This section is from the book "Phantasms Of The Living", by Edmund Gurney, Frederic W. H. Myers, Frank Podmore. Also available from Amazon: Phantasms of the Living.
§ 2. It is clear that the points to be settled are two: - the frequency of the phantasms which have markedly corresponded with real events; and the frequency of phantasms which have had no such correspondence, and have been obviously and wholly subjective in character. These points are absolutely essential to any conclusion on the question before us; and if not settled in any other way, they must be settled by guesses or tacit assumptions. The theory of chance-coincidence, as opposed to that of telepathy, has so far depended on two such assumptions. The first is that the coincidences themselves are extremely rare. They can then be accounted for as accidental. For we know that there are such things as hallucinations representing human forms, which do not correspond with any objective fact whatever outside the organism of the percipient; and it would be rash to deny that the death of the person represented may now and then, in the world's history, have fallen on the same day as the as telepathic evidence in these volumes, 241, or more than 46 per cent., are males; 286, or less than 54 per cent., are females; and 28, or between 5 and 6 per cent., are ministers of religion.
The slight preponderance of female informants may probably be due to their having, as a rule, more leisure than men for writing on matters unconnected with business.
1 Explicit denials have been given by 73 out of the 109. From 22 others no answer has been obtained on the point, either through our own failure at first to realise its importance, or owing to death or some unavoidable cause; but of these 22, the majority have pretty clearly implied that what they describe was a unique experience. Of the 14 who can recall some further instance or instances, 4 have had a single apparently subjective hallucination under exceptional conditions of bad health or mental strain; 3 have had one such experience when in a normal state; and 7 have had several such experiences - some of which, however, differed from the telepathic cases in not representing a living figure, while others were themselves either probably or possibly of telepathic origin. I may add that in a large number of other cases, not given in the actual words of the percipient, there is very good reason to believe the experiences to have been unique hallucination. The second assumption is that these purely subjective apparitions of forms are extremely common. It can then be argued that even a considerable number of them might fall on the same day as the death of the corresponding human being.
Supposing that we could each of us recall the occasional experience of gazing at friends or relatives in places which were really empty, then - since people are perpetually dying who are the friends and relatives of some of us - every year might yield a certain crop of the coincidences.
But as soon as we make these assumptions explicit and look at them, we see how baseless and arbitrary they are. Why should either of them be admitted without challenge? The second one especially seems opposed to what we may call the common-sense view of ordinary intelligent men. The question whether or not a very large proportion of the population have had experience of morbid or purely subjective hallucinations is one, I submit, where the opponents of the chance-theory might fairly take their stand on the ordinary observation of educated persons, and have thrown on others the onus of proving them wrong. On this point a broad view, based on one's general knowledge of oneself and one's fellows, does exist; and according to it, "spectral illusions" - distinct hallucinations of the sense of vision - are very far from the everyday occurrences which they would have to be if we are to suppose that, whenever they coincide in time with the death of the person seen, they do so by accident. Nay, if we take even one of our critics, and bring him fairly face to face with the question, "If you all at once saw in your room a brother whom you had believed to be a hundred miles away; if he disappeared without the door opening; and if an hour later you received a telegram announcing his sudden death - how should you explain the occurrence "? he does not as a rule reply, "His day and hour for dying happened also to be my day and hour for a spectral illusion, which is natural enough, considering how common the latter experience is." The line that he takes is, "The supposition is absurd; there are no really authentic cases of that sort." Under the immediate pressure of the supposed facts, he instinctively feels that the argument of chance-coincidence would not seem effective.
Still, "common sense" - though it would support what I say - is not here the true court of appeal. And, moreover, it is not unanimous. On the second point, as on the first, I have received the most divergent replies from persons whom I have casually asked to give a guess on the subject; and some have guessed the frequency of the purely subjective hallucinations as very much below what it actually is. The moral - that we cannot advance a step without statistics - seems pretty obvious, though the student of the subject may read every word that has ever been published on both sides of the argument without encountering a hint of the need. There is plenty of assertion, but no figures; and a single instance, one way or the other, seems often to be thought decisive. To A, who has himself seen a friend's form at the time of his death at a distance, the connection between the two facts seems obvious; B, having heard of a phantasm of a living person which raised apprehensions as to his safety, but which "came to nothing," is at once sure that A's case was " a chance." I have even seen this view expanded, and a leading review gravely urging that the coincidences must be regarded as accidental, if against every hallucination which has markedly corresponded with a real event we can set another which has not This is certainly a statistical argument - of a sort - and might be represented as follows: - At the end of an hour's rifle-practice at a long-distance range, the record shows that for every shot that has hit the bull's-eye another has missed the target: therefore the shots that hit the bull's-eye did so by accident.
 
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