From time to time, statutes were passed with the intent of rendering uses more or less subject to the rules of the common law,25 but these were but partially effective, and were superseded by St. 27 Hen.VIII. c. 10 (A. D. 1535), generally known as the "Statute of Uses." This statute, after reciting the evils, real or imaginary, which proceeded from the existing system,26 provided, in effect, that where one person was seised of lands, tenements, or hereditaments to the use, confidence or trust of any other person or persons, the persons having the use, con fidence or trust should be seised and deemed to be in full seisin and possession of such lands, tenements, and hereditaments, of and in such like estates, as they had in the use; and that the estate and possession of the

Hist. Real Prop. 324, and note 5; 1 Crime's Dig. tit. 11, c. 2, Sec. 11; Keilw. 42, pl. 7.

23. Sugden's Gilbert, Uses. 12-14; 1 Cruise's Dig. tit. 11, c. 2, Sec. 9.

24. Co. Litt. 271b, Butler't note II; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 445; 1 Cruise's Dig. tit. 11, c. 2, Sec.Sec. 12-14.

25. Digby, Hist. Real Prop.

343; 1 Sanders, Uses, ch. 1.

26. The statute appears to have been passed at the'instigation of the Crown, in order to increase the Crown revenues. See article by Professor W. S. Holds-worth, on "The Political Causes Which Shaped the Statute of Uses" in 26 Harv. Law Rev. 108.

Real Property.

[ Sec. 99 persons so seised shall be deemed to be in the persons so beneficially entitled after such manner as the latter were entitled in the use, trust or confidence. The statute contained a similar provision for the case of two or more persons being seised to the use of any one or more, but not all, of themselves.

It has by some writers been said that the intention of this statute was entirely to abolish conveyances to uses, but it seems that its purpose was merely to turn equitable into legal estates, making the cestui que use in every case the legal tenant, and, as such, liable to the feudal burdens, and subject to forfeiture for treason, and also to prevent the disposal of lands by will.27 By not abolishing uses, the statute, it has been said, "preserved for the land law the elements of elasticity, and the opportunities for development which were inherent in the use."28

The Statute of Uses has the effect of giving to the cestui que use the seisin and possesion, with a legal estate of the same character as the estate which he had in the use, he thus becoming complete owner both in law and equity.28a The use is said to be executed by the statute. The legal estate, however, thus executed in the cestui que use, cannot be greater than that which was given to the feoffee to uses. Accordingly, in the case of a grant to A for life, to the use of B and his heirs, B takes a legal estate for life merely, and not one in fee.28b

27. Sugden's Gilbert, Uses, 139 note, Digby, Hist. Real Prop. 344.

28. Prof. Holdsworth, in 26 Harv. Law Rev. at 117.

28a. See 2 Blackst. Comm. 333: Williams, Real Prop. 175; Mait-land, Equity, 35.

28b. Bacon, St. Uses, 47; 1 Sanders, Uses & Trusts, 107; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 312; Jenkins v. Young, Cro. Car. 230; Meredith v. Joans, Cro. Car. 244; First Baptist

Soc. in Andover v. Hazen, 100 Mass. 322. Compare Sugden's Gilbert, Uses, 127, note (2). Wilcox v.Wheeler, 47 N. H. 488, is not in accord with this view, the court there applying to a use executed in the cestui que use the rule ordinarily applicable in this country to trusts,-that the trustee shall take such an estate as the nature of the trust requires.

The Statute of Uses has been substantially re en acted in a number of the states of this country, and in others has been adopted as a part of the common law;29 and accordingly in those states, unless the case is within one of the exceptions which the courts have engrafted on the statute, as hereinafter stated, if an estate is conveyed to A for the use of or in trust for B, the legal title in terms conveyed to A will immediately vest by force of the statute in B and A will take nothing.30 In several states, however, the statute cannot he regarded as in force, owing either to direct adjudications to that effect, or particular statutory provisions.31