This section is from the book "Phantasms Of The Living", by Edmund Gurney, Frederic W. H. Myers, Frank Podmore. Also available from Amazon: Phantasms of the Living.
And though this belief may have been rash and premature before the necessary statistics had been obtained, I have tried in the last section to show that it may now be justified by precise calculation.
But the significance of extreme closeness of coincidence may be yet more strikingly suggested, if we consider the probability of the joint event before either part of it has occurred. My census gives 1/248 as the probability that a particular individual would within 12 years have a visual hallucination of a friend not known to be dead. Mr. S. has, say, x friends, of whom about a fourth would naturally die in this period; and the period comprises 210,240 half-hours. Thus the probability of Mr. S.'s hitting off by chance such a coincidence as he did hit off was 1/248 x 1/X x X/4 x 1/210.240. or about 1 in 208 millions. It might, I think, be safely said that, in the world's history, no one has ever contemplated the possible participation of himself, or of any other specified person, in an event of this degree of unlikelihood, and has afterwards found his idea realised. But apart from this, the points to be specially weighed are (1) that Mr. S.'s case was drawn from a very inconsiderable fraction of the population - a fraction liberally estimated at 1/80; and (2) that this fraction of the population has supplied many other parallel instances of great closeness of coincidence.
Taking only the "borderland" and waking phantasms recorded on first-hand testimony in the main body of this work, I find that 66 of them are represented as having occurred within an hour of the event on the agent's side - which event in 41 of the 66 cases was death; 15 more, according to the facts stated, were within two hours of the event, which in 10 of the 15 cases was death; and in nearly all these cases, as well as in several others, it is quite possible that the coincidence was absolutely exact. I do not forget, what I have expressly pointed out in Chapter IV (General Criticism Of The Evidence For Spontaneous Telepathy), that exaggeration of the closeness of the coincidence is a likely form for exaggeration in such matters to take; but in a considerable number of the cases mentioned, good reason is shown for believing it to have been as close as is stated.
But the huge total of improbability is nothing like complete. Nothing has been said of the aggregate strength of the cases where the phantasm was unrecognised. Nothing has been said of the large array of cases where the coincident event was not death, but some other form of crisis - a class which does not lend itself easily to a precise numerical estimate, but whose collective force, even if it stood alone, would be very great. Once more, each of the two classes of cases - the "reciprocal" and the "collective" - which still await discussion, includes specimens of visual and auditory phantasms; and some of these afford an immensely higher probability for a cause other than chance, than the more ordinary cases where only one person is impressed. For the improbability of one sort of coincidence, that between B's unusual hallucination and A's condition - has now to be multiplied by the improbability of another sort of coincidence, that between B's hallucination and a second unusual impression (whether a hallucination or of some other form) on the part of A or C. Nor even so will the argument for telepathic phantasms be nearly exhausted.
For it will have been observed that throughout I have been taking into account nothing beyond the bare facts of the death and the hallucination, and altogether neglecting the correspondences of detail which in some cases add indefinitely, and almost infinitely, to the improbability of the chance occurrence.
It would be very easy to amplify this reasoning, and to extend and vary the computations themselves; but the specimens given are perhaps sufficient. They cannot possibly be made interesting; but they are indispensable if the question is ever to be set at rest, and the appeal to the doctrine of chances to be anything better than empty words. Figures, one is sometimes told, can be made to prove anything; but I confess that I should be curious to see the figures by which the theory of chance-coincidence could here be proved adequate to the facts. Whatever group of phenomena be selected, and whatever method of reckoning be adopted, the estimates founded on that theory are hopelessly and even ludicrously overpassed. With so enormous a margin to draw on, there is no particular temptation to exaggerate the extent to which the evidence for the phenomena is to be relied on. In some cases it is possibly erroneous; in many it is undoubtedly incomplete; narratives may have been admitted which a more sagacious criticism would have excluded.
But after all allowances and deductions, the conclusion that our collection comprises a large number of coincidences which have had some other cause than chance will still, I believe, be amply justified.
 
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