The court held that this was such an agreement as may be enforced; that this agreement is signed by both parties, and while the plaintiff does not in express terms agree to buy or pay, by implication he agrees to do both. The property is sufficiently described and the time for the payment of the balance of the purchase price is fixed with certainty.

Chief Justice Champlin delivered a dissenting opinion in which he held that this agreement was not one which should be specifically enforced; that while the property itself is described with sufficient certainty, the time and terms of payment are not stated nor the time when the deed is to be executed; and that an agreement in order to be sufficient under the statute of frauds must be complete in itself and leave nothing to parol.

Lambert v. Weber, 83 Mich. 395. This case arose out of the filing of a bill for specific performance on the part of the plaintiff to compel defendant to convey certain property to plaintiff under the terms of a written agreement entered into between the parties. According to the terms of the agreement the defendants agreed to convey certain described property in the City of Detroit to the plaintiff for twenty-five hundred dollars, twenty-five dollars of which was to be paid down at the time of executing the agreement. The balance of the purchase price was to be paid at the delivery of the deed and a Burton abstract of title, with tax statements of said land. The twenty-five dollars was paid down at the time of executing the agreement and the memorandum was signed by both parties. The defendants had an abstract prepared but there appeared to be some flaw in the title. Negotiations continued between the parties but nothing came from them because defendants did not produce an abstract satisfactory to the plaintiffs or one such as they were entitled to demand. Finally the defendants repudiated the agreement and disposed of the land to a third party and plaintiff brings this bill not only to enforce specific performance of the original agreement but to set aside the subsequent conveyance.

The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief prayed for in this case. The contract did not contain any definite provision as to when the deed should be executed and the money paid but it is plainly evident that the complainants were to have a clear title. According to the terms of the agreement the money was to be paid, "at the delivery of the deed, and a Burton abstract of title, with tax statements." The parties understood by this that the defendants must show complainants a clear title before they asked them to pay the purchase price. Since defendants did not furnish a clear abstract of title complainants were not in default in refusing payment until such abstract was produced. This contract is certain and definite enough in all particulars to permit of specific performance and to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds.

Francis v. Barry, 69 Mich. 311. This was an action for damages brought by the plaintiff to recover for the breach of a contract made by the defendant with the plaintiff, by which defendant had agreed to convey to plaintiff certain property. The contract is based upon numerous letters exchanged between the parties wherein the terms of sale were discussed and finally certain terms were agreed upon. Briefly stated the correspondence shows an offer by the defendant to sell and convey to the plaintiff certain property known as the "School-craft-store Property," for $2,500, $2,000 in cash on delivery of deed and the balance to be paid by two notes amounting to $500 to be signed by the plaintiff and payable from the rents of the store. An acceptance of this offer of defendant's on the part of plaintiff was clearly proved. Subsequent to this agreement between the present parties, litigant, the defendant disposed of the land to a third party for $3,000.

The defendant contends that this agreement which plaintiff sets up is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the statute of frauds because there is not a sufficient contract in writing, and also that a sufficient description of the property to be conveyed is not disclosed by the written correspondence.

The court held that a complete and binding contract may be created by letters or other writings relating to one connected transaction, if without the aid of parol testimony, the parties, the subject matter, and the terms of the contract may be collected. That in the instant case these requirements are complied with, the terms of the contract are clear and unmistakable, likewise the parties and subject matter of the contract. The contention of the defendant that there was not a sufficient description of the property is unsupporta-ble; the property was referred to by both parties in the early part of their correspondence as "the Schoolcraft Store" and later as "the property." This later designation assumed a definite meaning in the light of what had gone before and could refer to nothing but the Schoolcraft-store property and such a description is wholly sufficient to identify the property.

Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Mich. 360. The plaintiff in the above entitled case filed a bill for specific performance to enforce an oral contract for the purchase of a house and lot. At the time of this purchase the defendant gave to the plaintiff the following receipt:

"Mamburg, Michigan, June 6 (there is a six and a seven over it), 1917. Received of Edd Gardner and Delia Gardner One Hundred Dollars ($100) on purchase price of house and lot in Hamburg village. Balance of Eighteen Hundred Dollars ($1,800) to be paid and deed given in five days. A H. Pearson."

This agreement was followed by a surrender of possession to the defendants. Plaintiff prepared a deed for the premises and tendered the deed and abstract of title. Performance on the part of the defendant was again refused. In the meantime the defendant had continued in possession of the property, had changed the partitions therein, trimmed some of the shade trees and harvested the vegetables from the garden. The court held that specific performance should be awarded, citing 36 Cyc, p. 686; Peckham v. Balch, 48 Mich., 197; Cole v. Cole Realty Co., 169 Mich. 347; 2 Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, Sec. 747.