This section is from the book "The Law Of Real Property and Other Interests In Land", by Herbert Thorn Dike Tiffany. Also available from Amazon: A Treatise on the Modern Law of Real Property and Other Interests in Land .
An estate for years comes to an end at the expiration of the term for which it was created, and this without any notice from the landlord to the tenant or from the tenant to the landlord,91 except in two or three states in which the statute appears to require a notice in order to terminate the tenancy at the end of the term named.92
In the case of a term limited to endure, not for a certain number of days but for a year or a month, the term comes to an end, not upon the day corresponding to the day on which the term commences, but upon the day preceding that day, that is, the term is regarded, for the purpose of computation, as commencing at the midnight preceding the day named for its commencement.93 So a lease for a year, commencing the first day of April, expires at the end of the last day of March94 and a lease for a month, commencing the first day of the month, expires the last day of the month.95 The same
234; Friend v. Oil Well Supply Co., 165 Pa. St. 652, 30 Atl. 1134. So in Andrews v. Needham, Noy, 75, Cro. Eliz. 656, it is decided that by the entry under elder title the tenant is relieved from a covenant to repair and yield up at the end of the term, "for if the land be gone, the obligation is discharged." See, also, Wheelock v. Warschauer, 34 Cal. 265.
91. Cobb v. Stokes, 8 East. 358; McKissick v. Ashby, 98 Cal. 422, 33 Pac. 729; Secor v. Pestana, 37 111. 525; Hamit v. Lawrence, 2 A. K. Marsh. (Ky.) 366; Stockwell v. Marks, 17 Me. 455, 35 Am. Dec. 266; Dorrell v. Johnson, 17 Pick. (Mass.) 263, 266; Engels v. Mitchell, 30 Minn. 122, 14 N. W. 510; Waldo v. Jacobs, 152 Mich. 425, 15 Ann. Cas. 343, 116 N. W. 371; Young v. Smith, 28 Mo. 65, 75 Am.
Dec. 109; Centennial Brewing Co. v. Rouleau, 49 Mont. 490, 143 Pac. 969; Williams v. Mershon, 57 N. J. L. 242, 30 Atl. 619; Allen v. Jaquish, 21 Wend. (N. Y.) 628; Stedman v. Mcintosh, 26 N. C. (4 Ired. Law) 291, 42 Am. Dec. 122; Ashhurst v. Eastern Pennsylvania Phonograph Co., 166 Pa. St. 357, 31 Atl. 116.
92. See references in 2 Tiffany, Landlord & Ten. Sec. 196a note 11.
93. Say v. Smith, Plowd. 271; Sidebotham v. Holland , 1 Q. B. 378; Higgins v. Halligan, 46 111. 173; Buchanan v. Whitman, 151 N. Y. 253, 45 N. E. 556; Duffy v. Ogden, 64 Pa. St. 240.
94. Fox v. Nathans, 32 Conn. 348.
95. Steffens v. Earl, 40 N. J. L. 128, 29 Am. Rep. 214.
[ Sec. 59 rule holds good, no doubt, when the tenancy is for two or more years or two or more months, so that, for instance a term of two years commencing on the first day of May would end on the last day of April.
- (b) Special limitation. The tenant's estate for years, like a life estate, may be subject to a "special limitation," or, as it is sometimes called, a "conditional limitation," by which such estate may come to an end before the regular end of the term upon the happening of some contingency.96 So a lease may be made for a certain number of years, if the lessee lives so long,97 if another person lives so long,98 if B shall continue parson of Dale,99 if the lessee,1 or his licensee, being of a specified character,2 continues to occupy the premises, or if the lessee continues in the lessor's service,3 and in such cases the tenancy will come to an end before the expiration of the term named, in case the lessee or other person dies, removes from the premises, or leaves the lessor's employment, as the case may be.
- (c) Option to terminate. Not infrequently the lessor is given the right to terminate the tenancy before the expiration of the term named, such a right being sometimes absolute in character,4 and sometimes authorizing him to terminate only for some particular reason, as when he desires the land for building purposes,5 or when he sells the land.6 Occasionally there is merely
96. See post Sec. 90.
97. Co. Litt. 45b, 214b; Hughes' Case, 13 Coke, 66; Sutton v. Hiram Lodge, 83 Ga. 770, 6 L. R. A. 703, 10 S. E. 585.
98. Randle v. Lory, 6 Adol. & El. 218.
99. Sheppard's Touchstone, 274.
1. Doe d. Lockwood v. Clarke, 8 East 185.
2. Kehoe v. Marquess of Lans-downe , App. Cas. 451.
3. Marmet Co. v. Archibald, 37
W. Va. 778, 17 S. E. 299; Wren-ford v. Gyles, Cro. Eliz. 643.
4. See, e. g., Zantzinger v. Joseph, 43 App. Cas. (D. C.) 542; Wisner v. Richards, 62 Wash. 429, Ann. Cas. 1912D 160, 113 Pac. 1090.
5. Hodgkins v. Price, 137 Mass. 13; Russell v. Coggins, 8 Ves. Jr. 34.
6. Harrison v. Pinkney, 6 Ont. app. 225; Cooper v. Gambill, 146 Ala. 184, 40 So. 827; Jones v. Shib-ley, 113 Ark. 598, 166 S. W. 937; a stipulation on the part of the lessee to give up posses sion on demand or notice,7 a character of provision which, if construed as a covenant merely, cannot well operate to terminate the tenant's estate.8 If such a provision operates to terminate the tenant's estate on de mand by the lessor, it would seem to be something more than a covenant.8a The theory on which even an option to terminate the tenancy is to be regarded as operative, whether as a special limitation,9 a condition,10 or as a "power of revocation"11 has but seldom been the subject of judicial discussion, and it should perhaps be regarded as a question of the construction of the language used in each particular case. A provision terminating the tenancy on a sale by the landlord would seem to operate to terminate it on a sale being made, regardless of the desire of the vendor or of the vendee to the contrary,12 unless the provision can be construed
Molyon v. Carroll, 91 Conn. 642, 100 Atl. 1057; Wallace v. Bahl-horn, 68 Mich. 87, 35 N. W. 834; Lunke v. Egeland, 46 Mont. 403, 128 Pac. 610; Morton v. Weir, 70 N. Y. 247; Johnston v. King, 83 Wis. 8, 54 N. W. 28.
7. See Doe d. Wilson v. Phillips, 2 Bing. 13; Dennison v. Read, 33 Ky. (3 Dana) 586; Wheeler v. Dascomb, 57 Mass. (3 Cush.) 285; Sloan v. Cantrell, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.) 571; Bergland v. Frawley, 72 Wis. 559, 40 N. W. 372.