Several attempts have been made to explain hypnosis from the point of view of psychology; but they are generally marred by two defects; (1) the assumption that more has to be explained than is really called for - a point I have discussed on p. 225 - and (2) an attempt to explain everything by one concept, or rather by some catchword. For this purpose the concept "attention" was formerly much used, because the change in it is most striking in hypnosis; recently, however, it has had to give way to "change in the process of association." I thought, at first, that hypnotic phenomena could be explained by the one word attention, but gave up the idea more than fifteen years ago when I published my own theoretical considerations on the question in an earlier edition of this book. It is not by the use of any term that we shall gain a clearer insight into the phenomena of hypnosis; that can only be achieved by methodical analysis and a careful consideration of all kinds of analogies drawn from non-hypnotic life. At all events, a diversity of processes such as hypnosis presents cannot be explained by a catchword.

Hirschlaff, also, has recently insisted with great justice that if we are to arrive at a definite explanation of hypnotic states we must at least distinguish between the two great groups (cf p. 61).

As the different theories which depend on diversion of the attention are often met with, I shall develop them shortly in what follows. The ensuing explanations are not in contradiction with what has already been said, but are, on the contrary, supplemented by it in many essentials.

We have seen that susceptibility to suggestion is the chief phenomenon of hypnosis. The externally suggested idea of a movement induces the movement, the idea of an object causes a corresponding sense-delusion. However strange and paradoxical the symptoms of hypnosis may appear to us at first sight, there is, as was pointed out on p. 231, no absolute difference between hypnotic and non-hypnotic states. As I mentioned in the passage just referred to, a certain degree of susceptibility to suggestion is normal; but it is not merely confined to sense delusions, but extends to various other kinds of processes as well. Lipps expresses a very similar view in his Theory of Self Projection 1 which he considers closely related to suggestion. "Every consciousness of any condition of relativity in another consciousness necessarily implies the specific tendency to a corresponding experience. This tendency is, however, most direct, and consequently most active, whenever such a state of consciousness is conveyed by visual or audible manifestation of the other, or to speak more precisely, when it stands in direct connection with the aforesaid phenomena of the senses." But apart from the case in which the other person gives direct evidence of a condition, an analogous effect is produced, for example, by a command or an assertion.

If A. tells X. to lift his arm, X. is inclined to do it, but he controls the impulse by his own will, by arousing the opposite idea. The following example may make this clearer. When two people look at each other they both often begin to laugh if one assures the other he is going to laugh. This is a favourite joke among children. But the idea of laughing is a necessary condition for its appearance, and the stronger the idea the quicker will laughter ensue. The laughter may be prevented by arousing in ourselves the contrary idea, and if the will alone is not sufficient it must be supported by some sense-impression. Probably many of my readers have made the same observation in their own cases that I made when at school. We had a master who often talked such nonsense that we were obliged to laugh. One day he asked me why I was laughing, and I told him the reason truthfully. Of course he could do nothing to me as I was in the right. After that, he never asked any boy why he was laughing, but we noticed that he invariably gave us bad marks for our exercises when we had been laughing. It was a petty revenge. To avoid that unpleasant consequence of our laughter, we then took to pricking ourselves with a pin directly we felt we could not help laughing.

The pain drove away the idea of laughter, and so prevented it. This is an example of the prevention of laughter by indirect means - e.g., the sense of feeling. In other cases the idea of laughter may be suppressed directly by means of voluntarily produced opposing ideas.

1 Lipps's Theorie der Einfuhlung. I have rendered "Einfiihlung" - a word recently introduced into German - by "Self-Projection." Although the latter is an ugly term, and the older writers on aesthetics spoke of "Inner Imitation," I cannot think of a better. A simple example will make Lipps's meaning clear. A spectator at a football match often so "feels himself into" the actual position of some particular player that he participates in that man's individual game. - Note by the Translator.

Now, it appears that this process often takes place in ordinary life; the idea of a movement, for example, results in a movement (Joh. Muller) if it is not opposed by a contrary idea. Thus the idea of a movement called up in a subject in or out of hypnosis has a tendency to induce the movement. But in waking life this idea can be made ineffectual by other ideas that are inhibitory. Thus we may say that the hypnotized subject has lost the power of arousing certain inhibitory ideas - i.e.) in hypnosis the inhibitory ideas are inhibited. We have to thank Heidenhain for having first pointed out the importance of inhibitory processes in hypnosis. Munsterberg also thinks that the sole characteristic of a suggested idea is its power to inhibit an opposing idea, and he considers this applies as much . to suggestions in daily life (education, art, politics), as to the phenomena of increased susceptibility to suggestion in hypnosis.

to the defects in the attempts at psychological explanation hitherto given. He specially points out that the various analogies between hypnosis and waking life which I have given certainly exist, and show that hypnosis is a less strange phenomenon than was imagined, but that they do not suffice to explain it; the main point is why the one-sided concentration of the attention, or, as Wundt now prefers to call it, the contraction of consciousness, comes about. Psychology has hitherto been unable to offer an explanation of this point; and Wundt believes that psychology is not to-day able to offer any explanation without the aid of physiology. We must also admit that both the monist and the materialist have a right to put further questions on this subject, especially the following: - i. What is the state of the central nervous system and the other organs during hypnosis ? 2. What is the causal connection between this state and the phenomena of hypnosis ? 3. What is the causal connection between this state and the methods which induce hypnosis and put an end to it ?