Where an offer clearly and explicitly contains the essentials required by the statute-namely, a description of the land, an offer to sell at a specified price and the time or times and manner when the payments of the price are to be made, and when such offer is followed by an unqualified acceptance, written, signed and delivered either to the postal authorities, or to a telegraph company for transmission, a valid contract results and both parties will be bound.25 poration as her tenant. Gingrass v. Mather, 128 Mich. 582.

Where the vendee went to the vendor and turned over his contract to him without any execution of any written release or surrender for the purpose of permitting the vendor to sell to a third person, the court held that by his conduct the vendee had acquiesced in what the vendor proposed and was precluded from asserting any farther rights under the contract. Sullivan v. Dunham, 42 Mich. 521.

22. Underwood v. Slaght, 213 Mich. 391.

23. Waller v. Lieberman, 211 Mich. 441. To the effect that the interest of a contract purchaser in land can be surrendered by parol, see also McLaughlin's Estate, 126 Mich. 1.

24. Steven v. Wackeman, 213 Mich. 560-567.

25. Corning v. Loomis, 111 Mich. 23. Defendant wrote to plaintiff, offering to purchase certain land for $250.00 payable $25.00 at a specified date, and $25.00 every six months after the first payment, stating that he would improve the premises $50.00 worth the first year, and would set out fruit trees. Plaintiff answered accepting the terms of the offer, agreeing to charge defendant with the land upon his books, to credit him with all payments, and to give a deed when payments were completed. A subsequent letter from plaintiff to defendant had indorsed thereon the terms of the contract as proposed by defendant. Held, that the writings constituted a valid contract of sale. Word v. Davis, 154 Mich. 413. Holding that a certain offer was withdrawn before acceptance. Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 519. The contract sought to be enforced reads as follows: I will sell lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 of outlet 193, Rivard Farm, Detroit. Wayne Co., Mich., for $17,500.00 payable $8,000.00 cash, balance $2,-500.00 per annum, with interest annually from April 1, 1887, at five per cent. Upon payment of pro rata amount, lots to be released from mortgage for purchase money payments may be made by pro rata amounts at any time, on any lot or lots of subdivision with interest at five per cent to time of payment, or any of above payments may be made at any time before due. Payments to be made to David Preston, banker, and releases to be had through him upon such payments. This option is given to Alfred F. Wilcox until April 1, 1887, and, if not then accepted, to be void. Geo. T. Cline, Bellefontaine, Ohio, February 1, 1887. It is hereby agreed by both parties to the above that the above agreement shall not be recorded. Then complainant wrote as follows: I have decided to, and do hereby accept your written proposal of February 1, 1887, to sell me lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8, of outlot 193, Rivard Farm, in this city, and am prepared to comply with the terms of said proposal. Will you forward deed to Mr. Preston, or some one here, for delivery, on receipt of the deed, payment and mortgage specified in your proposal, or how will you arrange for the transfer. Trusting there will be no delay in concluding the matter, I await your early reply. Very truly, A. F. Wilcox. He also testified that on March 31, 1887, he wrote his acceptance upon said contract as follows: I accept the above proposition this 31st day of March, 1887, Alfred F. Wilcox. Holding that a valid contract resulted which could be specifically performed. Kempner v. Cohn, 42 Ark. 519. In this case the parties lived sixty miles apart, the places between which there was mail communication twice a day, Kempner in response to a request from Cohn on January 30th, wrote stating his terms of sale. Three days later Cohn had the title examined and secured the money to pay for the land February 7th. Before receiving notice of Kempner's withdrawal of his offer, Cohn wrote accepting it and arranging to close the transaction at once. Held, there was a complete and binding contract. Matteson v. Schofield, 27 Wis. 671. Was held that where there is a distinct offer of sale specifying the terms and describing the property and the offer is at once closed by an unqualified acceptance, the con-

Where the acceptance contains any qualification of the offer, changing or modifying the terms in any particulars, then such qualified acceptance will not result in a binding agreement.26

Where an offer is made same may be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. It is not a sufficient communication of acceptance to render the contract mutual and binding under the statute of frauds that a written acceptance executed by a proposed purchaser was delivered to a third person, a business associate of such signer and was delivered to the vendor although the fact of acceptance in writing was brought home to his knowledge in writing.27

Letters may be considered from the seller to the buyer relating to an agreement to sell land for the purpose of supplying any deficiency in the memorandum.28 tract is complete and capable of legal enforcement. Ryan v. United States, 136 U. S. 68. In this case certain letters and telegrams between the parties together with the orders of the War Department were construed together and were held to constitute an agreement binding upon Ryan to sell to the United States certain land of the City of Sault Ste. Marie. Swallow v. Strom, 83 Minn. 87. It was held that the memorandum may consist wholly of letters if they are so connected by reference express or implied that they show on their face they relate to the same subject matter. See also Walsh v. Branard (Minn., 1905), 103 N. W. 1031; Seymour v. Warren, 179 N. Y. 1 N. N. E. 260; Gates v. Paul, 117 Wis. 170, 94 N. W. 55; Lyman v. Robinson, 96 Mass. 14, Allen 242; Uran v. Coates, 109 Mass. 587; Williams v. Smith, 161 Mass. 48; Lee v. Butler, 167 Mass. 426; Hibbard v. Hatch Storage Battery Co., 174 Mass. 297; Hickey v. Dale, 66 N. H. 336; Otis v. Payne, 86 Tenn. 663; Wills v. Ross, 77 Ind. 1; Thames Sand &

Tile Co. v. Deville, 100 Ind. 309; Gustin v. Davis, 129 Ind. 472; Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 111. 310; Knight v. Colley, 34 Iowa 218; Matteson v. Scoffleld, 26 Wis. 671; Hickman v. Cheney, 155 Mich. 217, 118 N. W. 993.

26. Acceptance modifying or changing offer. In the following cases the offeree made some change in the offer so that it was held that his acceptance was conditional and therefore not binding. Palmer v. Marquette, Etc., Mill Co., 32 Mich. 274; McElvoy v. Buck, 35 Mich. 434. Gannon v. Stansfield, 216 Mich. 441. Where the defendant, owner of land, in accepting plaintiff's offer to buy with a cash payment and a six per cent three-year mortgage for the balance, changed the terms by adding "seven per cent thereafter." An oral acceptance by the plaintiff of defendant's change in the terms was insufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds and specific performance would be denied.

27. Hollingshead v. Morris, 172 Mich. 127.

28. Bailer v. Spiback, 213 Mich. 921.

Thus where an extension on an option signed by one of three vendors, vendees in common supplied the data lacking in the original option the two should be read together, and may be held binding on the vendor so signing, but not on the others who executed the original option only.29