The most important rights in land are those to which we apply the term "ownership," involving, within limitations more or less wide, the idea of rights in some particular person or persons (the owner or owners) to use the land according to his or their pleasure, and to demand that others refrain from such use. Accordingly we devote Part II of this work to the subject of "the ownership of land," using the word "ownership" without reference to the greater or less duration of the rights involved.12 Under this head we will consider such rights of unlimited and exclusive user, not only when these rights are capable of present exercise, but also when their exercise is restricted to the future by reason of rights of the same character having been temporarily vested in another, or others. We will also in this connection consider mere possibilities of future ownership and various rights of enjoyment incident to the ownership of land.

Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R. 16 Eq. 461.

By some of the earlier English cases, the distinction in this respect was made between real and personal property, and not between movables and immovables and so it has been held in New York-erroneously, it would ap pear-that leasehold interests are governed by the law of the domicile. Despard v. Churchill, 53 N Y. 192. Compare authorities above cited.

11. 3 Blackst. Comm. 294; Brantley, Pers. Prop. Sec. 7; notes to Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Smith's Lead. Cas. 652; McGonigle v. Atchison, 33 Kan. 726, 7 Pac. 550.

12. The term "ownership of land," is adopted from Mr. Dig-by's valuable History of Real Property. He says (4th Ed. page 303, note 3): "I do not forget that in common parlance we distinguish between tenant for years and the freeholder by saying that the former has the possession or possession, or one may have a right to receive a periodical compensation for the use of such land in another's possession, which is in theory payable out of the profits thereof. All of these various rights or privileges, which exist or may exist in favor of one person, in laud belonging to another, are considered in Part IV of the present work under the title "Rights as to the use and profits of another's land."

While we ordinarily speak of the ownership of land, this phrase is elliptical, and what one owns is properly not the land but rather the rights of possession and approximately unlimited user, present or future. In other words, one owns not the land, but rather an estate in the land.13 A similar ellipsis occurs in connection with any material thing. One owns not the thing, but the right of possession and enjoyment of the thing.14

One may, independently of whether he has an estate in land, have a right, a power, of creating or transferring rights in the land, in derogation, to a greater or less extent, of rights of ownership in another. "Rights to dispose of land not based on ownership," are treated in Part III of this work.15

The owner of land has, by reason of the natural juxtaposition of his land as regards neighboring land in another's possession, certain rights restrictive of the use of the latter land. Furthermore, as before indicated, a particular use of the land is frequently capable of separation from the possession and other uses, so as to vest the privilege of such use in a person other than the one in possession of the land. One may moreover be entitled to the benefit of a contractual stipulation in regard to the use to be made of land in another's occupation of the land, and that the latter only is the owner. But it is impossible to attempt to invest any word in common use with a technical meaning, without running counter in some instances to popular usage. At all events, a tenant farmer talks of 'my farm, and has the exclusive right of possession." And see, to the same effect, Williams, Real Prop. (21st Ed.) at p. 2.

13. Post Sec. 17.

14. Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 220 et seq.; 23 Yale Law Journ. at p. 24, article by Professor Hohfield.

15. A power of this character is a legal right only if we use the term "right" as including any advantage, actual or theoretical, recognized and given effect by the law. It is not a right if we regard a right as necessarily involving a correlative duty upon some person or persons. See Salmond, Jurisprudence (4th Ed.) 190; and the valuable article on "Fundamental Legal Conceptions," in 23 Yale Law Rev. at p. 16, by Professor Wesley N. Hohfield, whose untimely death involves a distinct loss to the science of jurisprudence.

One may have a right as regards another's land, involving, primarily at least, no privilege of using such other's land, nor power of himself disposing thereof, but merely the power of compelling a sale thereof, or of making an appropriation thereof, usually under process of law, in a certain contingency, ordinarily the non performance of some obligation imposed by contract or by law. Rights of this character we consider in Part VI of this work under the title "Liens"