The question has frequently-arisen whether the running of the statute against the true owner is affected by the fact that during the statutory period, although the possession was continuously hostile to the true owner, it was the possession, not of one person alone, but of two or more persons in succession. This question is ordinarily discussed with reference to the relation between themselves of the successive possessors, and it is said that successive possessions by different persons may be "tacked," so as to defeat the claim of the rightful owner, if such persons are in privity one with another, the expression "privity" serving to indicate the relationship which exists between two or more persons, one of whom claims under the other or others, as representing the same persona or estate.63

That an heir is entitled to tack his ancestor's possession to his own is generally conceded,64 and, by the very great weight of authority, one to whom another, having adverse possession of the land, voluntarily transfers the possession, can tack to his own possession the possession of the latter,65 even though the transfer of

63. Holmes, The Common Law, 368.

64. Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241; Fugate v. Pierce,

49 Mo. 441; Montague v. Marunda, 71 Neb. 805, 99 N. W. 653; Alexander v. Gibbon, 118 N. C. 796, 54 Am. St. Rep. 757, 24 S. E. 748; Barrett v. Brewer, 153 N. C. 547, 42 L. R. A. N. S. 403, 69 S. E. 614; Mcneely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Or. 515, 32 Pac. 402; Overfleld v. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173: Epperson v. Stansill, 64 S. C. 485,

42 S. E. 426; Civil v. Toomey, 103 S. C. 460, 88 S. E. 261; East Tennessee Iron & Coal Co. v. Broyles, 95 Tenn. 613, 32 S. W. 761.

65. Frost v. Courtis, 172 Mass. 401, 52 N. E. 515; Gage v. Gage, 30 N. H. 421; Mcneely v. Langan, 22 Ohio St. 32; Overfield v. Christie, 7 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 173. And see cases cited in next note. Contra, King v. Smith, Rice (S. C.) 10; Garrett v. Weinberg, 48 S. C. 28.

A devisee can tack to his possession that of his devisor,68a and even in the case of a sale under judicial process or decree, the purchaser has been held entitled

66. Faloon v. Simshauser, 130 111. 649, 22 N. E. 835; Shedd v. Alexander, 270 111. 117, 110 N. E. 327; Comm. v. Gibson, 85 Ky. 666; Wishart v. Mcknight, 178 Mass. 356, 86 Am. St. Rep. 486, 59 N. E. 1028; Sherin v. Brackett, 36 Minn. 152, 30 N. W. 551; Crispen v. Hannavan, 50 Mo. 536; Davock v. Nealon, 58 N. J. Law 21, 32 Atl. 675; Mcneely v. Longan, 22 Ohio St. 32; Parker v. Wolf, 69 Or. 446, 138 Pac. 463; Hughs v. Pickering, 14 Pa. St. 297; Illinois Steel Co. v. Budsisz, 106 Wis. 499, 48 L. R. A. 830, 80 Am. St. Rep. 54, 81 N. W. 1027, 82 N. W. 534; Rara-bert v. Edmondson, 99 Tenn. 15, 63 Am. St. Rep. 819, 41 S. W. 935; Moran v. Moseley - Tex. Civ. App. -, 164 S. W. 1093. But see Sheldon v. Michigan Cent. R. Co. 161, Mich. 503, 126 N. W. 1056, criticized 10 Columbia Law Rev. 763.

67. Southern Iron & Steel Co. v. Stowers, 189 Ala. 314, 66 So. 677; Messer v. Hibernia Sav. etc. Soc. 149 Cal. 122, 84 Pac. 835; Rich v. Naffziger, 255 I11. 98, 99

N. E. 341; Lake Shore & M. S. Ry Co. v. Sterling, 189 Mich. 366, 155 N. W. 383; Jennings v. White, 139 N. C. 23. 51 S. E. 799: Ferguson v. Prince, 136 Tenn. 543. 190 S. W. 548; Allis v. Field, 89 Wis. 327, 62 N. W. 85.

68. St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Mulkey, 100 Ark. 71, Ann. Cas. 1913C. 1339, 139 S. W. 643; Rich v. Naffziger, 255 111. 98, 99 N. E. 341; Helmick v. Davenport. R. I. & N. W. Ry. Co.. 174 Iowa. 558, 156 N. W. 736; Vandal! v. St. Martin, 42 Minn. 163, 44 N. W. 525; Crowder v. Neal, 100 Miss. 730, 57 So. 1; West v. Edwards. 41 Or. 609, 69 Pac.992 Naher v. Farmer, 60 Wash. 600, Ill Pac 768; Mielke v. Dodge, 136 Wis 388, 115 N. W. 1099: Clithero v. Fenner. 122 Wis. 356, 99 N. W 1027, 106 Am. St. Rep. 978.

Shaw v. Nicholay.30 Mo 99; Shorin v. Brackett,36 Minn. 152. 36 N. W. 551; Dunbar v. Aidrich, 79 Miss. 698,31 So. 841; Hart v. Williams, 189 Pa. 31. 41 Atl. 983. Contra Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S. Car 161,27 S. E to tack to his possession the possession of the person or persons whose title the sale was intended to divest.69

It has been held that one claiming as remai nderman under a will may tack to his own possession the possession of the testator and the life tenant under the will, since the possession of each is under the same title.70

If the personal representative of decedent, without statutory or testamentary authority, takes possession, his possession is in effect that of a wrongdoer, and it cannot be tacked to the possession of decedent.71 The rule is different, however, if he has authority to take possession.72

When, upon the death of a tenant in fee simple,' his widow remains in possession claiming by reason of a statute giving to a widow the right of possession, there would seem to be such.a "privity" between the deceased and his widow as to entitle her to tack his possession to her own,73 the case being somewhat analogous to that of tacking by the heir. And in such a case the temporary possession of the widow may, it seems, be tacked to that of the husband's heirs, in order to give the latter title by adverse possession.74 "When the widow has no right of possession immediately on the husband's death, but merely a right to have dower assigned to her, the possession of the widow can, it has been held, not be tacked to the possession of the husband.75 This view has, however, been questioned, it being asserted that the possesion of the widow in such case, not being adverse to the heirs,76 should be regarded as in their behalf and consequently subject to be tacked to the possession of the decedent to the same extent as that of the heirs.77

69. Riggs v. Fuller, 54 Ala. 141; Memphis L. R. R. Co. v. Organ, 67 Ark. 84, 55 S. W. 952; Kendrick v. Latham, 25 Fla. 819, 6 So. 871; Dunbar v. Aldrich, 79 Miss. 698, 31 So. 341; Miller v. Bumgardner, 109 N. C. 412, 13 S. E. 935; Clark v. Bundy, 29 Ore. 190, 44 Pac. 282; Cooper v. Great Falls Cotton Mills Co., 94 Tenn. 588, 30 S. W. 353; Hall v. Hall, 27 W. Va. 468.

70. Haynes v. Boardman, 119 Mass. 414; Hart v. Williams, 189 Pa. 31, 41 Atl. 983. Contra, Austin v. Rutland R. Co., 45 Vt. 215. See Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482, 10 S. W. 600.

71. Bullen v. Arnold, 31 Me. 583; East Tennessee Iron & Coal

Co. v. Ferguson, - Tenn Ch. - , 35 S. W. 900.

72. Cannon v. Prude, 181 Ala. 629, 62 So. 24; Vanderbilt v. Chapman, 172 N. C. 809, 90 S. E. 993; Rowland v. Williams, 23 Ore. 515, 32 Pac. 402. See Ricker v. Butler, 45 Minn. 545, 48 N. W. 407.

73. To that effect see Mcentire v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347; Mills' Heirs v. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248; Atwell v. Shook, 133 N. Car. 387, 45 S. E. 777; Johnson v. Johnson, 106 Ark. 9, 152 S. W. 1017; Mielke v. Dodge, 135 Wis. 388, 115 N. W. 1099. Contra, semble, Robinson v. Allison, 124 Ala. 325, 27 So. 461.

If one who is in adverse possession leases in turn to different persons, the possession of each of these lessees is, for the purpose of the statute of limitations, the possession of the lessor,78 and the possessions of the lessees may be tacked together, and may also be tacked to that of the lessor.79 And if one in adverse possession in his own right attorns to a third person, or agrees to hold as the latter's agent, his possession in his own right may, it would seem, be tacked to his possession in behalf of such third person, for the purpose of barring the claim of the true owner.80

It has been asserted, in quite a number of cases, that one who disseises another whose own possession

74. Hickman v. Link, 97 Mo. 482, 10 S. W. 600; Atwell v. Shook, 133 N. Car. 387, 45 S. E. 777; Jacobs v. Williams, 173 N. C. 276, 91 S. E. 951; Mills' Heirs v. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248.

75. Mcentire v. Brown, 28 Ind. 347; Sawyer & Kendall, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 241; Marr v. Gilliam, 1 Coldw. (Tenn.) 488; Baker v. Hale, 6 Baxt. (Tenn.) 46; Doe v. Barnard, 13 Q. B. 945.

76. Post. Sec. 513 (k), note 66.

77. Atwell v. Shook, 133 N. C. 387, 45 S. E. 777; Mill"s Heirs v. Bodley, 4 T. B. Mon. (Ky.) 248.

See editorial note 17 Harv. Law Rev. at p. 277.

78. Ante, Sec. 501, note 31.

79. Ramsey v. Glenny, 45 Minn. 401, 22 Am. St. Rep. 736. 48 N. W. 322; Landon v. Town-shend, 129 N. Y. 166, 29 N. E. 71; Alexander v. Gibbon, 118 N. C 796, 54 Am. St. Rep. 757, 24 S. E. 748; Weaver v. Love, 146 N. C 414. 59 s. E. 1041; Thompson v. Kauffelt, 110 Pa. St. 209. l Ath. 267; Sims v. Eastland, 3 Head 368;

Hanks v. Houston Oil Co. of Texas, - Tex Civ. . 173 S .W 635.

80. But Robinson v. Bazoon, 19 Tex. 524, 15 S. W. 586, is contra, was that of a disseisor, and so adverse to the record owner, cannot tack the adverse possession of such other to his own adverse possession, in order to make up the statutory period.81 There are a few cases of a contrary tendency,82 and the view first referred to has been criticized on the ground that the statute of limitations should be applied as against one who allows himself to remain out of possession for the statutory period, without reference to who may happen to be seised of the land during that period.83

There can be no tacking if the possession of one person does not immediately follow upon that of the other, since in that case the element of continuity of possession is absent.84