While certain words are said to be appropriate for the creation of a condition, such as "on condition," "provided," "so that,"94 no particular words are required, it being purely a question of the intention of the grantor or testator as gathered from the whole instrument.95 Nor does the presence of such conditional words necessarily create a condition.96 A reservation of the right of reentry in a particular event will usually render the estate one on condition subsequent97 as may a provision that in a particular event the property shall revert to

93. Post Sec. 290(d).

94. Litt. Sec.Sec. 328-331; Porting-ton's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35a, 41b; Mahoning County v. Young, 16 U. S. App. 253. See Papst v. Hamilton, 133 Cal. 631, 66 Pac. 10; Gray v. Blanchard, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 284; Jackson v. Allen, 3 Cow. (N. Y.) 220; Gilbert v. Peteler, 38 N. Y. 168; Raley v. Umatilla County, 15 Ore. 172, 3 Am. St. Rep. 142.

95. Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall, (U. S.) 119, 166, 18 L. Ed. 502; Fitzgerald v. Modoc County, 164 Cal. 493, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1229, 129 Pac. 794; Sumner v. Darnell, 128 Ind. 38, 13 L. R. A. 173, 27 N. E. 162; Birmingham v. Lesan, 77 Me. 494, 1 Atl. 151; In re Stick-ney's Will, 85 Ind. 79, 60 Am. St. Rep. 308; Hapgood v. Houghton, 22 Pick. (Mass.) 480; Parmelee v. Oswego & S. R. Co., 6 N. Y. 74; Watters v. Bredin, 70 Pa. St. 235; Perkins v. Kirby, 35 R. I. 84, 85 Atl. 648.

96. Goodman v. Saltash, L. R.

7 App. Cas. 633; Scovill v. Mc-Mahon, 62 Conn. 378, 21 L. R. A. 58, 36 Am. St. Rep. 350, 26 Atl. 479; Self v. Billings, 139 Ga. 400, 77 S. E. 562; Koch v. Streuter, 232 111. 594, 83 N. E. 1072; Ditch-ey v. Lee, 167 Ind. 267, 78 N. E. 972; Brady v. Gregory, 49 Ind. App. 355, 97 N. E. 452; Carroll County Academy v. Gallatin Academy Co., 104 Ky. 621, 47 S. W. 617; Frenchville, Inhabitants of, v. Gagnon, 112 Me. 245, 91 Atl. 951; Skinner v. Shepard, 130 Mass. 180; Mills v. Davison, 54 N. J. Eq. 659, 35 L. R. A. 113, 55 Am. St. Rep. 594, 35 Atl. 1072; Post v. Weil, 115 N. Y. 361, 5 L. R. A. 422, 12 Am. St. Rep. 809, 22 N. E. 145; Portland v. Terwilli-ger, 16 Ore. 465, 16 Pac. 90; Greene v. O'Connor, 18 R. I. 56, 19 L. R. A. 262, 25 Atl. 692.

97. Litt. Sec.Sec. 329, 330; Attorney General v. Merrimac Mfg. Co., 14 Gray (Mass.) 612; Kew v. Trainor, 150 111. 150, 37 N. E. 223, aff g the grantor98 or the instrument shall be void.99An agreement by a lessee to relinquish possession upon a contingency named has been regarded as not creating a condition.1

A condition subsequent may, by the common law authorities, be created on a transfer of a fee simple, or on an assignment of one's entire interest in a term of years, it not being necessary that the transferor have a reversion in order to support the right of re-entry.2 In one state, however, a different view has been taken, it being considered that the right of re-entry should exist only as an incident to an estate which it is designed to protect.3

- Oral condition. There are several decisions to

50A. 629; Winn v. State, 55 Ark. 360, 18 S. W. 375.

In Braddy v. Elliott, 146 N. C. 578, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1121, 125 Am. St. Rep. 523, 60 S. E. 507, it is said that the express reservation of a right of re-entry is necessary, but this is certainly not in accord with the cases generally.

98. Sheppard's Touchstone 125; Johnston v. Los Angeles, - Cal. -, 168 Pac. 1047; Moss v. Chap-pell, 126 Ga. 196, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 398, 54 S. E. 968; Latham v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 253 111. 93, 97 N. E. 254; Fay v. Locke, 201 Mass. 387, 131 Am. St. Rep. 402, 87 N. E. 753; Munroe v. Syracuse, L. S. & N. R. Co., 200 N. Y. 224, 21 Ann. Cas. 594, 93 N. E. 516; White v. Britton, 75 S. C. 428, 56 S. E. 232; Perry v. Smith, -Tex. Civ. App. -, 198 S. W. 1013; Potomac Power Co. v. Bur-chell, 109 Va. 676, 64 S. E. 982; Donnelley v. Eastes, 94 Wis. 390, 69 N. W. 157; But see Robinson v. Ingram, 126 N. C. 327, S5 S. E.

612.

99. Merrifield v. Cobleigh, 4 Cush. (Mass.) 178; Minneapolis Threshing Mach. Co. v. Hanson, 101 Minn. 260, 118 Am. St. Rep. 623, 112 N. W. 217; Randall v. Wentworth, 100 Me. 177, 60 Atl. 871.

1. Doe d. Willson v. Phillips, 2 Bing. 13; Dennison v. Read, 3 Dana (Ky.) 586; Wheeler v. Das-comb, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 285; Sloan v. Cantrell, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 571; Bergland v. Frawley, 72 Wis. 554, 40 N. W. 372. But see, as suggesting a contrary view, Simons v. Marshall, 3 G. Green, (Iowa) 502; Walker v. Dowling 24 Ky. L. Rep. 179, 68 S. W. 135; Chute v. Washburn, 44 Minn. 312; 46 N. W. 555.

2. Litt. Sec. 325; Co. Litt. 202a; Freeman v. Bateman, 2 Barn. & Ald. 168, Van Rensselaer v. Ball, 19 N. Y. 100.

3. Ohio Iron Co. v. Auburn Iron Co., 64 Minn. 404, 67 N. W. 221.

Real Property.

[ Sec. 79 the effect that if an estate is created by a written instrument, evidence of an oral condition subsequent cannot be introduced, as this would involve a violation of the "parol evidence rule," so called.4 An oral condition precedent appears to stand differently in this regard from an oral condition subsequent. It is generally recognized that, even though the parties to a transaction have incorporated their agreement in a writing, it may be shown orally that the writing is not to be effective until the happening of a certain contingency.5 And the application of this principle to the case of a lease or other conveyance of land,6 would result in effect in the establishment by oral evidence of a condition precedent to the passing of an estate by force of a written instrument.