He goes still further and says: - "This problem of testimony is, as we see, first and foremost a question for the jurist and the historian, and Stern was the first to point this out thoroughly." L. W. Stern himself commences his work Zur Psychologic der Aussage, 1902, with the words, "It is to a problem in applied psychology that this dissertation is intended to be a first contribution." All these historical statements are in so far false that a number of investigators had made experiments relating to the psychology of testimony long before Binet and Stern did so. Stern's work appeared in 1902, whereas the works I refer to appeared in the eighties and nineties of the previous century. Not only were such experiments made in those days, but their application in the administration of justice was thoroughly discussed at the time. There were investigators in the domain of hypnotism who made such experiments long before Stern. It is true that hypnotism was their starting-point, but they very soon recognized that very similar falsifications of memory could be produced without calling in the aid of hypnosis.

Thus, Bernheim, of Nancy, had already published in his book on suggestion that appeared in 1886 several experiments of that kind which he had been induced to undertake by the Tisza-Eszlar trial. Even as early as that he and Liegeois discovered that many very complicated scenes could be suggested to subjects as their own personal experiences, even without the induction of hypnosis. Among the other investigators who at that time worked in this field I may further mention Berillon (Revue de l'Hypnotisme, 1890-92) and Joire (1896). Also, at the Congress of Criminal Anthropology held at Geneva in 1891, Berillon had brought forward a proposition to the effect that in legal investigations a contradictory procedure should be followed instead of the present secret method, so as to prevent as far as possible the testimony delivered being influenced by unconscious suggestion. In consequence of the researches that had already been made in hypnotism and suggestion, a man, who was tried at the Aisnes Assizes in 1892 for murder and attempted murder, was acquitted, because the Court held that suggestion had a great deal to do with the evidence. Consequently this field of research is not quite so new as Lipmann and Stern represent.

If they had only looked through the literature of hypnotism and the back numbers of the Revue de l'Hypnotisme, they would have straightway discovered that a great number of experiments had already been made in respect to the question of falsification of memory without the use of hypnosis. It is certain that these falsifications of memory came about in two ways; in some cases the retro-active suggestion caused the subjects to relate almost spontaneously as personal experience of their own something that had never occurred, but in others the falsificafew cases. I have hardly a personal experience in this direction. I once observed a case of lock-jaw when the subject feared some word would escape him. The spasm was so strong that it was impossible to end it artificially.

Lichtenstadt declared in 1816 that he knew of no case of somnambulism in which indiscreet questions were answered. Delboeuf goes further, and says that when a hypnotic betrays what he wants to conceal, the apparent confession is false. A woman who confesses infidelity under hypnosis, but denies it in the waking state, Delboeuf would certainly regard as faithful. At all events, it is a fact that when such questions are put in hypnosis only the answer is easily suggested, not the betrayal of a real secret. According to Danillo, the statements made by hypnotic subjects are so untrustworthy that he would on principle refuse their being admitted in a court of justice.

It is much easier to attain the end in a circuitous way than by simple suggestion; by suggesting a false premise, for example, as I have mentioned on p. 151. Let the subject be told, for instance, that some person is present in whom he would confide, or that the people he does not wish to tell are absent. But all such statements must invariably be received with caution. For it is perfectly certain that hypnotized people can tell falsehoods as well as if they were awake and that subtle webs of falsehood are invented in hypnosis. Lombroso tried in one case to obtain a confession of a crime that had been proved, though the subject had always denied it. The attempt was useless; the subject told the same tissue of lies as when awake. Delboeuf, Algeri, and Laurent relate similar experiences. In any case, a statement made in hypnosis must be received with caution; it might be an indication, but never a proof.

Du Prel relates the case of a man named K., who was arrested on a charge of murder. There was another prisoner in the same cell, and K., who talked in his sleep, described the murder, and stated he had committed it, but when he awoke he declared he knew nothing of what had occurred. The other prisoner was then induced to question K., while asleep, as to all the details of the crime. K. complied. But he was acquitted of the crime of robbery attended by murder, because the confession he made in his sleep could not be used against him. Howard has reported several American cases in which confession made in hypnosis was used to obtain conviction.

A case of this kind occurred in Indianapolis; in another case that happened in California, Gardener was induced to hypnotize a man accused of murder, and is said to have obtained a confession of the murder in that way.

I must take this opportunity of remarking that the rest of Du Prel's statements in his work on hypnotic crimes will not bear serious criticism. He proposed to employ clairvoyant somnambulists in the detection of all kinds of crime, simply because he believes in any and every occult phenomenon. Kron justly thinks that such views indicate a golden age of criminology.