The explanation given for analgesia in the hypnotic subject is that it is induced by suggestion, reasoning from the fact that expected pain is much more keenly felt than that which comes unexpectedly.

Again I do not accord with these gentlemen. I believe the analgesia (insensibility to pain) to be the result of a concentration of the consciousness in another direction, which I illustrated in the case of the man who injured his leg in the railway accident without at the time being aware of the fact.

The derangement of memory sometimes following the hypnotic condition is the next symptom discussed by Dr. Moll. He claims that there is an analogy between the occasional forgetting of acts performed consciously in our waking life and the failure to remember, after the hypnotic state, those things which happened in hypnosis. But as this analogy is not sufficient to explain this derangement of memory, he assumes the existence of a double consciousness, which he explains as follows.

"If we think of the life of such a being as divided into several periods a, b, c, d, e, f, g, in the periods a, c, e, g, only the events of those periods will be remembered, so that in the period c, he will remember only what happened in a, and in the period e, what happened in a and c. On the other hand, in the periods b, d, f, both what has happened in them and in a, c, e, will be remembered. This idea of double consciousness is supported by Mas Des-soir and Pierre Janet. They hold that human personality is a unity merely to our consciousness, and that it consists really of at least two clearly distinguishable personalities, each held together by its own chain of memories, arguing from the fact that one performs many mental acts unconsciously. They cite as an example the experiment made by a Mr. Barkworth, who, it is claimed, could add up a long column of figures, at the same time carrying on an animated conversation. Dessoir considers that consciousness and memory are two elements of personality, and that in the case of Barkworth just mentioned there may be distinguished the elements of a second personality.

That the mental processes which take place consciously to the man are called the primary consciousness, while those which take place mechanically are called the secondary consciousness.

It is indeed a wonderful fact that European investigators should have reached the same conclusions independently which were arrived at centuries ago by the leading thinkers of Buddhism. This idea of a dual, or triple, or a quadruple consciousness is in no way new. We find it in early writings dating back many centuries before the birth of Christ. An educated Chinese gentleman made for me a translation from a Chinese work, the title of which is too intricate to be mentioned here, which taught the fact that there are many separate states of consciousness. According to this gentleman's translation, a doctrine something like the following was advocated: "Man possesses two great brains, and two small brains. One great brain may go to sleep while the other great brain remains awake, and it makes the man do strange things which he, when the other brain awakes, does not know." This is wonderfully like the idea which is held by our modern physiologists, namely, that one portion of the cortical cells of the brain may act independently of the others, and thus give rise to a separate conscious state. We find the modern teachers of Theosophy expounding similar ideas of multiplicity of conscious states.

I do not know that they attribute them, however, to the independent action of certain parts of the brain.

In the case just above mentioned the two consciousnesses exist together. It is stated, however, that they may, under certain circumstances, follow one another. As a demonstration an example of Dessoir's is quoted in which a person took up a dream on the second night where he had left off on the first.

Dr. Moll says further: "Applying this theory of double consciousness to the state of hypnosis, Dessoir thinks that hypnosis simply exhibits the hidden half of our mental life; the part which is called secondary consciousness and which can occasionally be observed in ordinary life, or more plainly in pathological states.

Dr. Moll, in leaving this subject, while he concedes that Dessoir's explanations are valuable, believes that he includes too much in his idea of double Ego, and states that he does not conceive the double consciousness on the same plan as Dessoir.

Post-hypnotic suggestions are discussed at some length by Dr. Moll. He considers that in a certain sense they can be explained by analogy, and supposes the following case:

"I give a letter to X., who has called on me, and ask him to post it on his way home, if he passes a letter-bos. This he does.

"I now give exactly the same commission to T., who is in a hypnotic state without subsequent loss of memory. He also fulfils the request."

In this illustration Dr. Moll does not consider that the fact that Y. posted the letter without conscious act of will, distinguishes his case from that of X., because in this case it is assumed that he also posted the letter mechanically, talking in the meantime to an acquaintance, and not remembering afterwards whether he posted it or not; to assure himself he feels in his pocket for the letter. Now, Dr. Moll says very truly that it would be more striking if X. should perform some action against his will, just as post-hypnotic suggestions are sometimes carried out.

He claims that an analogy to such a post-hypnotic suggestion can be very easily found, and gives the following as an instance.

"We will suppose that A. has lost a dear relation. A. is, in consequence, saddened and depressed, and cannot refrain from tears. Months pass and he grows calm; but when the anniversary of the death arrives he falls into the same state of mental excitement and tears which he cannot conquer. The vivid idea has been enough to throw him, against his will, into a certain state." He also gives, as another analogy, the case of a person who stammers. At home ho does not stammer, but a stranger comes in and he commences, against his will, to stammer, because he expected to do so.