555 B. Dr. Bramwell points out (see "What is Hypnotism?" in Proceedings S.P.R., vol. xii. pp. 204-58) that his own views as to the complete independence of the hypnotised subject's will had been long ago maintained by Braid, who considered that the subject had acquired new and varied powers, but had not at the same time lost his volition or moral sense. Braid asserted that he had proved that no one could be affected by hypnotism at any stage of the process unless by voluntary compliance. His subjects were docile and obliging; but despite this, they refused all criminal suggestions, and even developed a higher sense of propriety than characterised their normal condition.1 Against the view of Bernheim, Dr. Bramwell maintains that the so-called hypnotic crimes have no analogy with the simple automatic actions which subjects may easily be trained to perform. He goes on (p. 233): -

When I commenced hypnotic work some seven years ago, I, like Delboeuf, believed that the hypnotic subject was entirely at the mercy of the operator. I was soon aroused from this dream, however, not by the result of experiments made to test the condition, but from the constantly recurring facts which spontaneously arose in opposition to my preconceived theories. In the paper printed [in Proceedings S.P.R., vol. xii. pp. 176-203] under the heading "So-called Hypnotic Automatism," I cited a number of cases in which suggestions had been refused by hypnotic subjects. I also mentioned two subjects who had rejected certain suggestions and accepted others. Miss F., for example, recited a poem, but would not help herself to a glass of water from my sideboard, while Mr. G. would play one part, but not others, and committed an imaginary crime.

These subjects accepted suggestions which were apparently in opposition to their normal character. For instance, Miss F., who was extremely nervous and shy about singing or reading aloud, not only before strangers, but also before certain members of her own family, recited a poem in the waking state which I had read to her during hypnosis. Her mother told me that, under ordinary circumstances, she would rather have died than have done so. While Mr. G., who refused the roles of dissenting minister and hawker, accepted that of showman. He also, without the least hesitation, promptly put a piece of sugar in a friend's tea-cup, after having been assured it was arsenic. When asked why he had poisoned his friend, he replied, laughing, " Oh, that's all right, he has lived long enough! " I made no attempt to ascertain G.'s mental condition in reference to the supposed crime, but I think one can, without much difficulty, imagine it. G. was a respectable tradesman and a somewhat devout Dissenter, and it is not unnatural to suppose he refused the part of fish-hawker as this was not in keeping with his social position, and that of minister as it offended his religious susceptibilities, and accepted that of showman because it contained nothing objectionable to him.

Would it be reasonable to suppose that he should at the same time be capable of weighing fine distinctions between the suggested alterations in personality and unable to understand the experimental nature of the crime ? He, by the way, affords the only instance in which an imaginary crime has been carried out by one of my own patients. All others, without exception, have absolutely refused such suggestions.

Why should Miss F. have recited the poem and refused to take a glass of water from my sideboard? The answer to the first question is obvious. She was extremely anxious to get rid of the nervous embarrassment from which she suffered, and thus the suggestion contained nothing opposed to her volition. She herself explained the second; after leaving my house her mother re-hypnotised her, and asked why she had refused my suggestion, whereupon she replied, "I do not know Dr. Bramwell well enough to help myself unasked to a glass of water."...

1 See also as to Braid's views on this point, " James Braid; his Work and Writ-ines," by Dr. Bramwell, in Proceedings S.P.R., vol. xii. pp. 127-66.

[Other illustrative cases are given, and Dr. Bramwell continues: - ] These, and many similar facts, have forced me to abandon all belief in so-called automatism or helpless obedience; still, I must refer to some of the arguments in support of it before attempting to analyse further the mental condition in hypnosis.

(1) When subjects successfully resist suggestion, it is usual to explain this by assuming that they have not been so deeply hypnotised as those in whom no resistance has manifested itself. I cannot admit the correctness of this in my cases. During the last seven years I have had frequent opportunities of examining hypnotic subjects, at home and abroad, and have nowhere observed more profound somnambules than amongst my own patients, rarely, in fact, seeing cases to equal them. All to whom I have referred not only exhibited the phenomena of profoundest somnambulism, but nearly all had been subjects of painless operations in the hypnotic state.

(2) The personality of the operator, and his method of training his subjects, is supposed to play an important part in the acceptance or rejection of suggestions. Granting that this be true, it does not explain the resistance which I encountered. I commenced by believing that the subjects were entirely at my mercy, and did my best to develop their supposed obedience.

(3) The existence of one class of phenomena is considered as necessarily implying the existence of another and totally differing class. Durand le Gros asks: "Is it possible that suggestion should have the power of producing extraordinary physical changes and yet be without this particular effect upon the moral state ?" The facts I have already cited answer this question in the affirmative....

(4) Evidence in favour of obedience afforded by cases in which the subjects are alleged to have accepted criminal and analogous suggestions. These are important. The fact that the phenomenon of helpless obedience was invariably absent in my patients does not justify me in concluding that it did not sometimes occur in those of others. These cases of so-called automatism fall into two classes: (a) where an imaginary crime has been suggested; (b) where a real act has been performed, which it is assumed the patient would not have submitted to in the normal state.

(a) First, as regards imaginary crime.... A somnambule puts a piece of sugar into her mother's tea-cup, while her medical man makes various absurd and untruthful assertions as to its composition. Bernheim and Liébeault assert that the subject accepted these absurd statements as true, because, being hypnotised, she was unable to distinguish between truth and falsehood, while Delboeuf claims that she had sufficient sense left to know exactly what she was doing. To neither does it seem to have occurred to ask the subject during hypnosis what she thought about the matter herself. If they had done so, she would promptly have solved the difficulty, and told them that while they were gravely discussing probabilities, she was quietly laughing in her sleeve at the grotesque absurdity of the whole performance. [In his paper referred to above, pp. 197-202, Dr. Bramwell gives instances showing that his patients when hypnotised fully understood the nature of the suggestions made to them.]...

(b) Where a real act has been performed, which it is assumed the patient would not have submitted to in the normal state.... Before this can be used as an argument in favour of the helpless obedience of the hypnotised subject, one is justified in demanding that it should be clearly proved that under similar circumstances the patient would have objected to [it] in the waking condition....

Strangely enough, the most marked case of resistance to suggestion that I have observed was shown by Lidbéault's celebrated somnambule, Camille. To this I have already referred (op. cit., p. 197), but I wish to emphasise the fact that the classic hypnotic automaton, the one who was supposed to carry out a suggestion with the fatality of a falling stone, refused one, not on moral grounds, but apparently from pure caprice.

The difference between the hypnotised and the normal subject, as it appears to me from a long series of observed facts, is not so much in conduct as in increased mental and physical powers. Any changes in the moral sense, I have noticed, have invariably been for the better, the hypnotised subject evincing superior refinement. As regards obedience to suggestion, there is apparently little to choose between the two. A hypnotised subject, who has acquired the power of manifesting various physical and mental phenomena, will do so in response to suggestion, for much the same reasons as one in the normal condition. In the normal state we are usually pleased to show off our various gifts and attainments, more especially if we think they are superior to those of others, and in this respect the hypnotised subject does not differ from the normal. Both will refuse what is disagreeable; in both this refusal may be modified or overcome by appeals to the reason, or to the usual motives which influence conduct.

When the act demanded is contrary to the moral sense, it is usually refused by the normal subject, and invariably by the hynotised one.