Where the paper itself does not provide for the place of its presentation, as explained in the preceding section, the general rule is that the demand must be a personal demand. This personal service of a demand may be actual or constructive. If it is actually personal, it is made wherever the person upon whom the demand is made may be found. It is immaterial where this may be, whether at his office or place of business;l at his residence;2 or upon the street, if not objected to;3 and it is immaterial at what time the demand is made, provided it the agreement dispensed with the place designated in the paper. See Herring v. Sanger, 3 Johns. Cas. 71, and Nugent v. Mazange, 2 Mart. (O. S.) 264.

25 See Sec. 233, ante, note 2, and notes 14 and 15, supra.

26 Farnsworth v. Mullen, 164 Mass. 112; Nugent v. Mazange, 2 Mart. (0. S.) 264. The limitation is made on the authority of a similar principle. Pierce v. Struthers, 27 Pa. 249.

27 See cases in notes 8 and 9, supra. 28 See Sec. 250, ante.

29 See Sec. 250, ante.

1 See cases in note 5, infra.

2 See cases in note 5, infra.

3 King v. Crowell, 61 Me. 244; Townsend v. Heer Dry Goods Co., 85 Mo. 503; Parker v. Kellogg, 158 Mass. 90 (the demand was not objected to); but King v. Holmes, 11 Pa. 456, holds the demand not good if the person had a place of business. A barnyard may be considered a proper place for demand, no objection being made. Baldwin v. Farnsworth, 10 Me. 414.

4See g 250, ante.

5Bateson v. Clark, 37 Mo. 31; Winans v. Davis, 18 N. J. Law, 276; Otsego Co. Bank v. Warren, 18 Barb. 290 (a partnership); Arnold v. Dresser, 90 Mass. 435; Estes v. Tower, 102 Mass. 65; Barnes v. Vaughan, 6 R. I. 259; Burrows v. Hannegan, 1 McLean, 309; Hartford Bank v. Greene, 11 Iowa, 476; People's Nat. Bank v. Luttertoh, 95 N. C. 495; Holtz v. Boppe, 37 N. Y. 634; Adams v. Leland, 30 N. Y. 309; Simmons v. Belt, 35 Mo. 461.

6 At place of business sufficient. Wallace v. Crilley, 46 Wis. 577; Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 How. 368; Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick. 413; Baum-gardner v. Reeves, 35 Pa. 250;

Fields v. Mallet, 10 N. C. 465 (but in this case the indorser said the maker was not at home). At residence sufficient. Wiseman v. Chiapella, 23 How. 368. See the cases in note 5, supra, and Ashton v. Dull, 31 Leg. Int. 61. But if the place of business is abandoned, the residence must be sought for. Granite Bank v. Ayres, 16 Pick. 392. See Demond v. Burnham, 133 Mass. 339. Goldsborough v. Jones, 2 Cranch, C. C. 305, holds that if the maker is absent from his place of employment during business hours, demand must be made at his dwelling-house. The decision was a very palpable blunder. 7 See Sec. 250, ante.

8 See notes 5 and 6, supra,

9 Granite Bank v. Ayres, 16 Pick. 392. Compare Demond v. Burn-ham, 133 Mass. 339, and Talbot v. Nat Bank of Com., 129 Mass. 67.

10 Benedict v. Caffe, 5 Duer, 226.

11 McHenry v. Kellar, 6 La. Ann. 326.

12 See Sec. Sec. 274, 280, post

13 Baumgardner v. Reeves, 35 Pa. 250; Shedd v. Brett, 1 Pick. 413 (for place of business); Wiseman v. Chi-apella, 23 How. 368 (for residence). But compare Bank of Red Oak v. Orvis, 42 Iowa, 691; Apperson v. Bynum, 5 Cold. 341.

14Hunt v. Maybee, 7 N. Y. 266. And for the propriety of making a demand upon the clerk or other person in the office, see Sec. 248, ante, notes 19-24.

15 Barnes v. Vaughan, 6 R I. 259. And see Farmers' Bank v. Duvall, 7 Gill & J. 78. Banks are permitted to do this by a custom in New England. Whitwell v. Johnson, 17 Mass. 449. The best commentary upon this rule is the note 6 to this case by the editor of the edition of 1864, Benjamin Rand, Esq.

16 See note 6, ante, as to this right.

17 Bank of Red Oak v. Orvis, 42 Iowa, 691; Apperson v. Bynum, 5 Cold. 341.

18 Frost v. Stokes, 55 N. Y. Super.

If the residence is occupied by the party, family or servants, demand may be made there although the person sought is temporarily absent.22 The time of demand must be within reasonable hours, but what they are has not been accurately determined.23 If the residence is no longer occupied by him but by some one else, further search must be made for his residence, in accordance with the rules as to reasonable diligence. It is to be noted that in questions of demand, the bolder, if he employs an agent, must give the agent all the information which he possesses, for it must be shown not only that the agent exercised due diligence, but that the holder did also.24 But it is a reasonable qualification to this statement that the holder is to be considered any person or corporation which has the paper indorsed to it or transferred to it, though solely for collection;25 and such a holder is not an agent in the sense that the person who transfers must communicate his knowledge as to the residence of the person upon whom demand is to be made, although reasonable diligence may require an inquiry to be made of such transferrer or indorser. The demandant must take notice, of course, of addresses upon the paper itself.26

Ct 76; Miller v. Henner, 3 Mart (N. S.) 587. The demand may be made at the place of business as well.

19 Stewart v. Eden, 2 Caines, 121 (a case as to notice). See Goodwin v. McCoy, 13 Ala. 271, and Runyon v. Montfort, 44 N. C. 371, which were also cases as to notice.

20 Stayler v. Ball, 24 Md. 183. If known, demand must be there. La. Ins. Co. v. Shamburgh, 2 Mart (N. S.) 511.

21 Adams v. Leland, 30 N. Y. 309; Central Bank v. Allen, 16 Me. 41. A removal to a new state excuses a demand. Magruder v. Bank of

Washington, 9 Wheat. 598; Gist v. Lybrand, 3 Ohio, 307; Wheeler v. Field, 6 Met 290; Grafton Bank v. Cox, 13 Gray, 503; Sanford v. Norton, 17 Vt 285; Herrick v. Baldwin, 17 Minn. 209; Foster v. Julien, 24 N. Y. 28. But not if the removal is in the same state. Bigelow v. Keller, 6 La. Ann. 59; Reinke v. Wright, 93 Wis. 368.

22 Levy v. Drew, 14 Ark. 334 See Shamburgh v. Commagere, 10 Mart (O. S.) 18; Farley v. Hewson, 10 La. Ann. 783.

23 See Sec. 250, ante. 24Haly v. Brown, 5 Pa. 178.