51. See Robinson v. Bazoon, 79 Tex. 524, 15 S. W. 585, and ante, Sec. 501, note 31.

52. Singer Mfg. Co. v. Stockman, 36 Cal. 535, 95 Am. Dec. 205; Clark v. Peckenpaugh, 16 111. 11; Medlock v. Suter, 80 Ky. 101; Bean v. Bachelder, 74 Me. 202; Warren v. Bowdran, 156

Mass. 280, 31 N. E. 300; Dean v Goddard, 55 Minn. 290. 56 N . W. 1060; Wiese v. Union Pac. R. Co 77 Neb. 40, 108 N. W. 175; Northrop v. Wright, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 476 West v. Edwards, 41 Oreg. 609, 69 Pac. 992; Bannon v. Brandon, 34 Pa. St. 363, 77, Am. Dec. 655 Alsworth v. Richmond, Cedar Works, 172 N. C. 17. 89 S. E 1008.

53. See City of St. Paul v. Chicago M. & St. P. R. Co.. 45 Minn. 387, 48 N. W. 17

54. Elder v. Mcclaskey, 70 Fed. 529, 17 C. C A 251; Winter burn v. Chambert , 91 Cal. 170, 27 Pac. 658 Richard ion v. Watte, 94 Me. 176 48 Atl. 180; Cook v.

2 R. P. - 49 that the recognition of a title, which is really in A, as being in B would interrupt the running of the statute aganst A, the recognition of the title to one interest as being in B would not interrupt the running of the statute against A as to an entirely distinct interest.

- Effect of tenant's acknowledgment. If one is in wrongful possession by his tenant,55 a question may arise as to whether the tenant's acknowledgment of the true owner's title deprives the possession of the element of hostility, so as to interrupt the running of the statute. There are a number of decisions to the effect that such acknowledgment does not interrupt the running of the statute,56 while it has occasionally been asserted that it does cause such interruption.57 And in a few cases it has been decided that it causes such interruption if the rightful owner does not know of the relation of tenancy.58 These latter cases would seem to indicate the proper distinction in this regard. If the rightful owner has no reason to suspect that the person wrongfully in possession of his land is so in possession, not in his own behalf but in behalf of another, he is justified in assuming that the person in possession has full power to characterize his possession, as being hostile or the reverse, and if such person acknowledges the true

Clinton, 64 Mich. 309, 8 Am. St. Rep. 816, 31 N. W. 317: St. Paul v. Chicago etc. R. Co., 45 Minn. 387, 48 N. W. 17; Jackson v. Smith, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 406; Northrop v. Wright, 7 Hill. (N. Y.) 476; Coakley v. Perry, 3 Ohio St. 344.

55. Ante, Sec. 501, note 31.

56. Elliott v. Dycke, 78 Ala. 150; Mills v. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248; Middlesboro Waterworks v. Neal, 105 Ky. 58, 49 S. W. 428; Warren v. Frederichs, 76 Tex. 647, 13 S. W. 643; Cobb v.

Robertson, 99 Tex. 138, 122 Am. St. Rep. 609, 86 S. W. 746, 87 S. W. 1148; Pickens v. Stout, 67 W. Va. 422, 68 S. E. 354.

57. Russell v. Irwin, 38 Ala. 44; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budsisz, 115 Wis. 68, 90 N. W. 1019; Western Union Beef Co. v. Thur-man, 70 Fed. 960, 17 C. C. A. 532.

58. Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. St. 203; Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander, - Tex. Civ. App. -, 154 S. W. 233.

Owner's title, the latter is not guilty of laches in failing to take legal proceedings. On the other hand, if the rightful owner has reason to know that the person in possession is in possession merely in behalf of another, he has no right to assume that such person has authority to acknowledge his title, or, by reason of such acknowledgment, to refrain from legal proceedings. In at least one state59 it has been said that the fact that the landlord is unaware of the acknowledgment by his tenant of the true owner's title is a reason for not regarding such acknowledgment as effecting an interruption.60 This view is apparently based on the theory that if the landlord is aware of the acknowledgment by the tenant, he may be regarded as having previously authorized it, or as being in a position to repudiate it and to recover possession from the tenant.

Occasionally the asserted inability of the tenant to interrupt the running of the statute by taking a lease from the true owner is in terms based61 on the rule that a tenant in possession cannot attorn to a third person not having the reversion.62 But whether the acknowledgment of title takes the form of an attornment, that is, the acceptance of a lease, is immaterial. The tenant cannot usually interrupt the running of the statute in favor of his landlord, by acknowledging title in the true owner, for the reason that he has no authority to make such an acknowledgment. He represents his landlord for the purpose of holding possession against third persons, but not for the purpose of acknowledging the title of third persons.

Possession is accompanied merely by an oral agreement of transfer of title or by an invalid written conveyance.66 Consequently, in spite of decisions that, if the land in dispute is not included in the description in a particular conveyance, the possessions of the grantor and grantee cannot be tacked,67 it seems that even in such case the possessions can be tacked if there was an oral transfer of the possession by the former to the latter, in addition to the making of the written conveyance.68

59. Haynes v. Boardman, 119 Mass. 414. And see Rankin v. Tenbrook, 5 Watts (Pa.) 383.

60. In Coyle v. Franklin, 54 Fed. 644, 4 C. C. A. 538, it is decided that the acknowledgment by the tenant does not interrupt the running of the statute if the landlord immediately takes measures to recover the possession as having been forfeited by the tenant. In Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 70 S. E. 183 a failure to takes such measures was regarded as showing that the running of the statute was Interrupted.

61. See Elliott v. Dycke, 78

Ala. 150; Ellsworth v Eslicl

Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973; Cobb v. Rob. rtson, 99 Tex. 138, 122 Am St. Rep. 609, 86 S. W. 746, 87 S. W. 1148; Rankin v. Tenbrook, 5 Watts (Pa.), 386.

62. See 1 Tiffany, Landlord & Tenant, Sec. 19.