Where the agreement to purchase lands is sufficient to comply with the statute of frauds, in the absence of fraud or mistake, it is error to admit evidence of any other agreement or understanding not embodied in the memorandum, nor can such writing be contradicted by parol evidence.30 Thus, where upon the final closing of a transaction, the vendor sought to place a restriction in the contract, claiming it was orally understood from the first that such restriction was to form a part of the contract, and the memorandum of agreement said nothing about such restriction, the court held that parol evidence thereof was not admissible,31 and in a suit for the specific performance of a land contract, testimony of the vendor that it was orally agreed at the time the memorandum was signed that it should be considered abrogated unless the vendor's title should be cleared up within two months, was inadmissible to vary or add to the writing that contained no such conditional clause, the memorandum being conclusive as it contained the requisites of a valid contract.32 And where a lease required by the statute of frauds to be in writing, provided for a certain definite rental, parol evidence that the lessee orally consented to pay an increased rental is inadmissible to modify the terms of such written lease.33

Parol evidence, however, is admissible to show that a preliminary agreement, complete in itself, was delivered conditionally. Thus, where a written order was given for the purchase of goods upon an oral understanding that a previous

written order was to be cancelled, it was permissible to show such oral agreement by parol evidence.34

29. Cooper v. Pierson, 212 Mich. 657.

30. Ogooshevitz v. Sampson, 211 Mich. 180; Mull v. Smith, 132 Mich. 618; Smith v. Mathias, 174 Mich. 262; Ogooshevitz v. Arnold, 197 Mich. 203; Welch v. Oakman, 199 Mich. 188.

31. See Ogooshevitz v. Sampson -Supra.

32. Smith v. Mathias-Supra.

33. Miles v. Shreve, 179 Mich 671.

Parol evidence is likewise admissible where the description is abstract and of a general nature for the purpose of identifying property. Said the court on this point in one Michigan case: "The degree of certainty with which the premises must be denoted is defined in many books and cases are extremely numerous in which the subject has been illustrated. They are not all harmonious, but they agree in this: That it is not essential that the description have such particulars and tokens of identification as to render a resort to extrinsic aid entirely needless when the writing comes to be applied to the subject matter. The terms may be abstract and of a general nature, but they must be sufficient to fit and comprehend the property which is the subject of the transaction; so that with the assistance of external evidence, the description, without being contradicted or added to, can be connected with and applied to the very property intended and to the exclusion of all other property." In the case in which the court used this language a written proposition to sell all my entire rights, title, and interest in the lands * * * or standing in my name, for a certain definite price, was held to be sufficient,35 but whether the description answers the requirements of the statute must be determined on the face of the papers before the admission of testimony to connect the contract with the property.86