addressed to the drawer at a certain place and is accepted generally, a demand at that place of address is sufficient, unless the holder knows that it is a wrong address or could have so learned while he was presenting the bill.14 The converse of the preceding rules is also settled, and therefore, if the place of payment be designated in any of the ways indicated heretofore, demand to hold an indorser or drawer must be made at that particular place.15

A misnomer of the particular place that does not mislead does not vitiate in any way the binding force of the stipulation.16 But it may happen that the particular bank or counting-room or place of business has ceased to exist or is closed. Yet it seems that a demand there is sufficient;17

11 Chicopee Bank v. Philadelphia Bank, 8 WalL 641. The decision was made in a case where the bill had slipped into a drawer for waste papers in the cashier's desk. It was an acceptance, and the acceptors were insolvent at maturity. The suit was by the holders against the collecting bank for damages.

12 See Sec. 250, ante.

13 See Sec. 233, ante, note 2.

14 Struthers v. Kendall, 41 Pa. 214; Pierce v. Struthers, 27 Pa. 249. But the qualification in the last case is wrong. A demand at such place is all that is necessary. McClane v. Fitch, 4 B. Mon. 599.

15 See cases cited in note 10, supra, and Smith v. McLean, 4 N. C. 509, and Sec. 233, ante, note 2.

16 Powell v. State Bank, 1 Disney, 260; Worley v. Waldron, 3 Sneed, 548.

17 Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41; Spann v. Baltzell, 1 Branch, 301; Roberts v. Mason, 1 Ala. 373. But but it is doubtful on the authorities whether it would be necessary. The rule ought to be that if the bank is closed and out of business, no demand at all is necessary. A personal demand, however, under such circumstances ought to be considered proper. The place of business may be occupied by the successor of the particular business house or bank caused by its merger with another business. A demand at the place would still be sufficient.18 If another bank is occupying the premises designated, demand upon it is good;19 but a better rule would be that if the bank were named as a place of payment, and were still in business in the same city, the name of the bank would control the premises where it did business. If there be another bank, not necessarily at the same premises, which is closing up the affairs of the bank designated, a demand at such bank would be good.20 There is some authority, too, for the statement that if the paper is "negotiable " at a particular bank, where nothing is said as to the place of payment, it is equivalent to the statement that the paper is payable at that bank,21 and there is authority to the contrary.22 The second rule stated is the better one. The place of payment designated need not appear on the paper. It is sufficient if the parties agree upon it;23 but such an agreement between maker and holder, or drawer and holder, could hardly be binding on an indorser;24 yet, as between acceptor and holder, the be at some reasonable hour;4 but this proposition is disputed. But the demand, where it is not actually personal, but merely constructively so, is the one that causes the most difficulty. The person making the demand may know or may not know the residence or place of business of the party upon whom a demand is to be made. The most general proposition that may be advanced, assuming the demandant to know the facts, is that the person making the demand, where no place of demand is provided for, may select either the place of business or the residence, if the maker, drawee or acceptor, as the case may be, has both a residence and a place of business.5 And a good demand at either place is sufficient; the demandant is not required to resort to the residence if he does not find the party at his place of business, or vice versa6 But if the party has a place of business the preferable practice will be to make the demand at that place, whether it be an office or a business house. The demand should be made during business hours if the party be not found there; otherwise a demand there is not good.7 If business hours are over and the place of business closed, or the party not therein, the alternative remaining is to resort to the residence.8 The preliminary question to be determined in serving at a place of business is whether or no it be the party's place of business. If the place has been his place of business, but is abandoned, the demand should be made at the residence.9 So it seems to have been held where the makers had failed and an assignee was in possession.10 If the party has led the public to suppose that he has a place of business, that place will be considered his place of business for a demand.11 A comparison of cases upon the subject of service of notice of non-payment will be found instructive12 as to determining what is a place of business. If the demand is made at the place of business during business hours, the place of business may be closed. If so, the demand is complete and the paper is dishonored, just as it is dishonored if the residence is closed.13 But in the latter contingency the rule ought to be that if the person has a well-known place of business in the city where he resides, a demand should be made there if the residence is closed. If there be some one in the place of business, if he states that he is the person named his answer may be relied upon.14 If the person wanted is not there, demand should be made upon the clerk or one apparently in charge, and it will be sufficient. If the place of business is open, but no one there, the author's opinion is that the situation is the same as if the office were closed. Certainly, after waiting a reasonable time, a written demand left there designatiug some place to come and pay ought, in common sense, to be sufficient; but it has been held that a notification to a party to come to a certain place and pay a note was not a sufficient demand,15 but it did not appear in that case that any attempt at an actual demand had been made. Certainly the person ought not to be expected to wait an unreasonable length of time until some one came in, and if necessary to wait until business hours were over. Caution probably would dictate a search for the residence of the party. But it is, not infrequently the case with men of business in large cities that their residences are many miles away and a demand there would be impracticable. Therefore the rule ought to be that, if a demandant goes to an office or place of business of a party and, finding no one there, leaves a notice in some proper place in the office, as upon the desk of the party, if he can determine it, such a demand is sufficient. It is certainly sufficient in any place where the custom obtains and is so general that every one is supposed to have knowledge of it. But it may be that the person upon whom the demand is to be made has no place of business. In that case his residence must be sought and a demand made there. The law applicable to a demand at the residence is the same for whatever reason the demand is made there, whether it be because the demandant chooses the residence because he prefers it to the place of business,16 or because it is too late to make demand at the place of business, or because there is no place of business,17 or because the residence is designated as the place of payment. In this latter case it is to be observed that the designation of the dwelling-house of the party upon whom demand is to be made, as the place of payment amounts to nothing more than a giving on the paper of the place of residence. The demand nevertheless can be made at the person's place of business, if he has one.18 The question of residence must be determined preliminarily. A man may be fortunate enough to have two residences, a town house and a country house. If the city house is kept open or has some one in charge competent to receive the demand, such as a servant, or even if it be shut up, the demand made there upon such person is good.19 If the place is closed up and no one there, a search showing due diligence must be made to ascertain the present residence of the person sought.20 If the new place of business or present residence of the party is found to be in another state, demand ought to be made at the former residence or place of business,21 although this cannot be considered necessary.

Purcell v. Allemong, 22 Gratt. 739, holds that if the bank has been removed, notice of that fact must be given to the drawer.

18 Sanderson v. Oakley, 14 La. 373; Roberts v. Mason, 1 Ala. 373; but not necessary, it seems.

19 Faulkner v. Faulkner, 73 Mo. 327; Lane v. Bank of West Tennessee, 9 Heisk. 419.

20 Roberts v. Mason, 1 Ala. 373; Gelpecke v. Lovell, 18 Iowa, 17.

21A reference to a case has been lost by the author, but there is one such decision.

22 Beeding v. Thornton, 3 Cranch, C. C. 698. But if the note is negotiable at another bank than where it is payable, the bank where negotiated is not made the place for demand. Watkins v. Crouch, 5 Leigh, 522.

23 Pearson v. Bank of Metropolis, 1 Pet. 89; State Bank v. Hurd, 12 Mass. 172; Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449; Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265; Apperson v. Bynum, 5 Cold. 341.

24 Meyer v. Hibsher, 47 N. Y. 265; Smith v. McLean, 4 N. C. 509, where agreement binds the drawer and indorser.25 But if the in-dorser of the note puts upon it the maker's residence, when he indorses, or, on principle, at any other time, he ought to be bound by a demand at that place,26 unless the holder ascertains or ought to have ascertained that the address was a mistake, or unless the maker had changed his residence afterward to the knowledge, actual or imputed, of the holder. Where the place of demand is provided for as herein stated, presentation there is sufficient whether the person upon whom demand is to be made is found there or not.27 But it should be remembered that if demand is made at a bank it must be during business hours, or if thereafter upon some officer competent to answer while in the bank,28 and if at any other business house it must be during business hours.29