THE influence of the unconscious upon the processes of everyday life in normal individuals is shown when groups of ideas, which should work together, are dissociated from one another, or in a more extreme case, when a hidden complex determines our thoughts and actions without our knowing it.

Such dissociation, however, is only another, but rather extreme case of what we are quite familiar with in everyday life, for example the influence of self-interest in determining beliefs and leading to what we call prejudices

In normal life men often tend to keep two sets of ideas, as it were, in compartments of the mind shut off from one another. Thus the man who is religious on Sunday, but fails to put his creed into practice in business on Monday, avoids unpleasant mental controversy by keeping the two sorts of ideas and impulses - religious and business - as completely apart as possible. We also find some men highly trained in scientific method, who drop all attempt at rational thought when it comes to politics. It would be extremely difficult, if not painful, for them to have to control their social prejudices by the ideals of objective impartiality which as scientists they hold should determine our search for truth. Hence the two departments of thought are kept separate. And it is characteristic of the antagonism within the self that considerable annoyance may be caused in such a man when an attempt is made by another person to bring the two departments into definite relation for him.

Dissociation.

The Freudians hold that the influence of the unconscious in the normal mind is also shown in many slips of the tongue, in unintentional actions, and in the forgetting of things when there is an unconscious aversion from remembering them. Thus it sometimes happens that one repeatedly forgets something which is quite simple, and, one would suppose, quite fixed in the memory. In one case a name I constantly forgot, in spite of reminders, proved to be connected with an unpleasant idea associated with a special aspect of the war; and another repeatedly forgotten word was connected with a certain aspect of the father-complex. Many examples are given by Freud, and more convincing ones by Dr. Ernest Jones. The student, to whom this idea is new usually finds examples unconvincing at first; but the frequency with which such possible sources can be traced is remarkable, even allowing for the fact that life being what it is, many ideas will be associated with some unpleasant memory. One must, however, bear in mind the constant danger of guiding associations by a theory held concerning them; certainly we have not, and can scarcely ever have, evidence to the effect that most of our forgetting is due to repression, as is held by some Freudians. With this warning in mind, I may give a simple example of my own in detail. With the name "horse-chestnut" I have, of course, been familiar from childhood. On a recent visit to a certain town there were many chestnut trees in the garden of my hotel, and I gathered a large number to take home to my boys. I found some days after my return that I repeatedly forgot the name chestnut when speaking to my children of their games with these chestnuts, though I had been reminded of it recently more often than usual. I then found that the idea of chestnuts suggested the place where I gathered them, and recalled a distinctly unpleasant feeling, and I confessed to myself frankly (an idea that I had resisted before) that the visit which I had tried to think of as pleasant, had really been rather disappointing, and included several unpleasant associations. After this dragging to the surface I never forgot the name again. Of course, in such cases, it may be the further concentration of attention on the name which results in permanent remembrance. The notable point, however, about many cases of this type is that the forgetting cannot be attributed to lack of interest, the usual cause of forgetting, and sometimes the forgetting recurs after recall, by some expedient, and after a strong decision to remember. There are many instances in which one forgets what the conscious self is most anxious to remember, and these are the most interesting cases to examine. It seems not unlikely that the nervous child who forgets repeatedly a simple fact shouted at him again and again by an irritated teacher, may be experiencing non-deliberate repression of the whole unpleasant business, and so of the fact itself. There may also be an unconscious resistance against the teacher's attempt to get his own way.

Repression and Forgetting.

An unconscious wish also may, it is thought, cause the forgetting of something which has to be done. Dr. Jones points out how much more apt men are to forget to send cheques than bills. Recently, I got ready my income tax return, with some reluctance, and put it ready in a place where I regularly put letters for posting. For two days I went out without taking it with me. The third day I remembered to take it, but at night I found that I had taken it with me to the University, kept it safely all day and brought it home with me again. Dr. Jones even interprets the leaving of umbrellas, etc, behind as often due to an unconscious desire to return to the houses where they are left. Darwin was, apparently, well aware of the dangers of unconscious influence in gathering evidence for, or against, his theories. He writes in his autobiography: "I had during many years followed a golden rule, namely, whenever a published fact, a new observation or thought came across me, which was opposed to my general results, to make a memorandum of it without fail and at once; for I had found by experience that such facts and thoughts were far more apt to escape from the memory than favourable ones."*

Popular psychology has long recognised that desire may influence belief. "The wish," we say, "is father to the thought," and it would be generally agreed that nearly always, even when the wish which influences belief is conscious, it is at least dissociated from the affirmation of the belief, i.e. the connection between the two remains unconscious. Probably we may take a further step, and say that even wishes which normally do not rise to consciousness may influence beliefs, and if true this would be another reason for the exploration of the unconscious in order to get further light on our prejudices. That we can find some apparently rational explanation of a belief or action is no proof that it is not due partly if not entirely to an unconscious cause. Persons who, under the influence of hypnotic suggestion, have been told to do some absurd thing at a given time, after awakening from the trance often attempt to give a sober reason for their absurd action when they carry out the instruction (which, of course, they do not remember). This fact is very suggestive for the psychology of conduct and belief.