The English authorities are to the effect that the habendum may operate to enlarge the estate named in the premises, though not to abridge it. See Co. Litt. 299a, 2 Sanders, Uses & Trusts (5th Ed.) 156; Challis' Real Prop. (3rd Ed) 411; Kendal v. Macfeild Barn. Ch. Rep. 46. But see Karchner v. Hoy, 151 Pa. 383, 25 Atl. 20.

53. Co. Litt. 183a; Sheppard's Touchstone, 76, 102, 113; Altham's Case, 8 Coke, 154b; Berry v. Billings, 44 Me. 416, 69 Am. Dec. 107; Havens v. Sea Shore Land Co., 47 N. J. Eq. 365, 20 Atl. 497; Phillips v. Thompson, 73 N. C. 543; Mcleod v. Tarrant, 39 S. C. 271, 20 L. R. A. 846. 17 S. E. 773; statutes in force in many states,54 a grant to A, without words of inheritance, creates a fee simple, or passes whatever estate the grantor may have, the habendum may show that an estate for life only is intended to be conveyed.55

While the common-law rule that an estate specifically limited in the premises cannot be abridged by the habendum is still not infrequently asserted and occasionally receives a practical application,56 the tendency

Hanks v. Folsoru, 11 Lea, (Term.) 555.

54. Ante Sec. 21(a).

55. Mcdill v. Meyer, 94 Ark. 615, 128 S. W. 364; Montgomery v. Sturdivant, 41 Cal. 290; Buck v. Garber, 261 111. 378, 103 N. E. 1059; Doren v. Gillum, 136 Ind. 134, 35 N. E. 1101; Yeager v. Farnsworth, 163 Iowa, 537, 145 N. W. 87; Bodine's Adm'rs v. Arthur, 91 Ky. 53, 34 Am. St. Rep. 162, 14 S. W. 904; Baskett v. Sellars, 93 Ky. 2, 19 S. W. 9; Kelly v. Hill, - (Md.), - 25 Atl. 919; Week-ley v. Weekley 75 W. Va. 280, 83 S. E. 1005.

It has even been decided that since, under these statutes, the presence of words of inheritance is immaterial, the habendum may show that a life estate only is intended, although the grant is in terms to one and his heirs. Barnett v. Barneft. 104 Cal. 298. 37 Pac. 1049; Davidson v. Manson 14-6 Mo. 608, 48 S. W. 635; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C. 394, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 514, 63 S. E. 79; Contra. Prindle v. Iowa Soldiers' Orphans' Home, 153 Iowa, 234, 133 N. W. 160.

56. Dickson v. Van Hoose, 157 Ala. 459, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 719. 47 So. 718; Caulk v. Fox, 13 Fla.

148; Kron v. Kron, 195 111. 181, 62 N. E. 809; Chamberlain v. Runkle, 28 Ind. App. 607, 63 N. E. 486; Richards v. Richards, 60 Ind. App. 34.. 110 N. E. 103; Prindle v. Iowa Soldiers' Orphans Home, 153 Iowa, 324, 133 N. W. 106; Land v. Land, 172 Ky. 145, 189 S. W. 1; Lurk v. Mcnabb, 111 Md. 641. 74 Atl. 825; Smith v. Smith, 71 Mich. 633, 40 N. W. 21; Teague v. Sowder, - (Tenn.) - 114 S. W. 484; Reese Howell Co. v. Brown. 48 Utah, 142, 158 Pac. 684.

So after giving in clear terms a fee simple, a subsequent clause undertaking to state the persons to whom the land should pass on the grantee's death has been regarded as invalid. Marsh v. Morris, 133 Ind. 548, 33 N. E. 290; Humphrey v. Potter, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1264, 70 S. W. 1062; Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 690: Wilkins v. Norman, 139 N. C. 40, 111 Am. St. Rep. 767, 51 S. E. 797.

In Morton v. Babb, 251 111. 488, 96 N. E. 279. it was decided that where the granting clause was to A and his heirs subject to a limitation over to B., such limitation over was valid and effective although the habendum was to A at the present time is very considerably to limit its operation. Even though the language of the habendum, or of some other subsequent clause of the conveyance is, considered by itself, inconsistent with that of the premises, the court will frequently refuse to recognize any inconsistency and, viewing the instrument as a whole rather than as an aggregate of distinct parts, will consider the habendum or other subsequent clause merely as an aid in the construction of the premises.57 In this way, without any explicit repudiation of the common-law rule, the court may accord to the habendum a preponderating influence such as it did not have at common law.58 So it has been said that the common-law rule is one to be applied only when there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two parts of the conveyance.59 and his heirs without the limitation over, it being said that in case of inconsistency the granting clause should control.

In Cole v. Collie, 131 Ark. 103, 198 S. W. 710, it was held that an exception of the minerals in the land conveyed, inserted in the habendum, was nugatory.

57. Mcwilliams v. Ramsey, 23 Ala. 813; Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230. 8 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 443, 93 S. W. 979; Barnett v. Barnett 104 Cal. 298, 37 Pac. 1049; Bray v. Mcginty, 94 Ga. 192, 21 S. E. 284; Husted v. Rollins, 156 Iowa, 546, 137 N. W. 462, 42 L. R. A. N. S. 378; Palmer Oil & Gas. Co. v. Blodgett, 60 Kan. 712, 57 Pac. 947; Wilson v. Moore, 146 Ky. 679, 143 S. W. 431; May v. Justice, 148 Ky. 696, 147 S. W. 409; Putnam v. Pere Marquette R. R., 174 Mich. 246, 140 N. W. 554; Davidson v. Manson, 146 Mo. 608,

48 S. W. 635; Triplett v. Williams, 149 N. C. 394, 24 L. R. A. N. S. 514, 63 S. E. 79; Fogarty v. Stach, 86 Tenn., 610, 8 S. W. 846; Johnson v. Barden, 86 Vt. 19, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 1243, 83 At. 721.

58. See Barnett v. Barnett, 104 Cal. 300, 37 Pac. 1050; Garrett v. Wiltse, 252 Mo. 699, 161 S. W. 694; Jones v. Whichard, 163 N. C, 241, 79 S. E. 503; Culpepper Nat. Bank v. Wrenn, 115 Va. 55, 78 S. E. 620; Weekley v. Weekley, 75 W. Va. 280, 83 S. E. 1005.

59. Mcwilliams v. Ramsay, 23 Ala. 813; Whetstone v. Hunt, 78 Ark. 230, 93 S. W. 979; Richards v. Richards, 60 Ind. App. 34, 110 N. E. 103; Henderson v. Mack, 82 Ky. 379; Land v. Land, 172 Ky. 145, 189 S. W. 1; Robinson v. Payne, 58 Miss. 690; Black-well v. Blackwell, 124 N. C 269, 32 S. E. 676.

Occasionally the application of the common-law rule referred to has been regarded as called for when an estate in fee simple was clearly created by the granting clause, and subsequently a limitation over in favor of another person was inserted, to take effect upon the death of the grantee under some particular contingency, as for instance, death without issue, with the result of regarding such limitation over as invalid because operating to abridge the estate previously created.60 Such a view is, however, difficult to accept. An executory limitation in defeasance of a fee simple is perfectly valid when it occurs in a will;61 and there is no reason why it should not be so regarded when it occurs in a conveyance inter vivos. Indeed the validity of such a limitation, taking effect under the Statute of Uses, has long been recognized, being the ordinary case of a "shifting use."62 The common-law rule that an estate given in the granting clause cannot be subsequently cut down to a less estate does not properly apply to such a case of a mere possibility of the divesting of the fee simple estate by reason of the occurrence of some future contingency, even though this is named to occur at the time of the death of the grantee. The grantee has, in spite of this divesting clause, an estate in fee simple and not a life estate, so long as he has any estate whatsoever.63

60. Scull v. Vaugine, 15 Ark. 695; Carl Lee v. Ellsberry, 82 Ark. 29, 12 L. R. A. N. S. 957, 101 S. W. 407; Palmer v. Cook, 159 111., 300, 50 Am. St. Rep. 165, 42 N. E. 796; Lamb v. Medsker, 35 Ind. App. 662, 74 N. E. 1012 (semble); Ray v. Spears, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 14, 64 S. W. 413; Hughes v. Hammond, 130 Ky. 694, 26 L. R. A. N. S. 808, 125 S W. 144; Ex parte Town, 17 S. C. 532; Glenn v. Jamison, 48 S. C. 316, 26 S. E. 277; Contra. Morton v. Babb, 251 111. 488, 96 N. E. 279; Fogarty v. Stack, 86 Tenn. 610, 8 S. W. 846.

61. Ante Sec.Sec. 160, 163b.

62. Ante Sec. 157.

63. A like criticism may be made, it is submitted, of occasional decisions that after a clause creating a fee simple estate, a subsequent clause creating a power of disposition, the exercise of which would divest the fee simple, is invalid. See e. g-pritchett v. Jackson, 103 Md. 696,