46-47. Post, Sec. 547.

48. But in Huber v. Stark, 121 Wis. 359, 109 Am. St. Rep. 937, 102 N. W. 12, it was held that the fact that it was intended by the owner of the land that the user of his land should be permanent was immaterial, unless there was a consideration for the grant of permission.

It has in one state been decided that when a license to make a particular use of one's laud is merely inferred from acquiescence in such use,52 the making of

50. Thompson v. Normanden, 134 Iowa, 720, 112 N. W. 188; Laughery Turnpike Co. v. Mc-creary, 147 Ind. 526, 46 N. E. 906; Kentucky Distilleries Warehouse Co. v. Warwick Co., 166 Ky. 651. 179 S. W. 611; Wood v. Edes, 2 Allen (Mass.) r.ts; Risien v. Brown, 73 Tex. 135, 10 S. W. 661; Hall v. Chaffee, 13 Vt. 150. So if it is for one ye it-only, it is revocable thereafter in spite of expenditures. Brower v. Wakeman, 88 Conn. 8, 89 Atl. 913.

51. St. Louis Nat. Stock Xarda Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 112 111. 384, 54 Am. Rep. 243; Baynard v. Every Evening Printing Co., 9 Del. Ch. 127, 77 Atl. 885; Adams v. Weir & Flagg (Tex. Civ. App.), 99 S. W. 726.

52.Ante, this section, note 27.

2. R. P. - 2 improvements by the Jicensee did not render the license irrevocable.53 Such a view appears reasonable. There is evidently no attempted grant of an easement, and nothing on which the licensee can properly base an assumption that he has a permanent interest in the land, so as to justify his expenditure for improvements.

There are occasional decisions or dicta that after a license has become irrevocable by reason of the making of improvements thereunder or, as we would prefer to express it, after an attempted oral grant of an easement has been validated by such making of improvements, the license privilege remains irrevocable, or the easement endures, only so long as the improvements originally made continue available for the purpose of its exercise.53a This view appears to involve a failure to recognize the connection between the case referred to and the doctrine of part performance or equitable estoppel. There is no more reason that the privilege should in such case be restricted to the life of the improvements than that a decree specifically enforcing a contract for the sale of land, based on the part performance involved in the making of improvements, should call for a conveyance of an estate to endure only as long as the improvements endure.

Occasionally the courts have suggested or asserted that, in case the licensee has made improvements on the faith of the license, it can be revoked, but only if the licensee is placed in statu quo by reimbursement of the cost of such improvements.54 The propriety of this sold while lying upon the vendor's premises,56 and also in the case of chattels placed upon another's land by the latter's permission.57 So, as has been judicially stated,58 while a license by A to hunt in his park, whether given by deed or parol, is revocable, as merely rendering lawful the act of hunting, which would otherwise be unlawful, on the other hand, if the license be, not only to hunt, but also to take away the deer killed to his own use, this is a grant of the deer, with a license annexed to come on the land, and supposing the grant of the deer to be 20od, the license is irrevocable. The doctrine might also be applied in connection with a valid conveyance or sale of growing trees, or of minerals or fixtures in or on the land, which while legally a part of the land, are capable of becoming personalty by severance,59 but in such a case the inability of the landowner to deprive the transferee of the privilge of entering on the land for the purpose of removing the things granted may perhaps be more satisfactorily based on the theory that the grantee of those things, trees, minerals or fixtures, as the case may be, acquires not a license merely, but an easement, a right of way by necessity,60 which will endure so long as the necessity exists.

Form of relief in favor of the person making the improvements, like that of the absolute negation of the right to revoke, appears properly to be a question of the construction of the language used in according permission to make use of the land, as to whether it is a license or the attempted grant of an easement. If the latter, it is for the court, in its discretion, it would seem, to determine whether the landowner should be given an opportunity, by reimbursing the expenditures made on the faith of the invalid grant, to relieve his land of the easement to which it would otherwise be subject on the theory of equitable estoppel.

53. Shaw v. Profitt. 57 Ore. 192, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 63, 109 Pac. 584, 110 Pac. 1092; Ewing v. Rhea, 37 Ore. 583, 82 Am. St. Rep. 783, 52 L. R. A. 140, 62 Pac. 790. Compare Boynton v. Hunt, 88 Vt. 187; 92 Atl. 153.

53a. Ameriscoggin Bridge v. Bragg, 11 N. H. 102; Phillips v. Cutler, 89 Vt. 233, 95 Atl. 487;

Clark v. Glidden, 60 Vt. 702, 15 Atl. 358.

54. Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 68 Am. Dec. 190; Flick v. Bell, 110 Cal. xvii 42 Pac. 813; Southwestern R. Co. v. Mitchell, 69 Ga. 114; Dillion v. Crook, 11 Bush (Ky.) 321; Ferguson v. Spencer 127 Ind. 66, 25 N. E. 1035; Shipley v. Fink, 102 Md.

- License coupled with an interest. A license which is coupled with a grant or interest cannot, it is agreed, be revoked.55 What this means is that if one has an interest, acquired by grant or otherwise, in some thing or things upon the land, for the purpose of removing which a license to enter on the land is expressly given or necessarily implied, such removal cannot be prevented • on the theory that a license is revocable. The doctrine that a license coupled with an interest is irrevocable has been applied in the case of chattels

219, 62 Atl. 316; Dawson v. Western Md. R. Co., 107 Md. 70, 14 L. R. A. N. S. 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337, 15 A & E. Ann. Cas. 678, 68 Atl. 301; Johnson v. Bart-ron, 23 N. D. 629, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 557, 137 N. W. 1092. See compilation of cases in 44 L. R. A. N. S. 557.