This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
- (a) In accordance with creator's intention. One who has created a trust in favor of another, although without the payment of any consideration, cannot thereafter revoke the trust, unless a. power of revocation was expressly reserved.8 Those cases in which a right to revoke was recognized, in the absence of such an express power, are cases in which it was regarded as omitted by mistake, or the transaction was tainted with fraud, or unWilliamson v. Suydam, 6 Wail. (U. S.) 723, 738, 18 L. Ed. 967; Bowditch v. Banuelos, 1 Gray (Mass.) 220; Matter of Livingston, 34 N. Y. 555.
7. 1 Am2s, Cas. Trusts, 249; 1 Perry, Trusts, Sec. 284. See Heart v. Sansom, 110 U. S. 151, 110 L. Ed. 101; Yates v. Yates, 255 111. 66, 99 N. E. 360; Parkhill v. Doggett, 135 Iowa, 113, 112 N. W. 189; Weller v. Kolb, 128 Md. 221, 97 Atl. 542; McCann v. Randall, 147 Mass. 81, 9 Am. St. Rep. 666, 17 N. E. 75; Burnley v. Stevenson, 24 Ohio St. 474; Koehne v. Beattie, -R. I.-, 90 Atl. 211; McNish v. Guerard, 4 Strobb Eq. (S. C.) 66; Woodbridge v. Planter' Bank, 1 Sneed (Tenn.) 297.
8. 1 Ames, Cas. Trusts, 233; Hellman v. McWilliams, 70 Cal. 449, 11 Pac. 659; Massey v. Huntington, 118 111. 80, 7 N. E. 269; Ewing v. Jones, 130 Ind. 247,
15 L. R. A. 75, 29 N. E. 1057; In re Podhajsky, 137 Iowa, 742, 115 N. W. 590; Beard v. Beard, 173 Ky. 131, 190 S. W. 703; Von Bushwaldt v. Schlens, 123 Md. 405, 91 Atl. 466; Thurston, Petitioner, 154 Mass. 596, 26 Am. St. Rep. 278, 29 N. E. 53; Minot v. Tilton, 64 11. H. 371, 10 Atl. 682; Sounerbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 240; Wilson v. Anderson, 186 Pa. 531, 44 L. R. A. 542, 40 Atl. 1096; Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven, 214 N. Y. 468, 108 N. E. 819; Monday v. Vance, 92 Tex. 428, 49 S. W. 516; Sargent v. Baldwin, 60 Vt. 17, 13 Atl. 854; Holmes v. Holmes, 65 Wash. 572, 118 Pac. 733, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 645, Ann. Cas. 1913 B., 1021; Nor can the trust be terminated by the concurrence of the creator of the trust and the trustee without the consent of the cestui. Henderson v. Sherman, 47 Mich. 267 11 N. E.
An express trust will come to an end so soon as the time arrives at which the creator intended it should come to an end,10 an idea which is otherwise expressed by the statement that it comes to an end when the purposes of the trust are accomplished.11 So if a trust is intended to endure only during one's life, whether the life of the cestui12or of a trustee,13 it will expire on his death, and if intended to endure only so long as the cestui refrains from assigning his interest, it will terminate upon his assignment thereof.14 Likewise a trust will, it seems, come to an end when the accomplishment of the purposes thereof becomes impossible.15
153; Ewing v. Warner, 47 Minn. 446, 50 N. W. 603; Nelson v. Rat-liff, 72 Miss. 656, 18 So. 487; Andrews v. Hobson, 23 Ala. 219.
9. See Security, Trust & Safe Dep. Co. v. Farrady, 9 Del. Ch. 306; Lawrence v. Lawrence, 181 111. 248, 54 N. E. 918; Richards v. Reeves, 149 Ind. 427, 49 N. E. 348; Brannin v. Sherley, 91 Ky. 450, 16 S. W. 94; Brown v. Mercantile Trust & Deposit Co. 87 Md. 377, 4 Atl. 256; Butler v. Badger, 128 Minn. 99, 150 N. W. 233; Garnsey v. Mundy, 24 N. J. Eq. 243.
10. Waring v. Waring, 10 B, Mon. (Ky.) 331; Stone, Petitioner, 138 Mass. 476; Williams v. Thacher, 186 Mass. 293, 71 N. E. 567; Pilcher v. McHenry, 14 Lea (Tenn.) 77; Newman v. Dotson, 57 Tex. 117.
11. Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 111. 60, 72, 69 N. E. 900; Thompson v. Ballard, 70 Md. 10, 16 Atl. 878; Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S. W. 1151; Centenary M. E. Church v. Parker, 43 N. J. Eq. 307, simple subject to a legal life estate for his own life in a trustee named.24 Bui whether an equitable estate for life will always continue such in spite of the existence of a legal fee simple in the same person would appear to be open to question. There are in one or two states authorities to the effect that if one holds the legal fee simple nominally in trust for himself alone during his life, and after his death in trust for another, he has, during his life, a legal and not an equitable estate,25 though in another state a different view has been indicated.26
12 Atl. 142; see Tilton v. Davidson, 98 Me. 55, 56 Atl. 215; Parker v. Converse, 5 Gray (Mass.) 336. It has been held that it may come to an end as to a part only of the property, while continuing as to that partial interest as to which the purpose of the trust has not been accomplished, Wayman V. Follansbee, 253 111. 602. 98 N. E. 21.
12. Hyde v. Wason, 131 Mass. 450.
13. Security T. Co. v. Snow, 70 Conn. 288, 66 Am. St. Rep. 107, 39 Atl. 153; Hinckley v. Hinckley, 79 Me. 320, 9 Atl. 897; Baker v. McAden, 118 N. C. 740, 24 S. E. 531; Gambrill v. Trippe, 75 Md. 252, 15 L R. A. 235, 32 Am. St. Rep. 388, 23 Atl. 461; Finke v. Finke, 37 S. D. 46, 156 N. W. 595.
14. Brillhart v. Mish, 99 Md. 447, 58 Atl. 28; compare Young v. Snow, 167 Mass. 287, 45 N. E. 686.
15. Donaldson v. Allen, 182 Mo. 626, 81 S. W. 1151.
A trust which is intended to endure only during the continuance of an equitable life interest in a cestui named will come to an end, it seems, if such life interest is merged in the remainder thereon,16 as it will if by reason of a partition each person interested acquires an estate in fee simple in possession.17
- (b) By merger. The acquisition by one person of both the legal estate of the trustee, and the beneficial interest of the cestui que trust, has in some cases the effect of terminating the trust by reason of what is referred to as the "merger" of the equitable in the legal title. Just when such merger, with the resulting termination of the trust, will occur, is however a matter as to which the cases give no satisfactory criterion.
It has been said that one cannot he trustee for himself,18 but this cannot well mean that one is incapable of being one of the trustees of a trust of which he is one of the beneficiaries. This constantly occurs,19 and to apply the doctrine of merge in such a case might.be attended with very considerable practical difficulty, as for instance, when A and B have the legal title and B, C, and D have the equitable interest. The dictum referred to has, however, an obvious application when one has the legal estate in fee simple, and also an equitable estate in fee simple, with no outstanding particular estate in favor of another. In such a case there is no person to assert any trust obligation, and that merger occurs has been several times decided.20 A like view has been taken when there were two or more trustees who are absolutely identical with the beneficiaries in fee