The rules above stated, to the effect that the ownership follows, or is presumed to follow, changes in the location of the water, do not apply in the case of sudden and perceptible changes, and such changes, whether the land encroaches on the water or the water encroaches on the land, effect no change in the ownership of the locus in quo.22 And so, if the middle line of a stream is the boundarv line between two owners, the boundarv line remains the same, although, owing to a sudden change in the location of the stream, that line ceases to be the middle line of the stream.23 This distinction, when looked at, not as a rule restrictive of a doctrine of accretion, and of a doctrine of encroachment by water sisted upon, to the effect that the ownership of particular soil remains unchanged only when it retains its identity, it being said that the distinction is That between "a sudden disruption of a piece of ground from one man's land to another's which may be followed and identified," and "that increment which slowly or rapidly results from floods, but which is utterly beyond the power of identification."29

Upon the land, but as a limitation upon a rule of construction as to boundaries on waters, finds its reason in the consideration that, in fixing the boundary with reference to the water or some physical feature thereof, it may be presumed that the parties in interest had in mind the probability of its gradual change with the passage of years, but did not have in mind the jjossibil-ity of a sudden and perceptible change.

Whole or in part, of human agency, is not ordinarily regarded as affecting the application of the established rules on the subject,32 subject to this limitation, however, that the owner of land abutting on the water cannot himself extend its limits at the expense of adjoining proprietors by producing a condition which causes an accretion to his land.33 The question of the right of the owner of land thus to extend his land as against the state or a state agency would be determined with reference, not so much to the law of accretion, as to the right of a litoral proprietor, in that jurisdiction, to reclaim land covered by water.34 That the owner of land on tide water does not become the owner of "made" land, which results from filling in in front of his land under authority from the state has been occasionally recognized.35

Of which are peculiarly subject to disintegration by the action of the current. Such disintegration of the banks, although ordinarily culminating in a sudden and perceptible disappearance of the stratum of soil above the level of the water, has been regarded as involving a gradual rather than a sudden change, so that the boundary of the land shifts in accordance with the change.26 This view might perhaps have been based on the theory that the disintegration of the bank, which finally culminates in the sudden disappearance of its upper stratum, is itself gradual rather than sudden, but the tendency has been to regard the change as gradual rather than sudden for the reason that the soil, upon its removal by the water, loses all identity, and is gradually and imperceptibly attached by way of accretion to the banks of the river at other points thereon.27 That is, by these decisions, apparently, the continued preservation of the identity of the land or soil separated from the bank is regarded as necessary to render such separation sudden rather than gradual, within the meaning of the rule that the boundary re-mains unchanged in spite of a sudden change in the stream.

22. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 26. 34 L. Ed. 941; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 36 L. Ed. 186; Wallace v. Driver, 61 Ark. 429, 31 L. R. A. 317, 33 S. W. 641; Fuller v. Shedd, 161 111. 462, 33 L. R. A. 146. 52 Am. St. Rep. 380, 44 N. E. 286; Kit-teridge v. Ritter, 172 Iowa. 55, 151 N. W. 1097; Fowler v. Wood. 73 Kan. 511. 6 L. R. A. N. S.' 162, 117 Am. St. Rep. 534, 85 Pac. 763: Hahn v. Dawson. 134 Mo. 581 36 S. W. 233; Iowa Railroad Land Co. v. Coulthard, 96 Neb. 607.. 148 N. W. 328; Mulry v. Norton, 100 N. Y. 424, 53 Am. Rep. 206. 3 N. E. 581: In re City of Buffalo, 206 N. Y. 319, 99 N. E. 850; Den d Lynch v. Allen,

20 N. C. 62, 32 Am. Dec. 672; Spigener v. Cooner, 8 Rich. L. (S. C.) 301, 64 Am. Dec. 755.

23. Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 133 111 535, 5 Am. St. Rep. 545, 17 N. E. 439; Smith v. Miller, 105 Iowa, 688, 70 N. W. 123, 75 N. W. 499; Sweat-man v. Holbrook, 18 Ky L. Rep. 870, 38 S. W. 691, 39 S. W. 258; Rees v. Mcdaniel, 115 Mo. 145, 21 S. W. 913; Bouvier v. Stricklett, 40 Neb. 792, 59 N. W. 550; Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 580, 1 L. R. A. (N. S.) 762, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 316, 121 Am. St. Rep. 740, 13 Ann. Cas. 43, 104 N. W. 1061, 109 N. W. 744: State v. Muncle Pulp Co.. 119 Tenn. 47. 101 S.

The distinction between a gradual and a sudden change, on which the difference in the resulting rights is based, has usually been viewed as dependent on the question whether, in the particular case, the actual process of change is perceptible, and it has not been regarded as sudden, rather than gradual, merely because, at distinct periods of time, one may be able to see that a change has occurred.24 Occasionally the fact that the change took place as a result of a flood or storm appears to have been regarded as making the change a sudden one for the purpose of the distinction.25

The distinction above referred to, between a gradual and a sudden change in the location of the water, or of some feature thereof, appears to have been to some extent abandoned in connection with the Missouri and other rivers of the middle west, the banks

W. 437; A. G. Winemau & Sons v. Reeves. 245 Fed. 254. 157 C. C. A. 446.

24. King v. Yarborougb, 3 B. & C. 91; Jefferis v. East Omaha Land Co. 134 U. S. 178. 33 L. Ed. 872; Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 3C L. Ed. 186; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605. 56 L. Ed. 570: W&.rreu v. Chambers, 25 Ark. 120, 4 Am. Rep. 24; Coulthard v. Stevens, 84 Iowa, 241, 35 Am. St. Rep. 304, 50 N. W. 983; Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, 117 Am St. Rep. 534, 85 Pac. 763; Linthicura v.

Coan, 64 Md. 439, 54 Am. Rep. 775, 2 Atl. 826; Nix v. Dickerson, 81 Miss. 632, 33 So. 490; Camden & Atlantic Ry. Co. v. Lippincott, 45 N. J. L. 405: Halsey v. Mc-cormick. 18 N. Y. 147; Saunders v. New York Central & Hudson River R. Co., 144 N. Y. 75, 26 L. R. A. 378, 43 Am. St. Rep. 729, 38 N. E. 992.

25. St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226, 34 L. Ed. 941; Fowler v. Wood, 73 Kan. 511, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 162, 117 Am. St. Rep. 534, 85 Pac. 763; Lynch v. Allen, 20 N. C. 190, 32 Am. Dec. C71.

The distinction between a sudden and perceptible change on the one hand and a gradual and imperceptible change on the other, is frequently difficult of application, and it appears questionable whether, as is ordinarily assumed in this connection, in the case of a sudden change the process is necessarily more perceptible than in the case of a gradual change. Perhaps a preferable line of distinction, in so far as concerns land on which the water has encroached, is that suggested in some of the cases,28 and occasionally strongly in26. Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 36 L. Ed. 186; Belle-lontaiue Imp. Co. v. Niedring-haus, 181 111. 426, 72 Am. St. Rep. 269, 55 N. E. 184; Mccor-mack v. Miller, 239 Mo. 463, 144 S. W. 101; Bouvier v. Strickett,

40 Neb. 792, 59 N. W. 550; Denny v. Cotton, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 634, 22 S. W. 122.

27. See Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U. S. 359, 36 L. Ed. 186.

28. See cases cited ante, this section, note 26.

In case a stream cuts out a new channel through the land, so as to separate parts of the land which were formerly not separated, the ownership of each part remains the same as before, unless at least the separation can be regarded as gradual rather than sudden.30 To what extent the suddenness of the change is controlling in this connection does not clearly appear. The courts ordinarily refer to the change in the channel as being sudden in character, but there is high authority for considering the rule as the same even when the new channel is gradually formed, the decisive consideration being the lack of change in the location and character of the land as to which the question arises.31