Naturally, the juggler takes great care not to direct the spectators to look in any particular direction. If he were to do this the spectators would discover his object, and would not look at the spot which the juggler wishes, and the latter would not attain his end.

On the other hand, there are also cases in which a desired effect is attained simply by assuring the person concerned that the effect would appear. In most cases he is able to present arbitrarily the appearance of such an effect; but not always, however. An example brought forward by Bonniot should make this clear. One says to a person who is embarrassed, "You are getting red in the face now!" It is well known that many people really blush when the conviction that they are blushing is aroused in their minds. Now, a proceeding of this nature is called a suggestion, and should enable us to form a conception of what "suggestion" really means. We have seen that an effect (blushing) has been produced by merely suggesting the idea of it. If we base our conception of suggestion on the process just mentioned, then suggestion itself is a method of producing an effect by calling the imagination into play. This definition, which I laid down long ago, considerably restricts the whole conception of what is meant by suggestion, when compared with other definitions. For example, when Bernheim so defines suggestion as to include l'acte par lequel une idee est introduite dans le cerveau et acceptie par lui, we cannot under any circumstances in the present day accept such a wide concept.

Other authors also, such as Berillon, go much too far in their definition of suggestion: according to them we should eventually be compelled to include every possible kind of influence - reason, tuition, enlightenment - in our idea of suggestion. In spite of this, Hirschlaff objects that my definition is much too wide in its scope. Hirschlaff thinks it would include the source of many convictions which are brought about in a perfectly normal manner, and which have nothing whatever to do with the process of suggestion. "For example, if I say to an acquaintance, 'Some one has just told me that fire has broken out in your house during your absence,' my friend's motor and emotional spheres are both affected by the conviction which my statement has brought home to him. But that is not a case of suggestion." This last remark is perfectly correct, but in nowise contradicts the definition given above. In Hirschlaff's case the motor and emotional results did not occur because external influence had aroused the notion that such results would occur, but rather that the person in question was logically convinced from previous experience that what he had been told could be believed, his informant having no interest in telling an untruth, being therefore, so far, trustworthy.

As Bechterew also has insisted, the most important point in suggestion is that the influence must be of a direct nature, because it is not the Ego of the subject which brings about logical convictions and the like. Consequently, if the above definition be properly interpreted, there is no necessity to add to it. It must, of course, be admitted that misapprehensions are always possible: this we have seen from the very nature of the objections raised by Hirschlaff. Still that is no reason why we should not join William Hirsch and Lipps, and include the production of an effect, even when the conditions are inadequate, among the characteristics of hypnosis. If I tell a person on whose forehead a fly has settled that he feels an itching in that region, and he does really experience the sensation, that is not a case of suggestion. For here we have the adequate condition - the irritation caused by the fly. Even if in the case just stated, the person concerned were so lost in thought that he did not feel the itching until I called his attention to it, we should not be justified in speaking of suggestion. The mere fact of attracting his attention, coupled with the irritation caused by the fly, would be quite sufficient to make him feel the itching.

Similarly in HirschlafTs case, the man's belief that fire had broken out in his house was aroused by conditions which must be considered adequate; on the other hand, if he had been sitting hypnotized in his room and had believed the room to be on fire because he was told that such was the case, the physical conditions would not have been adequate. Anyway, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, we may formulate our definition as follows: - Suggestion is a process by means of which an effect may be produced, even when the necessary physical conditions are absent, by arousing the notion that the desired effect is about to be produced.

What is understood by inadequate conditions has been discussed by Lipps in his well-known essay, Zur Psychologie der Suggestion. "Sense-stimulation is undoubtedly the adequate condition for arousing perception. As far as the conclusion arrived at is concerned, there are various adequate conditions or means. Thus perception, reflection, or the persuasion of another may all be considered adequate conditions for my arriving at a conclusion. I can sum all this up in single expression - the adequate condition for arriving at a conclusion is 'a rational basis.' Consequently, when a conclusion is induced by suggestion the rational basis is wanting. Finally, consciousness of the value of any object - the pleasure it may produce, its utility, or its ethical or aesthetic worth - is sufficient to bring about a voluntary action. It is possible that custom and some other factors may here play a part."

It is not difficult to perceive that there is no definite limit to "inadequate conditions," since they depend so much on the individuality of the subject: As Lipps points out, the special value of anything may prove an adequate means of inciting a voluntary action. But the concept of value differs with different individuals. In spite of all this, it must be admitted that by recognizing these "inadequate conditions" we can more easily grasp the notion suggestion process.