This section is from the book "The Law Of Land Contracts", by Asher L. Cornelius. Also available from Amazon: Michigan Law Of Land Contracts.
Huldberg v. Creer, 172 Mich. 505. Where the option, properly signed, described the property by street number, consideration one dollar, purchase price to be $5,500, interest 5%, easy terms, held sufficient as to whether it was a sale or a lease and as to the description of the premises.
Huron Land Co. v. Robarge, 128 Mich. 686. A deed purporting to convey all the right, title, and interest in and to the estate, property and effects of a deceased person, be it real, personal or mixed, by the heirs of decedent, is sufficient to pass their interest in decedent's real estate.
Crooks v. Whiteord, 47 Mich. 286. Where ejectment was brought for land in town two, south of group have placed these decisions wherein the courts have held the agreement insufficient.63 range ten, west in Comstock township, the plaintiff, in support of his title, introduced a deed purporting to convey the same description of land in the township of that name, but describing it as in range nine. Held, that the discrepancy was not sufficient ground to exclude the deed, but that extrinsic evidence was admissible to identify the land conveyed with the premises in suit. Wiley v. Lovely, 46 Mich. S3. Where a deed described the land conveyed as lot 77 of the original plat of the village as recorded and the original plat only contained 29 lots, with another plat on record designating the lot to be number 78, and still another plat, not recorded, contained the lot as number 77, and that it had been dealt with for more than 25 years as lot 77, held, that the error in description did not invalidate the conveyance. It is often necessary to resort to parol evidence for the purpose of applying the deed to the subject matter.
Slater v. Breese, 36 Mich. 77. Omitting to name the state, county, and township, in the description of premises mortgaged, will not invalidate the instrument, where other adequate elements of identification exist; and it is not essential that the property should be described so as to identify it without the aid of extrinsic proofs, but it is always competent to connect the written description with the material subject matter by proof of the surrounding circumstances.
53. Under this section we have abstracted the following cases, all holding the memorandum insufficient:
Pangborn v. Sifford, 216 Mich. 164; Cooper v. Pierson, 212 Mich. 658; Zimmerman v. Miller, 206 Mich. 600; Groppers v. Marshall, 206 Mich. 560; Clark v. Holman, 204 Mich. 62; Tatten v. Bryant, 198 Mich. 515; Holland v. Holland, 195 Mich. 513; Rosenbaum v. Tyszka, 192 Mich. 457; Adler v. Katus, 190 Mich. 86; Berston v. Gilbert, 190 Mich. 638; Nichols v. Burchman, 177 Mich. 601; Miller v. Bearslee, 175 Mich. 175; Hildberg v. Creer, 172 Mich. 505; Ebert v. Cullen, 165 Mich. 75; Taylor v. Scott & Co., 149 Mich. 525; Kroll v. Diamond Match Co., 113 Mich. 196; Shipman v. Campbell, 79 Mich. 82; Webster v. Brown, 67 Mich. 328; Wadell v. Williams, 62 Mich. 50; Gault v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636; Maynard v. Brown, 41 Mich, 298.
Cooper v. Pierson, 212 Mich. 658. In this case a thirty-day option read as follows: "May 26, 1919. In consideration of one ($1.00) dollar, we, the undersigned, agree to give option to Morris Cooper on lots 831, 833 and 835, North Saginaw Street, for the sum of two hundred sixty and no/100 dollars per front foot. It is agreed that the first payment be made five thousand dollars. Balance to be secured by deed of trust for five years with six per cent. interest. This option will expire on June 26, 1919. Fred D. Pierson,
Robert L. Pierson, Fannie G. Pier-son."
This option was followed by a receipt and extension reading as follows:
"$100.00 June 26, 1919. Received from Morris Cooper one hundred and no/100 dollars, part payment on purchase price of Lots No............., known in option furnished to Morris Cooper in option dated May 26, 1919, the revised No. known as Number 821 North Saginaw Street, Flint, Michigan, deed to be drawn on or before 10 days. Fred D. Pier-son."
The court held the original option insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds in that it did not describe the property sufficiently, it not naming the state, county, city or village in which the property was situated, but held that with the extension which was signed by one vendor, the person executing the extension would be bound, citing Galt v. Stormont, 51 Mich. 636; Rosenbaum v. Tyszka, 192 Mich. 457; Groppers v. Marshall, 26 Mich. 560.
Zimmerman v. Miller, 206 Mich. 600. The parties in this case entered into a form of contract. The defendant refusing to perform, the plaintiff brought an action to recover damages for fraudulent rep-sentations; the court held that inasmuch as this contract indicates on its face that the defendant, F. P. Miller, was signing the same on behalf of someone else, it would not become a binding agreement until approved in writing by the vendor.
In Tattan v. Bryant, 198 Mich. 515, the litigation arose out of the following agreement in writing which plaintiff contends is a land contract, and seeks to enforce specific performance of, while the defendant contends it is merely a forfeited option:
"Memorandum of agreement, made and entered into this 13th day of April, A. D. 1914, by and between John A. Bryant, of the City of Detroit, Wayne County, Michigan, hereinafter known as the seller, and Catherine Tattan, of the same place, hereinafter known as the purchaser: In consideration of the sum of one dollar this day paid to the seller by the purchaser, said seller does hereby agree to sell to said purchaser the following described property, to wit: The Woodward Avenue frontage, being the westerly one hundred feet (100) of lots B and two, and the north one-half of the vacated portion of Pallister Avenue of Chandler avenue subdivision of part lot five (5) of subdivision of quarter section 57, ten thousand acre tract, excepting and reserving an easement or right of way on a strip of land ten feet in width from the easterly end of said property, as provided in a certain deed to John Kaiser, Sr.; also including easement and right of way over southerly ten (10) feet of land heretofore deeded to said Kaiser, Sr., on the following terms, to wit: For the sum of twenty-four thousand two hundred dollars ($24,200) payable five hundred dollars ($500) on the signing of this agreement and the balance of twenty-three thousand seven hundred dollars ($23,700) as follows: Twelve thousand two hundred dollars ($12,200) or more payable thirty days (30) from the date hereof and the balance of eleven thousand five hundred dollars ($11,500) as follows: Three thousand dollars ($3000) one year from date, three thousand dollars ($3000) two years from date, and the balance of five thousand five hundred dollars ($5,500) three years from the date hereof with the privilege of paying any and all sums at any time after this date, with interest at 6 per cent. per annum on any sums due and unpaid.
 
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