As is well known, hypnosis has only lately been generally recognized as such. Sinnett has pointed out for how long a time the most childish objections were raised against it. For instance, when Clocquet performed a painless operation on a patient whom he had magnetized, Mabru immediately raised the objection that, so far from the patient having been magnetized, he was in a state of coma which had nothing to do with the "passes." The opposition even went so far as to accuse persons anaesthetized by hypnosis of simultation. But in the end the most obstinate doubters - or, at least, those of them of any account - were compelled to admit that there is such a thing as the hypnotic state. Consequently, when discussing simulation I have not to consider whether there is such a thing as hypnosis at all, but whether there is simulation in any particular case.

Those who believed in hypnosis were for a long time regarded as deceivers or deceived. It was occasionally less harshly supposed that a man who busied himself with hypnotism must be suffering from some loss of mental balance. Latterly, Mendel, in a popular lecture, has expressed himself in this sense. He thinks that many men have given proof of their own pathological state in their autobiographies. Mendel certainly mentions no names, but judging from the context it is evident that he refers to those investigators who have described their own personal experiences of hypnosis. His charge would apply to such men as Forel, Bleuler, Obersteiner, as well as to Wundt, who described his own case of auto-somnambulism, and to many others. If Mendel's diagnosis is correct, then all the men mentioned must be looked upon as pathological specimens whose opinions are not to be taken seriously. Such a method of attacking unpleasant adversaries is a mere invention on Mendel's part, and cannot be too severely stigmatized. Even a newspaper of very moderate views put down Mendel's method of controversy as outside, the bounds of legitimate scientific discussion.

The newspaper in question added the ironical remark that it was strange that Mendel, who considered all persons who carried out hypnotic experiments to be of unsound mind, should have related how he had performed many such experiments himself.

In the first place, I think that simulation is much rarer than is generally believed. It has been too much the habit to look for one physical or objective symptom which could not be simulated, and settle the question of fraud from its presence or absence. And yet this is exactly the opposite of what is generally done in judging of mental states. When we want to diagnose a case and decide whether it is insanity or not, no authority on mental disorders would suppose fraud simply because some bodily symptom was absent. He will consider and weigh the case as a whole. Even when each symptom taken separately might be fraudulent they would be weighed against one another and a diagnosis formed from them. If the doctor also finds some symptom which cannot be simulated, he will weigh this too, but he will not conclude fraud from its absence. It is true that in this way the conviction may be only subjective, or rather it will be clear only to those who have studied mental disease. The outsider may often be able to raise the objection that this or that symptom may be feigned; but no specialist would allow himself to be influenced by this.

If we apply this to hypnosis, which is also a mental state, it follows that only he who has studied hypnosis practically is in a position to diagnose it, although many a person who has no knowledge whatever of hypnotic experiment considers that he is able to judge of hypnotism, express an opinion on it, and demand consideration for his views. Kron and Sperling have very rightly contested this assumption. It is not correct to diagnose fraud in hypnotism from the absence of a certain physical symptom. Even if each separate symptom may be feigned, the experienced experimenter will diagnose by summing up the different symptoms and comparing their relation to each other. It is satisfactory if he finds an un-feignable symptom besides; this is an objective proof, convincing even those who have no practical knowledge of hypnosis. But we must bear in mind that objective physical symptoms are more seldom found in hypnosis than in mental diseases. The first is a transitory mental state, in which objective physical change is less likely to occur than in mental disorders, which last for months and years.

However, we must, of course, try to find physical symptoms in hypnosis. Many authors have done so, Charcot in particular. Not only did he lend the weight of his name to the acceptance of hypnotism, but he is also to be credited with having searched for objective symptoms. We must, however, remember that the school of Nancy sought for objective symptoms and found them, though different from Charcot's; I mean the blisters, etc., produced by suggestion. It is, consequently, erroneous to consider that the essential difference between the two schools is to be found in the question of simulation. To exclude fraud we look for symptoms which cannot be voluntarily simulated; it is indifferent whether these are produced by suggestion or not There are symptoms which are produced by suggestion, and which are independent of the subject's will. Herein lies the chief difference between the school of Nancy and that of Charcot. The Nancy school believes that all the symptoms are caused by suggestion, even those independent of the will; while the school of Charcot finds bodily symptoms which are independent of the will and of suggestion - e.g., the increased neuro-muscular irritability met with in the lethargic state.

Consequently, suggestion is the main point on which the two schools. differ.

That there is a practical distinction between the questions of suggestion and fraud is shown by a whole series of observations. The case of Siemerling teaches us this. His subject was hemianaesthetic both with regard to sight and feeling - i.e.y the power of sight was limited on the side on which the skin was without feeling. The field of vision was concentrically narrowed, so that anything beyond a certain distance from the point on which the eyes were fixed could not be seen. Now, in hypnosis the sense of feeling on the hemianaesthetic side was restored by suggestion, and as soon as this happened the eye on the corresponding side became normal, without direct suggestion. Westphal and Siemerling thought this an objective proof of hypnosis; and, as a matter of fact, I think that we must agree with them.