The court held that this contract is sufficient in all particulars to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. The parties, property, consideration, terms, and time of performance are all clearly stated. Such being the case the court decreed specific performance. The court points out that this agreement is clearly distinguishable from Gault v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636, in that here the time for the payment of the purchase price is plainly stated while in the previous case no time for the payment was mentioned.

Goldberg v. Drake, 145 Mich. 50. Plaintiff brought suit to recover damages for the breach of the following agreement between himself and the defendant:

"Memorandum of agreement made this 29th day of April, A. D. 1904, between Samuel T. Goldberg, party of the first part, and Soledad Drake, party of the second part, in the manner following: The said party of the first part, in consideration of the sum of $25.00 to him paid upon the signing of this agreement, hereby agrees to sell unto the said party of the second part all that certain piece or parcel of land situate in the City of Kalamazoo, County of Kalamazoo, and State of Michigan, and more particularly known and described as follows, to wit: House and premises on West Lovell street on the south side thereof, the premises being the third lot west of the intersection of Park and Lovell streets.

"The said party of the first part hereby agrees to sell the said premises to the said party of the second part for the sum of $4000 (four thousand dollars), and that the said party of the second part may have this option for seven days. The sum of $25.00 paid upon the signing of this agreement to apply upon the sum of $4,000 to be paid in full for said premises.

"Sam T. Goldberg. "I hereby agree to the above the sum of three thousand nine hun-terms and to pay the balance, or dred and seventy-five dollars, within seven days.

"Soledad Drake."

The testimony showed that the part of this agreement above plaintiff's signature was signed by the plaintiff on the day of its date and that thereafter the defendant added the clause of acceptance and signed her name. Later the defendant refused to accept a deed for the property when tendered by the plaintiff and the latter bring this action.

The court held that this was a valid contract binding on both parties. There is nothing indefinite or uncertain about the contract. The parties, property, consideration and time of payment of said consideration are explicitly stated. Origin ally this instrument amounted to no more than an option, but when the addendum was added and signed by the defendant, that amounted to an acceptance and was as a matter of fact an unconditional promise to pay the purchase price within seven days. From that time on the purchaes was no longer optional with the defendant.

Garvey v. Parkhurst, 127 Mich. 368. This is an action brought by Emma Garvey against the defendant Parkhurst to recover the possession of land occupied by the defendant. Both parties derived title from one Charles Garvey, a son of the plaintiff. Complainant is the mother of Charles and Harry Garvey. On April the 6th, 1896, Harry Garvey wrote to his b r ot h e r Charles stating that he desired to purchase the premises in question and asked for his terms. To this inquiry Charles replied as follows:

"You asked me what I would do with you about my place. If you want it, I will let you have it for $150, and you pay the back taxes. I will give you five years to pay it in, but I can't give you a contract until I come home. I don't expect to come home for two years, but you can go on and build a house, and I wil give you a contract then. You will have to pay the taxes this summer."

There was no written acceptance of this offer by Harry but he went into possession of the premises relying upon the contract created by the letter. He remained in possession about one year when he assigned all "his right, title, and interest to a certain place," the place spoken of in the letter from his brother to the defendant. The latter went into possession and made improvements. Complainant was displeased because the property had passed out of the family and obtained a quit claim deed to the premises from Charles and then brought this action.

The complainant contended that this alleged contract between the two brothers was void under the statute of frauds, in that the offer above quoted did not contain a sufficient description of the property.

The court held that this contract was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds. That a description in order to be sufficient under the statute does not have to be a governmental description or a description by metes and bounds. That it is enough if the land is described by name so that it can be identified by extrinsic evidence not contradictory to the contract.

Munro v. Edwards, S6 Mich. 91. Complainant brought a bill to compel specific performance of a memorandum of agreement entered into between the complainant and the defendant. By the terms of this agreement the defendant agreed to sell to the plaintiff certain described property for $5,150; one hun dred dollars of the purchase price to be paid down, and three hundred as soon as the abstract was completed or within fourteen days from the date of signing the agreement. The plaintiff was to assume a mortgage for $1,500 then on the place, the amount of the mortgage to be counted in on the purchase price, the balance of the $5,150 was to be paid within six years. Plaintiff paid the $100 which was to be paid down but the defendant failed to furnish a satisfactory abstract of title and plaintiff did not pay the $300 within the fourteen-day period, as the supplying of the abstract was a condition precedent thereto. After the fourteen-day period had elapsed defendant repudiated the agreement. Defendant contends that this agreement is incomplete and lacks mutuality; that plaintiff does not agree to buy the land or to pay the $300.