Where verbal contracts for the sale of real estate have been partly performed, courts of equity have in the interests of substantial justice relaxed the rigid rule of law requiring contracts relating to real estate to be in writing, and have enforced such contracts in a large number of cases where the failure to do so would work an injustice. From the many decisions61 in relation to partly a receipt of part of the purchase price and a description of the land but not stating the time or times of payment of the sum remaining due is insufficient compliance of the statute of frauds to support a bill for specific performance.

See also Hillsberg v. Greer, 172 Mich. 505, holding a contract insufficient where neither the time of payment nor rate of interest was specified.

See also Harris v. Brown, 172 Mich. 164.

59. When a promise is made to compensate for services by will and the promisor dies without so providing the value of the services may be rceovered as a claim against the estate. In re. Williams Est., 106 Mich. 490.

Faxton v. Faxon, 28 Mich. 159; Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247; Car-michael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 85;

Fenton v. Emblers, 3 Burrow 1278; Jacobson v. LeGrange's Ex'rs, 3 Johns 199; Patterson v. Patterson, 13 Johns 379, Martin v. Wrights Adm'rs, 13 Wend. 460; Eaton v. Benton, 2 Hill 576; Bayliss v. Picture's Estate, 24 Wis. 651; Jilson v. Gilbert, 26 Wis. 637; Little v. Dawson, 4 Dall. 1ll; Snyder v. Castor, 4 Yeates, 353.

60. See also, Rhea v. Myers Est., 1ll Mich. 140, holding that a verbal agreement to convey land in consideration of personal services may be considered in estimating the value of the service in an action to recover therefor, although there has been no acts of part performance by the promisor.

61. See Pomeroy's Equitable Remedies, Vol 5, Sec. 2246, Fourth Edition. Gates on Real Property, Sec. 598, Fourth L. R. A. N. S., 957.

performed verbal contracts for the sale of land, the following general rules are deductible:

1. Proof of the contract and its terms must be clear, definite and conclusive.62

2. Such a part performance of the contract that failure to enforce it would be a fraud on the other party to the contract of such a character that it could not be fully compensated by a recovery of damages in a court of law, either through the inherent difficulty of estimating the damage or the responsibility of the party against whom the damage might be sought.63

3. The principle of equitable estoppel is sometimes invoked by the court in order to enforce an oral agreement and prevent a party from taking advantage of his own fraud.64

4. The rule permitting courts of equity to decree specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance, which

Relief Refused Because of Uncertainty of the Contract

62. Specific performance even of a binding contract is not a matter of right and a court of equity will re.fuse it and turn the complainant over to his remedy at law, if not clearly satisfied that it embodies a real understanding of the parties. Chambers v. Livermore, 15 Mich. 381-388; Smith v. Lawrence, 15 Mich. 499; Rust v. Conrad, 47 Mich. 499-454; Blanchard v. Railroad Company, 31 Mich. 43; Fowler v. DeLance, 146 Mich. 630.

Where the terms of the contract are uncertain specific performance will not be decreed. 26 Am. and Eng. Enc. Law, 2nd Edition, page 59 and cases cited.

Kelsey v. McDonald, 76 Mich. 188. Holding that the object of the statute of frauds was designed to prevent dispute as to what the oral contract sought to be enforced was and if incomplete or indefinite, specific performance would be denied. This case also holds that the mere naked possession by the complainant would not be sufficient if there was nothing done on the land that could not be compensated in an action for damages. Lamb v. Hinman, 46 Mich. 116; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418; Colgrove v. Solomon, 34 Mich. 494; Nims v. Sherman, 43 Mich. 50-1; Davis v. Strobridge, 44 Mich. 159; Demors v. Robinson, 46 Mich. 62; Scott v. Bush, 29 Mich. 523; Dwight v. Cutler, 3 Mich. 573; Bomier v. Caldwell, 8 Id. 463; Hogsett v. Ellis, 17 Id. 3645; Abell v. Mun-son, 18 Id. 418; Scott v. Bush. 26 Id. 418; DeMoss v. Robinson, 46 Id. 62; Wetmore v. Neuberger, 44 Id. 362; Gates, on real property, Sec. 598.

63. Pearson v. Gardner, 202 Mich. 360; Fowler v. Isabel, 202 Mich. 572; Pendergast v. Pendergast, 206 Mich. 525.

64. Lyle v. Munson, 213 Mich. 250.

do not comply with the statute of frauds, has received express recognition by statute which provides that nothing therein contained (referring to the statute of frauds), should be construed to abridge the power of the courts of chancery to compel specific performance of agreements in cases of part performance of such agreements.65

While part performance is essential in this class of cases in order to entitle the purchaser to equitable relief, nevertheless, part performance is not in all cases the essential test. In cases involving fraud, the defendant may be debarred from invoking the statute of frauds upon the doctrine of estoppel. Said the Supreme court in one case: "Part performance, while an essential in the test, does not in itself comprehend the whole doctrine of equitable relief in this class of cases. Misleading fraudulent conduct by act or acquiescence, is the underlying thought which moves the Chancery court under the principle of equitable estoppel to deny resort to the statute of frauds as an instrument of fraud." The question is not alone one of part performance, but part performance with the attending circumstances, making a case of fraud against which a court of equity ought to relieve. Thus, where a contract was executed on Sunday and the purchaser had taken possession and the defendant attempted to claim that the contract was void by reason of having been executed on Sunday, the court refused to allow such defense to prevail and enforced the oral agreement.66